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Abstract
Ever since Descartes, many of us have not questioned the assumption that the knowledge
we are able obtain from accessing our own mental states is a priori in nature since we can access
these states outside of experience. Content Externalism has called that assumption into question,
it carries the implication that our mental states necessarily depend on particular objects and
events that exist in our external environment for at least part of their content. Some philosophers
believe that this principle of Privileged Access is inherently incompatible with Content
Externalism. Others are convinced that both must be true and compatibility must be possible.
This thesis explores arguments from both sides and highlights the merits and disadvantages of
each. The paper concludes with the argument that a theory developed by Sarah Sawyer presents
the best solution to incompatibility problems.
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Chapter I
For centuries there has been a Cartesian perspective of the mind which has influenced our
beliefs about how we access the content of our own thoughts. Despite the many flaws in
Descartes’ arguments which led to the development of this Cartesian perspective of the mind,
some key features describing our access to our thoughts can be extracted from those arguments
which the majority people believe are undeniable. These features are that we are able to access
the content of our thoughts without the need for empirical investigation and that no one is in a
better position than ourselves to judge whether we are correct in our assessment of that content.
The former feature is often described as a priori, or direct, knowledge and the latter is described
as authoritative knowledge. While we may not be able to prove beyond a doubt that we have this
kind of ‘privileged access’ to our thoughts, the fact that people seem to access the content of
their thoughts in this way on a daily basis is enough to justify our belief in it.
Now this belief in a privileged access to our own thoughts would have become something
to be just taken on faith if it wasn’t for the fact that it creates a conflict when combined with
another theory that the majority of people also believe to be true. This theory is Content
Externalism which dictates that at least some of the content of our ‘wide’ mental states
necessarily depend on some relation it bears to the external environment. It is reasonable to
believe that any concepts we have which pertain to objects to the external environment will have
obtained their content from those objects in the external environment. Therefore it feels safe to
assume that the content of any thoughts we have using those concepts must have been derived
from the relations the concepts bear to their referents in the external environment. The problem
only ensues when we consider the idea that if we are able to know our thoughts and their content

2
without having to do empirical investigation then it appears that it is possible for us to have a
priori knowledge of contingent facts about our external environment. In other words, as long as
we assume content externalism is true and we do actually have a privileged access to our own
thoughts then seems to be the case that we can have knowledge without empirical investigation
which should only be obtainable through empirical investigation.
Many philosophers have developed arguments in attempts to solve the problem while
others drew up counter-arguments for why they either did not or could not solve the problem.
The philosophers in the former category are called ‘Compatibilists’ while those in the latter
category are called ‘Incompatibilists’. The purpose of this thesis is to present the best arguments
put forth from both sides and analyze their strengths and weaknesses. The ultimate goal is to
figure out if any argument sufficiently navigates around the problems that are created when we
combine content externalism and privileged access without sacrificing essential components of
either one.
Most Compatibilist arguments usually end up proceeding by assuming a different version
of either content externalism or privileged access than was in place when the conflict originated.
As long as the version being assumed of either content externalism or privileged access is
consistent with our intuitions that led us to believe in their truth in the first place then this would
not be an issue. However, most of these alternate versions lack that consistency. The arguments
which use a different version of privileged access usually result in only having a priori
knowledge to a portion of the content of our thoughts or even just to the fact that a thought has
occurred without knowing any of its content. In turn, the arguments which use a different version
of content externalism usually loosen the hold that the external environment has on the content
of our concepts. The reason these types of arguments are unacceptable is because they don’t
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solve the same problem that was originally created. Using a different version of content
externalism or privileged access to circumvent the issue is basically the same thing as being an
Incompatibilist because you are essentially admitting that the two cannot work together as they
currently stand so one must be changed.
The second chapter of this thesis begins with an incompatibilist argument by Michael
McKinsey. Even though Tyler Burge and Donald Davidson wrote on the subject prior to the
development of McKinsey’s argument, he deserves to be discussed first because his argument
was strong enough to draw the attention of the majority of compatibilist arguments that were
developed after the publication of his paper, “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access”(1991).
The following chapter pertains to Anthony Brueckner whose paper, “What an Anti-Individualist
knows A Priori”(1992), is a direct response to McKinsey’s paper. In Chapter 4 we finally arrive
at the views of Donald Davidson and Tyler Burge whose respective papers, “Knowing One’s
Own Mind”(1987) and “Individualism and Self-Knowledge”(1988), were written prior to
McKinsey’s paper but present compatibilist arguments which apply to McKinsey’s
incompatibilist argument. Both author’s compatibilist arguments appear strong until we consider
Paul Boghossian’s arguments in his paper, “Content and Self-Knowledge”(1989). Although this
paper was written prior to McKinsey’s, Boghossian’s arguments in it go into much more detail
than McKinsey as to why the kind of self-knowledge that is supposed to result from privileged
access is a problem when we assume content externalism. As a result many compatibilist
arguments were developed to address the problems presented by Boghossian. Following the
chapter on Boghossian we consider such arguments from Kevin Falvey, Joseph Owens, Andre
Gallois, and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio. Arguments from each of these authors take a unique
perspective on the issue at hand but in one way or another they alter crucial features of either
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content externalism or privileged access which are indispensible without changing the debate
altogether. For this reason we ultimately end up with arguments present by Sarah Sawyer whose
theory takes an unforeseen approach of embracing a conclusion that most people consider
absurd. It is through Sawyer that we will find the theory with the best potential for solving this
whole problem altogether.
As we proceed through each chapter I discuss each author’s arguments as they presented
them in their respective papers. After each argument is fully developed it is put up against
whatever incompatibilist arguments are the most relevant to see how it handles the problem they
create. Lastly I illustrate the weak points of the argument and assess its strength in being a
potential solution to the compatibility problem. While every argument has its own merits, it is
safe to assume that up until the chapter on Sawyer there will be significant problems with each
argument. However, even in insufficient arguments there are sometimes features which are
adopted by others and make contributions to the development of new arguments. It is for this
reason that many authors were included in this project despite their individual arguments lacking
any potential towards being a solution.
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Chapter II
In his paper, “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Michael McKinsey paints a
picture of Privileged Access by first starting with its Cartesian origins and moving forward to the
more uncontroversial version commonly accepted today. He defines a priori knowledge as
knowledge obtained independently of empirical investigation and Privileged Access as the
principle that it is possible to have such knowledge of one’s own neutral cognitive attitude states.
(McKinsey 175) McKinsey believes that the intuition that pushes us to accept Privileged Access
as an unquestionable principle is just an apparition of the mind. He refers to Tyler Burge’s use of
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment in Burge’s 1982 paper “Other Bodies” as reason to
believe that two individuals can be exactly the same internally and yet it is possible for them to
be in two distinct mental states. Any mental states which could fall into this category are to be
considered wide states as opposed to narrow because part of its content is determined by external
factors. McKinsey assumes that due to Burge’s position in “Other Bodies” he would advocate an
Anti-Individualist statement like the one below:
(B) Some neutral cognitive states that are ascribed by de dicto attitude sentences (e.g.,
‘Oscar is thinking that water is wet’) necessarily depend upon or presuppose the
existence of objects external to the person whom the state is ascribed.
Despite the apparent conflict between (B) and Privileged Access, in “Individualism and SelfKnowledge” Burge maintains the Anti-Individualist theory he promotes and Privileged Access
are compatible. For the remainder of the paper McKinsey dedicates his effort into showing that
both Burge and Donald Davidson, who shares a similar view, are wrong.
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It is obvious that the reason McKinsey decides to include a response to Davidson in his
paper is that Davidson claims that Incompatibilists are all making a particular mistake which
McKinsey does not believe any Incompatibilist has made so far. “Such philosophers make the
mistake, Davidson says, of inferring from the fact that a thought is identified or described by
relating it to something outside the head, that the thought itself must therefore be outside the
head and hence must be unavailable to privileged access.” (McKinsey 177) McKinsey claims
that he has yet to see any evidence that any Incompatibilist has made this mistake and the most
convincing reason for advocating Incompatibilism does not assume thoughts to exist outside the
head. Although McKinsey does not provide evidence for his own claim that the prominent
defenders of Incompatibilism aren’t making this mistake, his argument against Davidson hinges
on the fact that the version of Privileged Access Davidson is endorsing is too weak for even most
Compatibilists to accept. The crucial move in Davidson’s argument is to distinguish between
thoughts and their descriptions so that knowing a thought and knowing its description are two
different cases of knowledge. We could have a priori knowledge of a thought whose description
can only be known through empirical investigation. However, the description of a thought is
really just the content of a thought put into the form of a language. If the only knowledge we
have privileged access to is the existence of a thought we are currently having and not to its
meaning then this knowledge is very insubstantial. Surely no defender of Compatibilism wants to
claim that with an occurrence of a thought we can know a priori that it is occurring but in order
to come to know what the thought is about we have to do empirical investigation. Moreover,
McKinsey claims that under Davidson’s view we are not even in a privileged position to know
that the event is a mental state as opposed to a physical state. (McKinsey 177)
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Moving on to McKinsey’s assessment of Burge, McKinsey believes that Burge’s
Compatibility theory does not involve a weak version of Privileged Access like the version he
assumes that Davidson is defending. Instead he constructs his triad of propositions which he
claims Burge would argue for their consistency due to what he says in his paper, ‘Individualism
and Self-Knowledge’. The triad, to reiterate from Chapter 1, consists of the following
propositions:
(1) Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet.
(2) The proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is wet necessarily depends upon E.
(3) The proposition E cannot be known a priori, but only by empirical investigation.
Again, E is to be interpreted as an ‘external proposition’ which exhibits the relation between his
thought and whatever it is in the external environment that determines the content of the thought.
(McKinsey 178) McKinsey openly admits that the consistency of the propositions depends on
how we wish to interpret the dependency relation described in the second proposition. He
believes that the only reason Burge considers the triad consistent is because Burge interprets the
dependency relation as metaphysical necessity.
McKinsey’s reason for believing that this is the interpretation Burge uses is extracted
from an argument he uses that claims Incompatibilists are making the same mistake Descartes
made in his Meditations. Descartes believed that he could exist as a mind completely
independent from anything physical including physical reality because the existence of himself
as well as his thoughts were undeniable but the existence of his body and the physical universe
were not. Arnaud argued that Descartes was wrong because the asymmetry in the deniability of
the existence of those things can be present while everything that exists is physical in nature
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including Descartes mind and thoughts. While it is possible that Descartes could have been right
all along, if it is possible that Descartes or even just some his thoughts could not have existed
without certain physical objects existing then Descartes deduction of the possibility of existing as
a disembodied mind in a non-physical reality is invalid. Furthermore, knowledge that the
existence of Descartes or his thoughts depend on something physical in nature is something only
obtainable a posteriori. It is this last point that highlights the mistake Burge attributes to
Incompatibilists. The fact that the existence of a mental state depends on something physical
does not entail that one must know the dependency relation before it is possible to know the
mental state. Of all things we can claim to know a priori, the existence of ourselves as a ‘thinking
being’ seems to be the least controversial piece of knowledge to consider as a priori. Although it
is up for debate whether my existence depends on the existence of my parents, it is necessarily
the case that my existence depends on the fact that an egg was provided the second half of a
DNA sequence which resulted in the creation of my DNA sequence and initiated cellular
development. Surely is it possible to know a priori that I exist as a ‘thinking being’ without first
having to know the exact physical process that occurred which makes my existence possible. In
fact it must be possible since knowledge of that exact physical process is something only
knowable a posteriori.
McKinsey agrees that the triad is consistent under his interpretation of Burge’s theory.
Oscar may very well in fact know a priori he is thinking water is wet while the existence of that
thought depends on something physical. The dependency relation is characterized by the
proposition E which is only knowable a posteriori but since the dependency is metaphysical
entailment it does not need to be known before we can acquire knowledge of the thought. In this
case, E would be the proposition ‘that water exists’. Oscar does not need to have knowledge of
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this to think the thought because for all Oscar knows his thought was about an incorrect
statement. If water did not even exist it is still possible for Oscar to have the thought and know it
a priori. To deny this is on par with claiming that people who were orphaned as a child and
adopted by a family without them ever knowing do not know themselves or that they exist
because their existence metaphysically entails that their biological parents existed and they have
no knowledge of their biological parents’ existence.
However, McKinsey wants to argue that interpreting metaphysical entailment as the
dependency relation attributed to Anti-Individualism results in a different version of AntiIndividualism from the one developed by Putnam or even Burge himself. When it is
metaphysical entailment that determines whether a given mental state is a wide or narrow state, it
necessarily leads to the notion that nearly all of our mental states are wide states. (McKinsey
180) McKinsey turns Burge’s own argument against him by first stipulating the premise that it
may very well be possible that we could not exist without the existence of the specific pair of our
biological parents in the actual world. If metaphysical entailment is the dependency relation that
determines wide individuation then for us to be able to be in any mental state whatsoever
metaphysically entails the existence of our parents. This entails that every mental state that has
ever occurred in a human being is a wide state. Anti-Individualism would at once become both
fairly insignificant, because there aren’t any narrow states left to distinguish from wide states,
and hard to defend, because it instantly becomes a radical theory when it claims that every
mental state presupposes the existence of an external object. Radical theories are much easier for
opponents to object to since radical theories by nature are controversial.
The consequence of metaphysical entailment brought on Anti-Individualism is the reason
McKinsey believes Burge made a mistake when interpreting the dependency relation as
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metaphysical entailment. While it solved the problem of the apparent incompatibility between
Anti-Individualism and the Principle of Privileged Access, Burge did not foresee that his solution
made the concept of a narrow mental state an empty concept. McKinsey thinks that what Putnam
and Burge originally had in mind for wide states in Anti-Individualism, at least for Burge before
he wrote ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, had to do with the external implications of the
content of mental states and not their existence. (McKinsey 181) While the existence of our
mental states may depend on the existence of our biological parents, it is not necessarily the case
that the content of our mental states do as well. Arguments will always be made that the content
of our mental states presuppose their existence so transitively the content also depends on the
existence of our parents but arguments like these miss the point. The existence of a mental state
may depend on external objects that have no bearing on the meaning of the mental state and the
most that knowledge of the dependency relation would tell us is what made the occurrence of the
state possible. On the other hand, the content of a mental state is precisely what gives it meaning
and knowledge of the dependency relation it has to external objects will not only provide us with
knowledge of how the mental state was individuated but also knowledge of the existence of the
objects that determined its individuation. According to McKinsey, Putnam and Burge intended
the classification of a wide state to, “say something about what it means to say that a given
person is thinking that water is wet.” (McKinsey 181)
At this point McKinsey introduces his notion of conceptual implication as the correct
interpretation of the dependency relation. His definition of this notion is that, “a proposition p
conceptually implies a proposition q if and only if there is a correct deduction of q from p, a
deduction whose only premises other than p are necessary or conceptual truths that are knowable
a priori, and each of whose steps follows from previous lines by a self-evident inference rule of
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some adequate system of natural deduction.” (McKinsey 181) Disregarding theses extremely
strict standards, McKinsey refers to Putnam as a reason for the dependency relation to be
interpreted as conceptual implication because Putnam defined wide and narrow mental states in
terms of logical possibility. This combined with the fact that Putnam originally evoked wide and
narrow individuation as Cartesian concepts leads McKinsey to believe that a narrow state should
be defined as, “a state from which the existence of external objects cannot be deduced,” and
conversely a wide state should be defined as, “[a state] from which the existence of external
objects can be deduced.” (McKinsey 181) Here McKinsey provides a reinstatement of (B) from
the beginning of the paper where the only difference is the ‘necessarily depends upon or
presupposes’ is substituted with ‘conceptually implies’. However, when he does this the triad is
no longer consistent because the second premise states that Oscar can know E a priori when the
third proposition clearly states that E is only knowable a posteriori.
McKinsey considers an objection to his argument before concluding that AntiIndividualism conflicts with Privileged Access when Anti-Individualism is understood properly.
He points out another charge Burge makes against Incompatibilists about a mistake some of
them may be making. Burge believes some Incompatibilists have been assuming the proposition
below:
(4) Since the proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is wet necessarily depends
upon E, no one, including Oscar, could know that Oscar is thinking that water is wet
without first knowing E.
If Incompatibilists were making this assumption then Burge would be correct that they were
wrong but McKinsey is right in pointing out that this was actually an incorrect assumption on
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Burge’s part. Anyone who holds (4) to be true is appealing to closure principles which are
known to be false. McKinsey’s Incompatibility argument does not assume (4) because nowhere
is it required that E be known before the thought can be known. Instead his argument is that for it
to be possible to know the content of our thought a priori it must be possible to deduce a priori
from that knowledge the existence of the physical objects conceptually implicated by the content
of the thought. Since knowing the existence of anything physical a priori is an absurd conclusion,
either Anti-Individualism contains an inherent problem or the a priori nature of knowledge
obtained through Privileged Access is an illusion.
There are a few objections to McKinsey’s argument that should be considered before
moving on to the Compatibilists and their responses to McKinsey’s triad. First off, if we recall
the distinction between knowledge of the existence of a mental state and knowledge of the
content of a mental state from our discussion of Davidson, perhaps Burge did have metaphysical
entailment in mind for wide individuation but only the metaphysical entailment of the content of
the mental state and not of the existence of the mental state. In these terms it is not the case that
all of our mental states are wide states because the individuation of the states no longer
presupposes the conditions that make our own existence possible. The existence of our thought
may metaphysically entail the existence of our parents but the content of our thought does not
and it would be the metaphysical entailment of the content alone that matters for whether it is
determined a wide or narrow state. In this situation, narrow states would be the mental states
which do not utilize natural kind concepts because only natural kind concepts metaphysically
entail the existence of external objects.
Although there is another objection that can be made disregarding the idea that
metaphysical entailment can pertain to the content of a mental state just as conceptual
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implication it able to. The strict standard McKinsey sets up for conceptual implication cannot be
what Burge and Putnam had in mind for wide individuation either. In its most basic form, for a
state to be considered a wide state is simply to say that the content of our thought was
determined at least in part by an external object. We would be taking it a step further if we were
to say that knowing a priori we are in that state means that we can know the existence of an
external object a priori. There are at least three additional pieces of knowledge that must be
knowable a priori before the bridge between a priori knowledge of a mental state and the
existence of an external object can even begin to be constructed. First of all, we must be able to
know a priori that the state we are in is in fact a wide state. The possibility of our ability to
acquire even empirical knowledge that our mental state contains at least one natural kind concept
is a very controversial subject let alone a priori knowledge of it. Without knowledge that the
state is a wide state we can never be warranted in a deduction from knowledge of the state to the
existence of external objects. Secondly, we would also need to know a priori the hold that
Externalism has on wide mental states, specifically regarding the dependency relation. Even if
we can know a priori our mental state is a wide state we need to know that Externalism ensures
that if we have a natural kind concept we must have acquired the concept from interacting with
the natural kind object in the correct manner. While most philosophers agree that Externalism is
a conceptual truth and is knowable a priori, it is not the case that a majority of people who are
not philosophers have heard of Externalism and know it well enough to see it as a conceptual
truth. In order to know Externalism a priori one must have either encountered the concept at
some point in time or have the ability to develop the concept on one’s own outside of experience.
It is implausible to believe that even people who have this ability have done so because for such
a person inexperienced in philosophy an endeavor to take on such a development would take
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many, many years. The last piece of knowledge which is required for the deduction is a priori
knowledge of a system of logic and its self-evident inference rules. Even though this is the
easiest obstacle to overcome in terms of common consensus, it is true that arguments have been
made against the validity of the modus ponens inference rule which is considered by many
philosophers to be one of the most basic inference rules around today. I am not going to go over
this argument because I do think that modus ponens is a valid inference rule, but the crucial point
is that it is a required piece of knowledge which is far from being self-evident. These are three
pieces of knowledge which are required to move from a priori knowledge of a state to the
existence of external objects which seem to always to left out of the discussion especially on the
side of the Incompatibilists.
There is also the question to be asked as to whether McKinsey was correct about
conceptual implication when claiming that it must involve premises which are either known or
only knowable a priori? For instance, the existence of a triangular object conceptually implies
that the sum of its angles will be 180 degrees. However, unless someone has taught themselves
geometry completely outside of experience, then they will not be able to know the sum of its
angles without empirically investigating the object itself or the tenets of geometry. While every
human has the inherent capability to teach themselves geometry outside of experience upon
encountering the object, it seems unlikely that people with lower IQ’s will actually be able to
accomplish this feat. So it would seem that there is an important difference between a piece of
knowledge being knowable a priori and an individual person having the ability to come to know
it a priori. Just because something is knowable a priori for Einstein doesn’t mean that everyone
has the ability to know it a priori.

15
Lastly, there is a question that needs to be asked as to whether McKinsey’s definition of
conceptual implication is proper in the debate about the compatibility of Externalism and
Privileged Access? McKinsey’s proposed third proposition has it that however we wish to
interpret E, it will necessarily have to be something only knowable a posteriori if our ultimate
goal is to make the propositions in the McKinsey Argument consistent. However, the way
McKinsey defines conceptual implication ensures that whatever E is it will have to be something
knowable a priori. So McKinsey will be right that no matter how things are set up, conceptual
implication will always lead to the inconsistency of the triad. The only way to remedy this
problem is to object to his stipulated definition of conceptual implication. All that would do is
call for a whole new argument to be constructed because for any given argument its validity
cannot be guaranteed to remain constant when a substitution of definitions for a term contained
in the argument occurs. Therefore, McKinsey’s argument cannot be required to account for such
an objection since it would no longer be the same argument if a different definition for
conceptual implication were introduced. Even if McKinsey decides to respond, his response
would run along the lines of why the definition they are promoting isn’t correct and why his
definition is correct rather than actually making any substantial contribution to the compatibility
debate.
The trick is that McKinsey set everything up so that the only possible outcome is the
outcome he wanted rather than allowing for other possibilities and then proving them wrong. It
may very well turn out that McKinsey was right and it was a coincidence that the only apparent
possibility was that the triad is inconsistent because in actuality it is the only way things could
have been all along. However, if making progress in the debate is our overall goal then without
such foreknowledge, the idea of restricting all possibilities to the one McKinsey is trying to
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promote does not seems like a smart one. If we are trying to figure out whether E is only
knowable a priori or a posteriori then conceptual implication should allow for the possibility of
both and see which situation most resembles the way things actually are. If we are trying to
figure out whether McKinsey’s stipulated version of conceptual implication is how we should
interpret the dependency relation, then we should see what potential outcomes it leads to and
which outcome most resembles the way things actually are. Instead, McKinsey stipulated both
and expects it to be a proven truth that the triad in inconsistent when actually it does not prove
anything since the way he set it up does not allow things to happen any other way.
Despite all the problems with the McKinsey argument that I just discussed, one problem
remains for the Compatibilist. Even though reaching a priori knowledge of the external world
requires a lot of a priori knowledge that is up for debate as to whether we can actually obtain it a
priori, the idea that we are capable of obtaining a priori knowledge of the external world is a
serious problem. Before a Compatibilist can hope to completely defeat the McKinsey argument,
they must prove that this capability doesn’t exist or that it isn’t the problem it appears to be.
Since arguing that a priori knowledge of the external world is an unproblematic notion certainly
appears to be a futile endeavor, most Compatibilists aim at proving that we cannot acquire, in an
a priori fashion, the knowledge of the necessary or conceptual truths required to make the
deduction to a priori knowledge of the external world.
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Chapter III
Anthony Brueckner was one of the first to respond to the argument McKinsey presented
in his paper, “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access”. Brueckner starts his paper, “What an
Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori”, by pointing out that McKinsey’s argument is based on a
incorrect interpretation of the necessary dependence relation involved in Burge’s AntiIndividualism. As you recall from the previous chapters, the triad that McKinsey believes Burge
would hold consistent is as follows:
(1) Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet
(2) The proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is wet necessarily depends upon E
(3) The proposition E cannot be known a priori, but only by empirical investigation
Brueckner agrees with McKinsey in that the consistency of the triad depends on how we
interpret E. According to what McKinsey says in his paper, Brueckner assumes that McKinsey
would interpret E as E1 below:
(E1) Oscar inhabits an environment containing H2O and not XYZ
Using the only paper where Burge uses the terms ‘necessary dependence’, i.e. “Individualism
and Self-Knowledge”, Brueckner takes it that McKinsey’s attribution of (2) to Burge with E
being interpreted as E1 comes from a counterfactual proof. If E1 was false and Oscar’s
phenomenology, functional structure, behavior, etc., were held fixed, then some of the content of
Oscar’s thoughts would have been different from what they actually are. Therefore, the content
of the thought depends on E1. As you recall, McKinsey interprets the necessary dependence as
conceptual implication which he defines as “a proposition p conceptually implies a proposition q
if and only if there is a correct deduction of q from p, a deduction whose only premises other
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than p are necessary or conceptual truths that are knowable a priori, and each of whose steps
follows from previous lines by a self-evident inference rule of some adequate system of natural
deduction.” (McKinsey 181)
Brueckner fully concedes that when the necessary dependence in (2) is taken to be
conceptual implication under this definition and E is interpreted as E1, the triad will always be
inconsistent. However, Brueckner also points out that when (2) is interpreted as such it is not
something that an Anti-Individualist advancing Burge’s version of the theory is committed to
accept. Under Burge’s Anti-Individualism, one can accept (a), that Oscar would not have been
thinking that water is wet had he been in a Twin Earthly environment containing XYZ instead of
H2O, while rejecting (b), that every world in which Oscar thinks that water is wet is a world
containing H2O. The proposition (b) is a direct consequence of (2) when E is taken to be E1.
(Brueckner 200) The proposition (a) simply implies that in the specific situation we are
envisioning Oscar would not have had the thought he did had he been in a different environment
when it occurred while (b) is making a sweeping generalization that in any potential situation
that has, is, and will ever occur, we could never think a thought about H2O in an environment
that does not contain it. Even if we weren’t using conceptual implication, E1 has it that Oscar’s
ability to think the thought ‘water is wet’ necessarily depends on the fact that Oscar inhabits an
environment containing H2O.
Brueckner claims that Burge does in fact deny (b) in his paper, “Other Bodies”, which
McKinsey alludes to as one of the reasons why conceptual implication should be how we
interpret the necessary dependence. Brueckner does not explicate Burge’s denial in detail but he
claims that Burge is cautious when discussing conceptual implication because, “such questions
concern the possibility of a Kantian transcendental argument against skepticism proceeding from
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the assumption of anti-individualism about content.” (Brueckner 200) Essentially Brueckner is
claiming that Burge knew that conceptual implication as the necessary dependence inevitably has
the consequence that we can access a priori knowledge of the external world. Since knowledge
of this kind is impossible to have a priori, Burge knew to tread lightly when discussing the
conceptual implication of mental states.
Although this does not completely free Burge’s Anti-Individualism from the criticisms of
McKinsey because there is still a way to revive McKinsey’s argument without using E1 or
conceptual implication. Brueckner considers the objection that Burge’s thought experiment
involving Oscar allows for Oscar to have a priori knowledge of (2c) below:
(2c) If Oscar’s environment had been sufficiently different from the way it in fact is (for
example, if it had contained XYZ instead of H2O), then, even holding fixed Oscar’s
phenomenology, functional structure, behavior, etc., Oscar would not have been thinking
that water is wet.
From a priori knowledge of his thought ‘water is wet’ combined with a priori knowledge of (2c)
obtained through the thought experiment, Oscar can know a priori that his environment does not
contain XYZ. (Brueckner, 201) Brueckner responds to this objection by again claiming that (2c)
can be separated into two distinct propositions, (2c1) and (2c2) below:
(2c1) If Oscar’s environment had been sufficiently different from the way it in fact is,
then, even holding fixed Oscar’s phenomenology, functional structure, behavior, etc.,
Oscar would not have been thinking that water is wet.
(2c2) Oscar’s environment in fact contains H2O and not XYZ
The former can be known a priori while the latter cannot be known a priori and it is only with a
priori knowledge of the latter that we could be said to have a priori knowledge of the external
world.
So it seems that even if we interpret E as E1 and use conceptual implication as the
necessary dependence, Burge’s Anti-Individualism does inevitably entail the possibility of a
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priori knowledge of the external world. The only propositions that a Burgian Anti-Individualist
must potentially allow for a priori knowledge of is (2c1) which on its own does not allow for the
possibility of accessing a priori knowledge of the external world. Although, objecting to
McKinsey’s argument was not the only goal of Brueckner’s paper because even though it is no
longer the case that conceptual implication necessarily leads to the inconsistency of the triad,
Brueckner wants to figure out how we should correctly interpret the necessary dependence
factor. Brueckner alludes to “Other Bodies” to show that Burge does in fact argue that it is
possible for someone to have the concept of water in a world where there is no water or even if
water didn’t exist on any world. Though, in cases such as this we need reason to believe that it is
in fact a water concept rather than a twater concept or any other water counterfeit.
There are two possible ways through which someone can have a water concept in a
waterless world. The first is by acquiring the concept from a linguistic community which
obtained the concept through some members of the community theorizing about a liquid with the
chemical makeup H2O. The other possible way is that the person acquires the concept by
theorizing about a liquid with the chemical makeup H2O on their own, which accounts for the
possibility of having a water concept in a waterless world when the individual is alone in the
world. In both cases it is assumed that enough physical entities exist in the world so that whoever
is doing the theorizing can distinguish the concepts of those entities from their theoretical water
concept. (Brueckner 202) Through Brueckner’s interpretation of Burge’s claim about the
possibility of having a water concept in a waterless world, Brueckner was able to postulate (N)
below as the true characterization of the necessary dependence in (2):
(N) It is necessary that if Oscar is thinking that water is wet, then either (i) water exists,
or (ii) Oscar theorizes that H2O exists, or (iii) Oscar is part of a community of speakers
some of whom theorize that H2O exists.
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Through this characterization we are now in a better position to make an attempt at deducing
how we should interpret the necessary dependence relation that ensures either (i), (ii), or (iii)
must be the case if Oscar is able to have the thought in question. Is (N) true in virtue of
conceptual implication, metaphysical entailment, or something else? While Burge never answers
this question directly, Brueckner claims that Burge does not state once in the paper from which
(N) was extracted that the necessity he had in mind was conceptual and knowable a priori.
Brueckner also believes that since (ii) and (iii) pertain to how chemical theory reveals the nature
of water, Burge had intended (N) to be taken as a metaphysical necessity which is sometimes
only knowable a posteriori. Since (N) is a metaphysical necessity, Brueckner argues that Burge’s
Anti-Individualism does not require that (N) is knowable a priori despite the fact that it is
metaphysically entailed from a thought that is known a priori. (Brueckner 203)
Though Brueckner’s job is not done because there is an objection to his argument through
raising the question of whether Anti-Individualism or even just some parts of the theory can be
known a priori. For instance, even if (N) is not knowable a priori, it may be the case that the
proposition (P) below can be known a priori:
(P) It is necessary that if Oscar is thinking that water is wet, there exist some physical
entities distinct from Oscar.
While Brueckner suspends judgment as to whether (P) is knowable a priori, he admits that if it is
knowable a priori then this knowledge combined with a priori knowledge of a thought would
allow for a priori knowledge that the world, “contains physical entities sufficient to fix the
contents of his thoughts.” (Brueckner 204) The possibility of having a priori knowledge of (P) is
an extremely controversial claim, but Brueckner believes that it even if it is possible it will not be
a problem for Compatibilism. Combining a priori knowledge of (P) and the thought described in
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it would at most grant us a priori knowledge that some physical entity exists which is distinct
from us. McKinsey believes such knowledge is impossible but Brueckner thinks differently.
While such knowledge is implausible, Brueckner believes that to say it is impossible is to make
the claim that there could never be a successful Kantian transcendental argument. It is not the
case that just because so far no adequate Kantian transcendental argument has been offered the
existence of such an argument is impossible. It certainly possible that Transcendentalism is true
but it is an extremely hard theory to make a case for its truth. If McKinsey wants his claim, that a
priori knowledge of the existence of some physical entity distinct from oneself, to have any
traction he must provide a full-fledged rejection of Transcendentalism as a whole.
Even though Brueckner has backed McKinsey into a corner where the only way out is
through the complete rejection of Transcendentalism, his argument does not help the
compatibility cause very much. While Brueckner’s argument shows how difficult it would be to
make the move from a priori knowledge of our thought to a priori knowledge that a given entity
exists in our external environment, sacrifices were made along the way that force us to diminish
our intuitions about privileged access. When we have a thought about water, we know it is about
water and not some alternative concept because we know how we acquired our water concept
and the substance that our water concept refers to. We may not know that we actually interacted
with the substance as a natural kind in our external environment for the same reasons that we
cannot know whether the external environment we perceive through our senses is even real.
However, as long as we proceed on the assumption that in our perceptions of the external
environment we correctly perceive existing objects then we do actually know that our concept of
water used in our thought is of entities that exist in the external environment. Any compatibilist
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theory must be able to account for this if it is to be considered a potential solution to the problem
so Brueckner’s theory does not make the cut.
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Chapter IV
Donald Davidson is considered by many to play a very significant role in the
compatibility debate between Privileged Access and Anti-Individualism (Content Externalism).
While he does have much to say on the subject in general, his biggest contributions to this topic
are a few key ideas and thought experiments presented in his paper, “Knowing One’s Own
Mind”, as well as his overall argument for compatibility. These ideas were eventually adopted
and used by other authors who proceeded to make big steps toward a Compatibilist solution. The
most significant of Davidson’s ideas is without a doubt his introduction of first- and secondorder mental states. Many authors, including Tyler Burge, Kevin Falvey, and Joseph Owens,
have used the concepts of first- and second-order mental states directly in their proposed
solutions despite the fact that Davidson never explicitly uses those terms himself. Later on in this
chapter we will discuss Tyler Burge’s Basic Self-Knowledge which uses the nature of secondorder mental states to develop a set of self-verifying self-knowledge. As we will see when we get
to the chapter on Paul Boghossian, Davidson’s own argument for compatibility doesn’t come
close to addressing all the problems associated with the apparent incompatibility of Privileged
Access and Anti-Individualism. However, his ideas did help others develop arguments which
have addressed many more of the problems that Davidson’s argument missed and have even
been considered by some to have solved the whole problem altogether.
Before getting into Davidson’s ideas, thought experiments, and arguments, there is one
other significant contribution that Davidson made to the debate and that is providing one of the
clearest illustrations of the initial compatibility problem. It all comes down to the fact that our
method of determining what other people think is by gathering evidence based on their behavior
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and our knowledge of the person. However, our methods for determining what is going on in our
own mind rarely involve the use of evidence even when it is readily available. “It is seldom the
case that I need or appeal to evidence or observation in order to find out what I believe; normally
I know what I think before I speak or act. Even when I have evidence, I seldom make use of it.”
(Davidson 87) Perhaps all that means is that most people have been conditioned by the external
world to give the concept of evidence more weight than it deserves. However, what is more
likely is that it should cause us to question the way we actually do know our own minds.
Disregarding a drastic paradigm-changing discovery such as finding out what we think
we know of our own minds is just an illusion, we can be extremely sure that we do know our
own minds. Whether or not our knowledge of our own minds is a priori or infallible is still up for
questioning, but the fact that when we have a thought we know we are having that thought seems
pretty undeniable. Furthermore, we can come to know what we are thinking in the absence of or
prior to any evidence being available. On the other hand, to even be able to attempt to know the
minds of others we must use evidence and without any evidence to use we are completely unable
to make any determination. All the while it is almost universally accepted that the knowledge of
our own minds determined without evidence is more reliable than the knowledge of other
people’s minds determined with evidence. “It is a strange idea that claims made without
evidential or observational support should be favored over claims with such support.” (Davidson
88) It is important to note that Davidson believes we can be mistaken about our own thoughts so
we are not infallible when it comes to knowing our own minds. However, even this addition does
not change our intuition that our knowledge of our own minds which usually lacks evidential
support seems more reliable than our knowledge of the minds of others which requires evidential
support.

26
One unique point made by Davidson is that if/when we are ever wrong about what is in
our own minds then it cannot be that we were led astray by incorrect evidence. Although, he
doesn’t address the fact that we probably could claim that the error was at least in part due to a
lack of evidence. Regardless, we tend to be correct about our own minds with a lack of evidence
and there seems to be no reason why we should trust claims made without evidence more than
we trust claims made with evidence. According to Davidson, this all comes down to a question;
“Setting aside, then, self-deception and other anomalous or borderline phenomena, the question
is whether we can, without irrationality, inconsistency, or confusion, simply and
straightforwardly think we have a belief we do not have, or think we do not have a belief we do
have.” (Davidson 90) This quote will also be important later because it is one of the two places
where Davidson’s concept of second-order mental states can be extracted.
Hilary Putnam presented what seems to be the biggest obstacle to overcome in answering
this question with his Twin Earth though experiment. By this point we know Twin Earth all too
well so we know that Putnam argued that what words mean depend on more than ‘what is in the
head’ and therefore the meaning of our thoughts using those words will depend on the same
factors which cannot be found within us. Davidson offers the best description of the problem at
hand:
“Putnam holds that many philosophers have wrongly assumed that psychological states
like belief and knowing the meaning of a word are both (I) ‘inner’ in the sense that they
do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom the state
is ascribed, and (II) that these are the very states which we normally identify and
individuate as we do beliefs and the other propositional attitudes. Since we normally
identify and individuate mental states and meaning in terms partly of the relations to
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objects and events other than the subject, Putnam believes (I) and (II) come apart: In his
opinion, no states can satisfy both conditions.” (Davidson 91-92)
Davidson states here that the ultimate purpose of his paper is to show that ordinary mental states
can and often do satisfy both conditions (I) and (II). For Davidson, a mental state of belief can be
‘inner’ by being identical to a state of the body which occurs within the body and thus be
identified without referencing anything outside the body. At the same time this belief has a
meaning through its content which is ‘nonindividualistic’ due to the fact that at least part of its
meaning was derived from the external environment and thus identified in part by its relations to
things within the external environment. (Davidson 92)
This brings us to the sunburn thought experiment which is one of the significant
contributions that Davidson has made to the debate. One of the reasons that Burge doesn’t think
an ordinary mental state can satisfy both (I) and (II) is because of Putnam’s distinction between
‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ psychological states. According to Putnam, narrow psychological states are
mental states which do not refer to anything in the external environment while wide
psychological states are those that do. Davidson believes that Putnam’s reason for making such a
distinction rests on two “largely unquestioned assumptions”:
(1) If a thought is identified by a relation to something outside the head, it isn’t wholly in the
head.
(2) If a thought isn’t wholly in the head, it can’t be ‘grasped’ by the mind in the way required by
the first person authority. (Davidson 102)
Since ‘narrow’ psychological states are a very small set of all the mental states to which our
intuitions tell us that we have privileged access, Davidson wants to object to (1). “It should be
clear that it doesn’t follow, simply from the fact that meanings are identified in part by relations
to objects outside the head, that meanings aren’t in the head. To suppose this would be as bad as
to argue that because my being sunburned presupposes the existence of the sun, my sunburn isn’t
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a condition of my skin.” (Davidson 103) If we were to take two people with physically identical
skin conditions where one was caused by sunburn and the other by some other means then one
presupposes the existence of an external object while the other either doesn’t presuppose the
existence of any external object or at the very least it presupposes the existence of a different
object. This shows that it’s possible for two people to be in physically identical states despite the
causes and meanings behind those states being different. For this reason Davidson argues that we
should view all psychological states in the same way. In the hypothetical scenario where two
people have brain states which are physically identical, there is no reason to think that the
content of the mental states associated to their respective brain states can’t refer to distinct
objects in the external environment. “Individual states and events don’t conceptually presuppose
anything in themselves; some of their descriptions may, however.” (Davidson 103)
The sunburn thought experiment does provide an argument for how (I) and (II) can both
be satisfied by an ordinary mental state. As long as ‘inner’ in (I) is defined as being identical to a
state of the body and not identified by referring to objects or events outside the body then the fact
that they don’t conceptually presuppose the existence of external objects allows them to satisfy
(I). In the sunburn experiment even though the causes of each person’s skin conditions were
different, the conditions in themselves were physically identical and both identifiable without
reference to anything outside of the body. However, once we focus on the descriptions of the
skin conditions, which would include their causal histories, then we find that the description of at
least one of them presupposes an external object. For ordinary mental states, to describe them is
essentially to state their meaning or content which is why we usually feel like our mental states
in themselves are identified in part by the relations to external objects which give them their
content. The states themselves do not presuppose anything but it is hard for us to imagine our
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mental states without their content because we seem to always know the content of our mental
states the instant they occur. So ordinary mental states when considered separately from their
content satisfy (I) but the fact that they have content which almost always have relations to
external objects or events ensures that they satisfy (II).
Even though Davidson has at this point accomplished what he stated was the purpose of
paper, he still hasn’t explained how we can have privileged access to the content of our mental
states and not just to the fact that they have occurred within us. This is what Davidson’s
compatibility argument is meant to solve. Throughout the paper Davidson makes claims that we
shouldn’t view the content of our mental states as ‘objects’ which are supposed to be ‘before the
mind’ or ‘grasped’ by it. (Davidson 107) He brings back his sunburn thought experiment by
explaining that a ‘sunburn expert’ who inspects the two people’s skin conditions could not,
through inspection alone, determine which is the actual sunburn and which is the one caused by
other means. By analogy, without empirical investigation we can know that a mental state is
occurring within us but we cannot know the description or meaning of the state. According to
Davidson, when we view the content of our mental states as objects which play a role in the
individuation of our mental states we cannot know the identity of the states without knowing the
object that is its content. In turn, we cannot know the object without knowing what determines
the identity of the object. “For if it to be in a state of mind is for the mind to be in some relation
like grasping to an object, then whatever helps determine what object is it must equally be
grasped if the mind is to know what state it is in.” (Davidson 106) As long as we view the
content of our mental states as objects in this way then it seems impossible that we could ever
know the content of our mental states. “For unless one knows everything about the object, there
will always be senses in which one does not know what object it is” (Davidson 108)
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Davidson’s solution for this problem is that we stop viewing the content as objects and
instead we should identify them in part by their causal history. The way in which we learned our
concepts and what has prompted us to apply them is what identifies our mental states that use
them. It is not the case that in order to know the content of our thoughts that we must know
everything there is to know about the concepts we utilize in those thoughts because that would
include knowing how people in our social environment use the word and the referents of those
concepts in the external world. In other words, when we do not see the content of our mental
states as objects it is no longer the case that we must know everything about the concepts which
play a role in the content before we can be said to have knowledge of the content.
Davidson’s compatibility argument does offer a lot to the compatibilist position; as we
will see later on it does resemble Sarah Sawyer’s compatibility argument which I believe does
actually solve the problem altogether. However, Davidson’s argument has the consequence that
virtually no one’s concepts could be the same because no two people would have the same causal
history for their concepts even if they carry the same label. The reason we commonly thought of
the content of our mental states as objects was because we wanted to know that when two people
used the same word that they are referring to the same concept. This by no means proves that
Davidson’s argument is wrong because it may very well turn out that we think we understand
each other when in reality everyone just talks to each other in their own unique languages which
happen to have similar words. However, if Davidson is right then without further development of
his argument to account for this then we are really just substituting one problem for another.
The biggest contribution that Davidson has made to this debate is something that he never
explicitly states but other authors do and use it in their theories directly. This contribution is the
idea of first- and second-order mental states. There are two quotes in this paper form which this
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idea can be extracted. “Setting aside, then, self-deception and other anomalous or borderline
phenomena, the question is whether we can, without irrationality, inconsistency, or confusion,
simply and straightforwardly think we have a belief we do not have, or think we do not have a
belief we do have.” (Davidson 90) “In general, the belief that one has a thought is enough to
justify that belief.” (Davidson 88) As we will see when discussing Tyler Burge, his postulation
of ‘Basic Self-Knowledge’ seems to be directly drawn from the latter quote. Essentially for
Burge, Basic Self-Knowledge is a second-order propositional attitude like judgment or belief
whose object is a first-order thought occurring simultaneously. Burge believes Basic SelfKnowledge cannot be wrong because the occurrence of a second-order judgment like ‘I judge
that I am thinking water is wet’ is self-verifying. To judge or believe that we have a thought is
enough to make the judgment true because making the judgment or forming the belief ensure
that we are having the thought.
Up until this point no one had been discussing different levels of thought being involved
in the process of how we come to know the content of our thoughts. Davidson himself never
actually wrote about it explicitly either. Instead, he just focused on thoughts and beliefs which
happened to fall into the category that was later titled ‘second-order mental states’. However,
years after Davidson wrote this paper Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens wrote a paper titled,
‘Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism’, which is the topic of a later chapter. In that
paper, Falvey and Owens develop an argument for why we can have introspective knowledge to
the content of our thoughts based on the nature of second-order states. Their argument is that
since the concepts of our first-order mental states are derived from the external environment and
our second-order mental states draw their concepts directly from the first-order states, some
concepts we would normally consider to be relevant alternatives to other concepts are not
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actually relevant because we could not have the former concepts in certain environments. This
will be explained more in the chapter on Falvey and Owens but the crucial point is that the whole
concept of second-order mental states plays an essential role in arguments being developed many
years after Davidson wrote his paper.
When it comes to the compatibility debate between Anti-Individualism and Privileged
Access, Donald Davidson is like the Bob Dylan to Rock and Roll. He was a major influence to
many that followed him, especially to the compatibilists, but he never received the credit that he
deserved. Davidson’s overall argument came the closest to an actual solution to the whole
problem but the way he presented it didn’t make it very appealing to readers because it was
vague, a bit confusing, and highlighted its weaknesses rather than obscuring them. Despite the
errors, however, his influence can be seen all the way to Sarah Sawyer which is, in my opinion,
where the road of this debate ends. So instead of focusing on how much progress Davidson has
lent to the compatibility cause himself, we should focus on his ideas that others adopted and
made progress in the cause through their development.
In his paper, “Individualism and the Mental”, Tyler Burge developed an antiindividualistic theory concerning the individuation of mental states which, through some
interpretations of the theory, had serious implications pertaining to the potential knowledge we
can acquire about our mental states. We can assume that Burge was unaware of these
implications while writing the paper because a few years later he began writing “Individualism
and Self-Knowledge” as an attempt to explicate the problem generated by his theory and offer a
potential solution to the problem.
Burge states that the problem is created when one combines his Anti-Individualism
regarding the individuation of mental states with a restricted Cartesian perspective of Self-
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Knowledge, which essentially boils down to a version of the Principle of Privileged Access.
Despite all the problems with Descartes’s views of Self-Knowledge, there are two features we
can trace to him which seem to be undeniable. These two features are the directness and certainty
in which we come to know our own mental states compared to how we come to know the mental
states of others. When some of the content of our mental states is determined by the external
environment, it is difficult to see how we can have the ability to know our mental states and their
content with the directness and certainty that we appear to have without first investigating the
external environment. Although Burge’s main goal in his paper is neither to explain nor defend
his anti-individualism or the restricted Cartesian conception of Self-Knowledge. (Burge 111)
Instead he wants to make the problem that occurs when the two are combined visible and then
offer a class of Self-Knowledge, which he labels ‘Basic Self-Knowledge’, with certain
characteristics that allow us to know them with the directness and certainty required by the
restricted Cartesian perspective of Self-Knowledge without conflicting with his theory of AntiIndividualism. While basic self-knowledge does not completely solve the problem because it
only accounts for a small sub-set of all mental states, it identifies a class of self-knowledge
which must be true and thus knowable a priori. It puts the ball in the court of the Incompatibilist
to explain how we can’t know them a priori because it leads to a priori knowledge of the external
world.
Burge derives his prime examples of basic self-knowledge from Descartes’s famous
cogito argument. The force of the argument is drawn from the idea that my ability to think that I
exist allows me to know that I do exist because I would not be able to think about my existence,
or think about anything for that matter, if I did not actually exist. Since our own existence is
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necessary for us to have the ability to think about our existence, any occurrence of a thought ‘I
exist’ is necessarily true and thus knowable a priori.
Burge takes this paradigm and applies it to our propositional attitudes. Two examples that
he gives are, ‘I think (with this very thought) that writing requires concentration’ and ‘I judge (or
doubt) that water is more common than mercury’. (Burge 111-112) The propositions ‘writing
requires concentration’ and ‘water is more common than mercury’ may or may not be true
independent of a person’s attitude towards them. However, when a person is thinking the
proposition ‘water is more common than mercury’ and then develops the propositional attitude ‘I
judge that water is more common than mercury’, the propositional attitude must be true because
the act of making the judgment ensures its truth. The only way that the propositional attitude
wouldn’t be true is if the person’s mental state characterized by that exact propositional attitude
did not occur. Just like Descartes’s cogito, the existence of the mental state pertaining to the
judgment ensures that the judgment itself is true. The same goes for thoughts about the
proposition ‘writing requires concentration’. The proposition itself may not be true because it is
possible that some people have the ability to write without concentrating. Regardless, when
someone has the thought ‘I think (with this very thought) that writing requires concentration’ the
truth of the individual proposition ‘writing requires concentration’ makes no difference to the
truth of the thought because the act of thinking the thought alone ensures that it is true.
Later on in his paper, Burge offers a more detailed description of basic self-knowledge in
terms of first and second-order mental states which he borrows from Davidson. Essentially basic
self-knowledge takes the form of a second-order judgment whose content is a first-order thought.
While having a first-order thought we, at the very same time, think about the thought as our own.
According to Anti-Individualism, the content of the first-order thought is derived from the
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external environment and locked into the conditions from which it was acquired. As an example
we can take the commonly used thought ‘Water is wet’ to represent the first-order thought.
Second-order judgments have a reflexive and self-referential nature in that upon having the
thought ‘Water is wet’ we simultaneously judge in ourselves that ‘I am thinking that water is
wet’. (Burge 122) This second-order judgment is self-referential because we are truly just
thinking the same first-order thought occurring within us but we think of it as our own thought
and not just as concepts acquired from the external environment that we put together in a way
that represents that environment. The second-order judgment is also reflexive because the very
act of having the first-order thought naturally causes us to think that we are having that firstorder thought and therefore judge ourselves to be thinking it. Since the content of the first-order
thought is contained within itself, that content is transferred to the content of the second-order
judgment because the object of reference for the second-order judgment is the first-order thought
itself. (Burge 121)
It is worth pointing out that some would argue that basic self-knowledge can only avoid
the problem of being a priori knowledge about contingent facts of the external environment if the
content contained in the first-order thought is closed off from our awareness at the second-order
level. This is something Burge does not address because his purpose with basic self-knowledge
is not to definitively solve the compatibility problem between Privileged Access and AntiIndividualism, but rather to label a class of knowledge which could be compatible and leave it to
Incompatibilists to say why it isn’t compatible. This objection would be one such response by
Incompatibilists but it still remains to be seen if it has any real traction in the debate. One
potential counter-response is that perhaps we are only aware at the second-order level of our
perception of the content of the first-order thought. While we may perceive the content correctly,
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there is no guarantee that we are and therefore no guarantee that it actually represents the
external environment. This begs the question of whether we could truly consider it knowledge if
the perception may or may not be accurate, but this is something Burge actually does address
when he compares what we commonly count as perceptual knowledge to what we should
consider self-knowledge. At the very least, this introduction of first and second-order mental
states to basic self-knowledge helps avoid potential counterfeit objections. The first-order
thought will always be the object of reference for the second-order judgment. “Basic selfknowledge is self-referential in a way that insures that the object of reference just is the thought
being thought. If background conditions are different enough so that there is another object of
reference in one’s self-referential thinking, they are also different enough so that there is another
thought.” (Burge 121-122)
As Burge states, “it is certainly plausible that these sorts of judgments or thoughts
constitute knowledge, that they are not products of ordinary empirical investigation, and that
they are peculiarly direct and authoritative.” (Burge 112) As long as mental states of this kind
count as knowledge and didn’t result from empirical investigation then they can meet the
‘knowable a priori’ feature of Privileged Access because they are self-verifying due to the fact
that their existence alone ensures their truth. We can know them directly because as long as they
exist they are necessarily true and for the same reason we know them with certainty.
Since it is clear that mental states of this kind are self-verifying and are not the result of
empirical investigation, all that is left to do so that they may be classified under the label ‘Basic
Self-Knowledge’ is to prove that they count as knowledge and not just trivial bits of information.
This is a daunting task which many would believe impossible to accomplish since there is a
whole field of philosophy devoted to figuring out the conditions that must be met for something
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to be considered knowledge. Burge takes on this epistemic endeavor through assessing the
conditions we tend to require by common practice for something to count as perceptual
knowledge. In doing so he compares and contrasts perceptual knowledge and self-knowledge so
that we may see which conditions should be kept due to their similarities and which should be
revised or discarded due to their differences. Due to skepticism it is rare in philosophy that
common practice can be used to prove anything. To address this Burge states, “My discussion of
knowledge and individualism has proceeded on the unargued assumption that skepticism is
mistaken.” (Burge 117) With this statement alone he allows for common practice to actually
have some traction in his argument because it cannot be defeated by the claims that one person
thinks otherwise or that the entire population who believe in the common practice could be
wrong.
The first aspect of perceptual knowledge that Burge thinks applies equally to selfknowledge is that in order to have perceptual knowledge of something we are not required to
first have knowledge of the conditions that made the perceptual knowledge possible. (Burge 117)
To grant someone the perceptual knowledge ‘there is a pool over there’, we do not require that
they first must know how their sense of sight works, that they are not hallucinating, that the
object is not a counterfeit like a pond made to look like a pool, etc. All that we require for it to be
considered knowledge is that they perceived an object that meets the conditions to be classified
under their concept of a pool. Likewise, for us to classify something as self-knowledge we
should not require that we know all of the conditions that made our acquisition of the knowledge
possible. For instance, when we have the thought ‘I think (with this very thought) that writing
requires concentration’ we should not be required to know the concepts of writing, requirement,
or concentration before we can know the occurrence of the thought as well as which terms are
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used in its content. It is true that knowledge of the concepts would allow for a richer and more
thorough understanding of the thought which would lead one to believe that the knowledge of
the thought is richer and more thorough as well. In the same regard knowledge of how sight
works, that you are not hallucinating, or seeing a counterfeit would seem to add more depth to
our perceptual knowledge than if it lacked knowledge those things. However, as long as
skepticism is assumed to be mistaken and the conditions for what counts as knowledge in
common practice are kept the same, then just because a ‘deeper’ knowledge can be found doesn’t
mean that the more ‘shallow’ knowledge shouldn’t actually count as knowledge.
Despite the similarity between perceptual knowledge and self-knowledge described
above, there is a big difference which leads Burge to believe that it is less plausible than with
perceptual knowledge to think that in order to consider basic self-knowledge as knowledge that
we need to be able to differentiate the thoughts involved in such knowledge from ‘twin
thoughts’. This is one form of counterfeit objections like I described in the discussion of first and
second-order mental states. Burge’s reason for this claim is that perceptual knowledge has forms
of objectivity that basic self-knowledge does not share. (Burge 119) The first form of objectivity
in perception deals with the possibility of error. We have no guarantee that our perception of
objects actually matches the true nature of objects outside of that perception. This could be due
to any number of things like illusion, hallucination, or just the brute fact that the process of
perception may adjust the true nature of things in the same way that light appears to bend when
going through different mediums. This is not possible in basic self-knowledge because it is selfreferential and self-verifying. (Burge 120) The second-order judgment must be true because if
the first-order thought were different enough to have any effect on the truth of the second-order
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judgment then we would have a different second-order judgment altogether instead of a false
one.
The other form of objectivity in perception is that we can compare our own perceptions
of an object to other people’s perceptions of the same object. Science would not be our method
of determining truth in our physical world without our ability to recreate experiments that have
already been done so that we can test for errors and variations. With perception we have no way
of knowing if you and I perceive the same things when we look at the same object without being
able to compare our perceptions. With basic self-knowledge there cannot be this kind of
objectivity because it must be done from the first-person point of view. (Burge 121) Basic selfknowledge is self-verifying because the first-order thought and the second-order judgment occur
at the same time in the same individual in such a way that the second-order judgment cannot be
false as long as the first-order thought is also occurring. There is no way that another person
could be witness to this process in any way for them to be able to offer any further information
that would prevent basic self-knowledge from being self-verifying. Even if an invention were
created that allowed us to see the thoughts of other individuals, all they would see is that we had
a thought and that we thought about it as our own in such a way that the second-order judgment
must be true regardless of the content of the first-order thought. We could have the first-order
thought ‘1+1=3’ and then the second-order judgment ‘I am thinking that 1+1=3’ and it still
couldn’t be wrong because the truth of the first-order thought does not change the fact that we
are thinking it.
While Burge’s basic self-knowledge is only a small set of all the self-knowledge that
must be made compatible with Privileged Access and Anti-Individualism, its introduction does
offer a good stepping stone on the way to compatibility. Its weakest point is whether or not such
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second-order judgments can actually be classified as knowledge. However, with skepticism on
the table that is a problem for practically everything we have ever wanted to consider knowledge.
All in all Burge has given Compatibilists hope that finding a compatibility between Privileged
Access and Anti-Individualism is truly possible.
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Chapter V
In his paper, ‘Content and Self-Knowledge,’ Paul Boghossian starts off by explaining the
overall purpose of his paper. The purpose is, “that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis
about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is
determined by its relational properties.” (Boghossian 149) I would like to assume here that
Boghossian meant part of the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties but I
am not so sure I can warrant that assumption. Some of Boghossian’s main arguments hinges on
the idea that there are no intrinsic properties of a mental event, i.e. an occurring mental state,
since even the internal factors that determine the content of the mental event are relational
properties of the event itself which he claims is the ‘currently prevailing orthodoxy’.
(Boghossian 161) If this is true then every property of a mental state is an extrinsic property. We
will look at this a bit later because it is a controversial point and it lies at the foundation of
Boghossian’s arguments.
Boghossian proceeds by explaining that the problem is that occasionally when we know
our own thoughts we seem to do so in a direct manner without having to infer this knowledge
from anything else. If we don’t use inference to obtain this knowledge then the only other
options are that we either use some form of inner observation or there is no process to describe
how we acquired the knowledge, we know our thought on the basis of nothing. However,
Boghossian believes that neither of the two options are an adequate description of how we come
to know our own thoughts. Both options give us reason to doubt that they will yield the kind of
knowledge of our mental states that we occasionally possess. The first section of his paper is
dedicated to showing that inference is not the manner in which we can come to know our own
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thoughts. Despite the fact that it is already stipulated that we do not use inference for this
knowledge Boghossian must have felt that it was useful for his argument to show why it was
stipulated in the first place. The second section attempts to show that inner observation will
never give us knowledge of a mental state because the properties that we are supposed to observe
cannot be perceived through observation alone. In the last section, Boghossian argues that we do
not know our thoughts, at least the majority of them, on the basis of nothing. Even if we gain
something from our thoughts on the basis of nothing is it not considered knowledge the way he
defines it. He states that in his use of the term ‘knowledge’, particularly ‘self-knowledge’, it must
be a true and justified belief about one’s own thoughts. (Boghossian 150) As long as proper
evidence is required for justification Boghossian finds it hard to believe that any ‘knowledge’
based on inner observation or nothing will be able to provide it.
The first section starts by referencing the perspective of the mind and self-knowledge
developed by Descartes which has greatly influenced the Philosophy of Mind for centuries.
Despite the obvious flaws in the Cartesian picture of the mind which have been rejected by the
majority of philosophers today, some aspects contain a truth about the nature of the mind that
cannot be ignored or denied. Even though we are surely fallible when it comes to our judgments
about our mental states, there does seem to be an asymmetry in the way we come to know our
own mental states compared to how we come to know the mental states of others. No matter how
well you know someone else the only way we are able to make a judgment about what mental
state they are, were, or will be in is if we observe their behavior and make an inference. When it
comes to knowing my own mental state not only is inference from observing my own behavior
hardly necessary but it runs counter to the intuitions about the direct nature in which we obtain
self-knowledge motivating the development of Privileged Access.
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Boghossian offers an argument of Ryle’s to help explain why it is necessary that we don’t
know our mental states by observing and inferring from behavior. Ryle promoted the idea that
the apparent asymmetry described above is just an illusion and we come to know our own mental
states the same way we come to know the mental states of others. Boghossian does not offer a
complete description of Ryle’s theory since he probably figures that most people would find it as
absurd as he does but I assume that one of Ryle’s claims for the reason the illusion exists is that
we know ourselves much better than the way we know anyone else. However, whatever reason
Ryle has for his theory doesn’t matter because in the actual world when we have an occurring
mental state we come to know that state before it has a chance at affecting our behavior in any
way. Boghossian offers an example of a thought to show this but I believe that it is better seen
with an example of a sensation. Imagine that you are sitting down watching TV and suddenly
there is a sharp pain in your foot. Neuroscience has shown us that what happens physically is that
at the point of origin of the pain electrical signals are first sent to the brain through the nervous
system and then the brain registers a feeling of pain at the point of origin. Since the brain also
controls the body’s behavior it would be illogical for the brain to send out signals to the body to
behave as if it is in pain before the brain even registers that the body has had an experience that
causes the pain feeling. If we substitute ‘thought’ with ‘feeling of pain’ then this Boghossian
quote sums up the moral of the example; “Your knowledge of that occurrent thought could not
have been inferred from any premises about you behavior because that thought could not yet
have come to have any traction on your behavior.” (Boghossian 152) It is a given fact that when
a heavy box falls on my toe I feel the pain before I start jumping up and down holding my foot
while screaming “Ow! Ow! Ow!” Moreover there is the famous Super-Spartan thought
experiment where a whole society is taught to suppress all pain behavior no matter how much
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pain they feel. Regardless of the extremeness of the thought experiment it shows that it is indeed
possible to feel something and not behave as if you do.
Boghossian moves on to consider other potential forms of inference that could be used to
acquire self-knowledge. He uses a tenet of Internalism to help show that any use of inference in
obtaining self-knowledge necessarily runs into a problem familiar to many philosophers.
According to Boghossian, the intuition motivating Internalism is that regardless of what is going
on in the external world, a person cannot be considered justified in having a belief if from their
particular subjective perspective it is epistemologically irrational or irresponsible to hold that
belief true. (Boghossian 153) As usual there are thought experiments supporting this intuition
just as there are also thought experiments aiming to disprove it. However, one experiment that
Boghossian discusses highlights the fact that under Internalism the only evidence available to a
person to justify knowledge of their mental state is what is already in their mind because they are
only allowed to make a judgment about the mental state from their subjective perspective. Since
they are restricted from using anything in the objective world, the person is forced to use other
mental states as evidence for justification of the knowledge. This is another way of saying they
inferred the knowledge of an occurring mental state from other mental states, past or present.
There is an inevitable problem concerning justification in the field of Epistemology when
something is justified by another thing which is not already intrinsically justified itself. Evidently
this problem is that if anything is to be used as evidence for justification it must already be
justified independent of the thing for which it was intended to provide justification. If a belief in
the proposition that p is justified by a belief in the proposition that q then the belief that q must
be justified by something else if it is to work as proper evidence for the justification of the belief
that p. An infinite regress is inevitable as long as the path of justification is not brought to a halt
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by something which does not require justification by something else. Here is where Internalism
is no longer required for Boghossian’s argument because he just needed to paint the picture of
what it would look like if we were inferring knowledge of our mental states from other mental
states. He takes this argument as showing that it is necessary under Internalism that selfknowledge be non-inferential.
Boghossian points out another similar but distinct problem when we consider knowledge
of our own mental states instead of only considering knowledge of a proposition. Here
Boghossian stipulates that in this scenario to be justified in believing a proposition, the
proposition must be justified relative to another belief, or other mental state, rather than rest on
another belief that carries its own justification. (Boghossian 154-155) Let’s say I have a belief
that r and I believe that I have the belief that r instead of knowing that I believe that r. For this
belief that I have a belief to be justified it must be the case that there is another mental state
related to the belief that r which justifies the belief that r. This mental state happens to be a belief
that s where the proposition that s justifies the proposition that I believe that r. In this scenario,
my belief that r is a justified belief due to the truth of the proposition that s but we can only be
justified in believing that we hold the belief that r if we also believe that s. Furthermore we can
only obtain justified knowledge that I believe that I believe that r if we know that we believe that
s and knowledge of the belief that s justifies the belief that I believe that r. What this amounts to
is that if all self-knowledge were inferential, in order to obtain justified knowledge of a mental
state we must already have knowledge of another mental state that justifies the knowledge of the
former state regardless of whether the latter state is justified itself. The knowledge of the latter
mental state can only be acquired in the same manner which means that it must have been
obtained from knowledge of yet another mental state. Instead of an infinite regress of
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justification we have an infinite regress of knowledge of particular mental states that must be
known before we can have justified knowledge of an occurring mental state. If all selfknowledge is inferential, it cannot be the case that there will be a mental state which does not
presuppose knowledge of another mental state because knowledge of the latter state is selfknowledge and must have been inferred from something. At this point Boghossian concludes that
the type of knowledge Privileged Access is supposed to yield cannot be obtained through
inference since it will inevitably lead to an infinite regress in one way or another.
There is not much to be said in response to Boghossian’s first section because whether or
not you are inferring from only mental states or from things in the environment as well it is
obvious that inference leads to many problems. Boghossian could have even shortened or
completely cut out his first section because the Principle of Privileged Access already implicitly
restricts inference from yielding inferential knowledge. When Privileged Access is put in terms
of direct knowledge, knowledge from inference does not exhibit the property of directness that is
required. Any use of inference between the instantiation of a mental state and the acquisition of
the knowledge of the state is a mediating factor that must exist between the two stages if the
transition is to be possible. For knowledge to be considered direct we must be able to go from the
instantiation stage to the acquisition stage without there being any other necessary stages in
between. If a particular inference is necessary for the transition then the resulting knowledge
must be indirect knowledge. When Privileged Access is put in terms of a priori knowledge,
inference can be used if it only involves other things known a priori but the problem of infinite
regress is once again apparent.
Boghossian decides to move onto his next section where he attempts to show that the
knowledge characterized by Privileged Access cannot be the result of inner observation. He
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believes that the true problem here comes from a widely accepted relationist conception of
content which dictates that, “the content properties of our mental states and events are
determined by, or supervenient on, their relational properties.” (Boghossian 157) His first
argument against inner observation is the usual claim that in order to say I know my thought
involves my water concept I need to first be able to know that it is does not involve my twater
concept. Since we can only figure this out by investigating the environment to see which
substance I was in the presence of when my thought was instantiated, it is safe to say that I
cannot know a priori that my thought was about water rather than twater.
Boghossian concedes that this argument was too swift to account for the whole issue and
introduces the relevant alternatives hypothesis. This hypothesis is used with thought experiments
whose real-world applications have been outlandishly stretched to include logical possibilities
that, as far as we know, have never and will never be actualized. What it states is that when we
are using a thought experiment to make a point of argument and this thought experiment asks us
to consider a situation where something is the case but it could have been otherwise, the only
potential alternate cases that should be offered for consideration are those that are realistic
alternatives in the actual world. For instance, twater is not a realistic alternative in the actual
world since the existence of a liquid with all the same properties as water except for chemical
makeup seems highly implausible for many reasons. The key reason for its implausibility is that
the properties of any substance ultimately boil down to its chemical makeup so the different
chemical makeup of twater should exhibit some difference in properties. However, Boghossian
does not consider this reason for twater’s implausibility and claims that the relevant alternatives
hypothesis can be sidestepped rather easily by stipulating situations to be used in thought
experiments where the alternatives are relevant.
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Let’s disregard the inherent problems with twater that question how relevant it can be and
imagine Putnam’s Twin Earth experiment. The variation Boghossian wishes to introduce is that
instead of there being a person on Earth with a twin on Twin Earth, one person is shuttled back
and forth between the two planets without their knowledge. If the person stays long enough on a
planet then they will acquire any concepts of the planet they did not previously acquire from the
other, as long as externalist demands of the acquisition of concepts are met. Boghossian tells us
here that this concept acquisition can occur in one of two ways; either the Earthian concepts
displace the Twin Earthian concepts upon acquisition and vice versa or upon acquisition they
have both planet’s respective concepts at their disposal. Boghossian asserts that the latter is the
more interesting way to tell the story but since the former is how it’s usually described that is
what he will use. I agree with Boghossian that the latter is the more interesting, not to mention
more realistic, way to tell the story. It is hard to imagine what it would be like to lose a concept
we have already acquired just because another similar, but distinct, concept is added to our
repertoire. Though, his main argument does not hinge on his choice of the two options so it does
not make much of a difference.
Let’s consider a person we’ll call S who has been shuttled back and forth between Earth
and Twin Earth without their knowledge and each time they are on a planet long enough their
‘water’ concept is displaced with whatever concept corresponds to the planet they are currently
on. When S arrives on Earth after such a displacement occurs, S is asked whether they recently
had a thought involving a concept very similar to but distinct from their current water concept.
Since S is unaware of the existence of twater, Twin Earth, or that the content of his thoughts are
dependent on his environment, S most likely would answer ‘no’. However, S did in fact have
such a thought and his lack of knowledge isn’t explained by a lack of memory. Part of the
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content of his thought that makes it a thought about twater rather than water was unavailable to S
at the time of the thought and when the question was asked. The fact is that the aspect of the
content of the thought that makes it a twater thought rather than a water thought is only
knowable through empirical investigation. In order to answer the question correctly, S not only
needs to know whether they were on Twin Earth or Earth but also have knowledge of chemistry
because the original Twin Earth experiment stipulated that this is occurring before anyone can
discover the chemical makeup that distinguishes water from twater. (Boghossian 159-160)
Through this Twin Earth variation Boghossian has made twater a relevant alternative, in his eyes
at least, and showed that inner observation alone cannot allow us to differentiate one concept
utilized by a thought from counterfeits.
However, there is a more serious concern for proponents of Privileged Access than inner
observation alone lacking the ability to distinguish a concept from potential counterfeits. This is
the argument that there is really no such thing as intrinsic properties when it comes to mental
states or events and their content. The current relationist conception of content that he mentioned
in the introduction of the paper has it that even non-external factors that determine the content of
a mental state or event are relational properties of the state or event. (Boghossian 161) We could
also consider the functionalist idea that the only narrow properties that can determine the content
of a mental event are the events causal properties. In this regard the content of a mental event
would be determined by how the event interacts with other mental events as well as its role in
mental functions such as reasoning and contemplation. To illustrate this Boghossian uses a very
brief thought experiment comparing thoughts about water to thoughts about gin. In order to
know my thought is about water as opposed to being about gin I must know my thoughts causal
role is that of R instead of R* which would be the causal role of a thought about gin. Though
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Boghossian does not think that it is possible to acquire this knowledge directly and his reasoning
for this revolves around Hume’s observation that it is not possible to gain knowledge of
anything’s causal properties without the use of inference. (Boghossian 161-162)
Boghossian considers an objection to his argument which claims that he has been
appealing to a false principle. This false principle consists of the idea that, “in order to know a
mental event one must know how things stand with respect to the conditions that individuate that
event.” (Boghossian 161) Boghossian completely agrees with the objection because his argument
would be at fault if it was assuming such a principle but he maintains that his argument relies on
a much different assumption. This assumption is that an object’s relational or extrinsic properties
are not the kind of things that can be ascertained through inspection alone. Boghossian also
provides two claims which are supposed to justify this assumption. These claims are that
knowing an object’s intrinsic properties alone are not enough to know that it has some particular
relational property and that the simple inspection of an object can give you at most knowledge of
its intrinsic properties. (Boghossian 162) In order to strengthen his argument Boghossian
considers another objection that there could perhaps be exceptions to his assumption where
inspection of an object can yield knowledge of an extrinsic property. One such exception could
be the monetary value of American coins since we seem to be able to know the value of a coin
through inspection alone. However, Boghossian believes this is a misconception. The reason we
seem to know an extrinsic property of a coin through inspection alone is because some of the
coin’s intrinsic properties provide this knowledge. To show this Boghossian designs a thought
experiment where we are asked to imagine that all coins appear exactly the same and the only
thing that dictates what value they have is what kind of mint they were coined at. There are one
cent mints, five cent mints, ten cent mints, etc. In this case the only way to know a coin’s value is
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to know the history of that particular coin which cannot be acquired from inspection alone.
Though Boghossian takes it a step further to argue that even without this thought experiment, the
way we ascertain the value of coins appears to be through inspection but it is really inference
from the data we acquired from the inspection. (Boghossian 163) We infer from the fact that the
coin says ‘ten cents’ on it that the coin is a dime and thus worth ten cents within an American
monetary system. Here Boghossian concludes his discussion of why we cannot know the content
of our thoughts through inner observation.
The last section of Boghossian’s paper is dedicated to showing how the knowledge of the
content of our mental states cannot be based on nothing. Since inference and inner observation
are not available as options anymore the last possibility that Boghossian can think of is that such
knowledge is the kind of thing where there is no available evidence for its justification.
Boghossian states that when knowledge in gained through observation or through an inference
based on an observation it is to be considered a cognitive achievement with a substantial
epistemology. There are three examples of knowledge that he considers which do not fall under
that classification. Judgments such as ‘I am here now’ are true and justified the moment they are
thought without the need of additional evidence. The second example deals with the Kantian
thesis that experiencing the world as containing substances is a precondition for experiencing the
world at all. In this case the knowledge that the world contains substances is cognitively
insubstantial since all that is required for it is that the individual experiences the world. The third
example is that of self-verifying judgments like Burge’s Basic Self Knowledge that we discussed
in the previous chapter. (Boghossian 165-166) If it is possible to view knowledge of the content
of our mental states along these lines then this view would allow us such knowledge. However,
Boghossian does not believe that we can view knowledge of mental states in such a way.
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There are three characteristics that Boghossian states that knowledge which is not a
cognitive achievement would be expected to have which he believes is absent in self-knowledge.
The first is that paying more attention to our thoughts should not result in more or strengthened
knowledge of the thought than with less attention. For instance, pretty much everything that can
be known about the judgment ‘I am here now” is available immediately and any further attention
paid to us does not provide any additional knowledge. The second characteristic is that adults
seem to be better at reporting their mental states than children but knowledge based on nothing
should be equally available to everyone no matter how well trained their mental capacities are.
As Boghossian states, “How is this to be explained if self-knowledge is not to be thought of as an
information-sensitive capacity that may be subject to cultivation or neglect?” (Boghossian 167)
However, the most important characteristic is that knowledge based on nothing should not be
prone to error since it must be true if it is to be considered knowledge in the first place and the
fact that it is based on nothing means that no justification is available because it wasn’t supposed
to be required at all. Anything prone to error requires justification and anything that does not
require justification should not be prone to error. Knowledge based on nothing should also be
complete since the only way to complete something that is currently incomplete is to acquire the
rest from observation or inference but those options are not available for knowledge based on
nothing. As any human being knows, self-knowledge is far from being infallible and we often do
not have complete knowledge of our mental states immediately upon their occurrence. If that
weren’t the case then what need would the human race have for psychologists and psychiatrists?
While this accounts for most of our mental states of which we want to say we can have
direct knowledge, it does not account for Burge’s Basic Self Knowledge which are self-verifying
mental states. We saw in the last chapter that judgments like ‘I judge: I believe that thinking
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requires concentration’ are self-verifying in that having the second-order judgment about the
occurring first-order belief provide enough justification in themselves for their truth. The only
way the judgment could be wrong is if I did not have the occurring belief that writing requires
concentration but since that belief is the object of the second-order judgment then if I did not
have the occurring belief I would also not be making the same judgment since the judgment
would not have the same object. The first problem Boghossian has with Basic Self Knowledge is
that it does not account for our standing mental states. He claims that we do not actually have to
have the first-order belief in order to have the second-order judgment and without the first-order
belief the judgment is no longer self-verifying. While this seems to be ignorant of how Burge
characterizes the necessity of the first-order mental states it does not matter because
Boghossian’s real objection to Burge does not depend on this misconception. Boghossian also
believes that Basic Self Knowledge is limited with occurring mental states. For the same reason
as with standing mental states, we can have the second-order judgment without actually having
the occurring first-order propositional attitude. Though Boghossian believes that Basic Self
Knowledge was limited with occurring mental states because he believes it is possible for a
second-order judgment that occurring simultaneously with a simple first-order thought could be
self-verifying. However, Boghossian’s real argument again Basic Self Knowledge actually uses
compatibilist motivations against a compatibilist argument. Everyday people seem to know their
own thoughts without the necessity of generating a second-order mental state about those
thoughts. When we think ‘writing requires concentration’ we do not need to generate any further
mental states before we know the content of that thought. (Boghossian 170) So the notion of selfverifying second-order mental states being required for the possibility of us being able to know
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our own mental states completely ignores the intuitions of Privileged Access which evoked this
whole debate to being with.
Boghossian considers the idea that even though Burge’s Basic Self Knowledge does not
reach as far as Burge thought, Burge did seem to provide one example where we could know our
own thoughts even though its individuation conditions rely on external factors. Though,
Boghossian does not believe that Basic Self Knowledge actually constitutes real knowledge. If
we consider the Twin Earth slow switching scenario brought up by Burge, when the person is
asked whether their thought yesterday was about water or twater it is proposed that they won’t
know the answer to the question. Boghossian elaborates by stating that it seems in this story that
a person will not know tomorrow what they are thinking at this moment but they do know right
now what they are thinking at this moment. (Boghossian 171) At this current moment the person
is able to have a second-order self-verifying judgment about their thought but no such selfverifying judgment will be available tomorrow. It is worth noting that this statement does depend
on Boghossian’s claim that Basic Self Knowledge only works with occurring mental states when
the second-order state occurs simultaneously with the first. In order for the person to know what
they thought yesterday they need to know what their environment was like yesterday.
Boghossian thinks there are only two possible explanations for why the person does not
remember what they thought yesterday; either they had forgotten or they never knew. However,
memory failure is the type of thing that can be removed from thought experiments by careful
design so the only option left is that they never knew in the first place.
The problems created by Boghossian are much more serious for compatibilists than those
created by McKinsey. Perhaps this is the case because Boghossian claims that when it comes to
his beliefs he is a compatibilist so his perspective on the issue is much different than McKinsey’s
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who is an imcompatibilist in his beliefs as well as his arguments. While there are ways around
each of Boghossian’s arguments, finding those ways without revising our descriptions of content
externalism or privileged access requires careful steps and delicate phrasing. The use of
inference may not inherently clash with the a priori description of privileged access as long as
making the inference does not require any empirical investigation but it does clash when the
knowledge of our thoughts we obtain through privileged access is described as direct.
Knowledge resulting from an inference had to go through an intermediary step which directly
goes against the idea of directness. Therefore any compatibilist theory which hopes to account
for the directness feature of privileged access while using inference must explain how directness
does not apply to inferential mediating steps.
While most compatibilist theories are developed to accommodate self-knowledge which
are not ‘based on nothing’, some theories do have something to worry about like those which
include things like Burge’s Basic Self-Knowledge. Such things could still be considered
knowledge due to their self-verifying nature but with them we could never know whether the
content of that knowledge refers to anything and it could therefore be based on complete
fabrications of our mind. It would be hard to call the knowledge that ‘I judge that I think the sky
is blue’ a cognitive achievement, or even true knowledge for that matter, if our concepts of ‘sky’
and ‘blue’ are descriptivist concepts that we made up which do not refer to any existing things in
the external environment. Compatibilist theories describing self-knowledge which are ‘based on
nothing’ must be able to describe how such knowledge can truly be considered ‘knowledge’
while also showing how this does not diminish our intuitions about privileged access.
The biggest problem for compatibilists posed by Boghossian’s arguments is that it
appears like we cannot obtain our knowledge of our thoughts using inner observation. So far no
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one has been able to describe a situation where observation alone without the use of empirical
investigation has resulted in knowledge of anything other than intrinsic properties. Extrinsic or
relational properties are the types of things that can only come to be known through observing
how the object or event interacts with other objects and/or events. While we may be able to
observe without empirical investigation how a given mental state and the concepts used within it
interact with our other mental states and concepts, empirical investigation is necessary to observe
how the mental state and concepts used within it interact with objects and events in the external
environment. If Boghossian is right that the content of a mental state is determined by its
relational properties then we can only assume that part of that content is determined by the
relational properties that the mental state bears to external objects and/or events. The only
options for compatibilist responses are to argue that knowledge of the content of our mental
states does not require knowledge of its external relational properties, that we can have partial
knowledge of the content of our mental states through the mental state’s relational properties that
we can observe without empirical investigation, or to deny either of Boghossian’s claims that
observation can at most grant us knowledge of intrinsic properties or that the content of a mental
state is determined by its relational properties. While there are still outs left open for
compatibilists, all four of those options are very difficult to argue.
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Chapter VI
While Burge used the concept of second-order states to describe a subset of selfknowledge to which we can have privileged access regardless of externalism, Kevin Falvey and
Joseph Owens used the concept in a different way which accounts for an even larger subset of
self-knowledge in their paper, “Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism”. Despite the fact
that externalism is a metaphysical theory, Falvey and Owens acknowledge that it does appears to
have an effect on knowledge of mental states. Although they never use the term ‘privileged
access’, you can tell they are using the same principle as we are when they state that externalism
seems to undermine the idea that we have direct and authoritative knowledge of our mental
states. (Falvey and Owens 107) The problem for them is that we should have to know our
environment has certain features to know the content of our mental states if that content is even
partially determined by those features. While Falvey and Owens do not adopt the Cartesian
notions of self-knowledge because they recognize the obvious flaws in the Cartesian theories of
self-knowledge, they claim that it is not easy to ignore the intuition that when we have an
occurring mental state the knowledge we acquire of that state seems to be both direct and
authoritative. In between the occurrence of the state and the acquisition of knowledge of that
state there is no empirical investigation performed and it seems that our judgments about the
states cannot be wrong except in the special cases of self-deception. To quote a phrase that
completely exhibits the spirit and motivation behind all Compatibilist theories, “Any philosophy
of mind that cannot accommodate and explain these intuitions must be mistaken.” (Falvey and
Owens 108)
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This particular paper by Falvey and Owens is separated into two parts. The first section
deals with how externalism restricts some kinds of knowledge from privileged access and
distinguishes between the kinds of knowledge which are and are not restricted by it. In the
second section, Falvey and Owens take the set of self-knowledge which they believe they have
proven to be applicable to privileged access, as well as the theory behind why is it not restricted
by it, and use it as an argument against skepticism. We are only going to discuss the first section
here because while defeating skepticism would be tremendous for the Compatibilist cause since
the idea of having a priori knowledge of the external environment would no longer be considered
an absurd conclusion; it is way too big of an issue to be taken on as a side project. Skepticism
has plagued every area of philosophy since the first claim was ever made so it seems much more
productive to push it to the side until it is the last issue that needs to be addressed. Besides, if
Falvey and Owens provide an argument which frees more knowledge of mental states from the
restriction of privileged access than Burge’s Basic Self Knowledge then we have progress on the
Compatibilist front despite skepticism. They in fact do provide such an argument which
distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge of the content of mental states that most
philosophers lump together. One of these kinds of knowledge is restricted from privileged access
for many of the same reasons that Incompatibilists argue all knowledge of mental states are
restricted. The other kind, they argue, is not restricted for reasons related to the concept of
second-order states and how their content is determined.
Falvey and Owens begin their discussion with the now very familiar Twin Earth thought
experiment developed by Putnam. Sparing the reader from another description of the experiment
all that is important is that whenever the person on Earth and their twin on Twin Earth express a
thought using their respective ‘water’ concepts, they are expressing thoughts with different
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content even though they are physically identical. Here is where Falvey and Owens offer their
distinction between two kinds of knowledge often used in similar thought experiments. When we
say our knowledge is direct and authoritative there are two different ways this can be taken:
(1) An individual knows the contents of his occurrent thoughts and beliefs authoritatively
and directly (that is, without relying on inferences from observation of his environment).
Call this kind of knowledge introspective knowledge of content.
(2) With respect to any two of his thoughts or beliefs, an individual can know authoritatively
and directly (that is, without relying on inferences from observation of his environment)
whether or not they have the same content. Call this kind of knowledge introspective
knowledge of comparative content. (Falvey and Owens 109-110)

Falvey and Owens readily concede that introspective knowledge of comparative content
is incompatible with externalism but this is mostly due to the fact that they believe such
knowledge is impossible regardless of whether externalism is true. However, Falvey and Owens
also believe that there is no reason to think that introspective knowledge of content suffers from
the same problem as (2) because they think all Incompatibilist arguments provided so far do not
make a distinction between (1) and (2). (Falvey and Owens 110)
Falvey and Owens present two different thought experiments to illustrate why
introspective knowledge of comparative content is incompatible with externalism. In the first we
are asked to imagine someone named Rudolf who is well acquainted with cilantro to the point
that he knows it is an herb, it is used in Mexican dishes, and it has a distinct smell. He often has
thoughts like, “Cilantro should be used sparingly,” which he expresses out loud. Rudolf also uses
dried coriander often when he cooks and it is stipulated that he is just as familiar with coriander
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as he is with cilantro. Similarly, he often has thoughts like, “Coriander should be used
sparingly,” which he expresses out loud. (Falvey and Owens 110) Although, Rudolf is not aware
of the fact that cilantro and coriander are two distinct names pertaining to the same concept.
The question is whether Rudolf can know his two thoughts are the same without
empirical investigation? Since the herb that both terms refer to is a natural kind and natural kind
concepts are the least controversial of all the concepts to which externalism is supposed to apply,
it seems like Rudolf is not capable of comparing his concepts of cilantro and coriander without
the knowledge that is only available in the environment that they are the same. (Falvey and
Owens 110-111) Although they never state it openly, I assume that Falvey and Owens do not
think Rudolf can use his introspective knowledge of the qualitative aspects of his mental states
using each concept to compare the concepts. The reason is that even if he could compare the
taste and smell of each concept to determine that they are so similar to the point of being
identical, he cannot know for sure that cilantro and coriander are both actually the same herb
without at least looking up the words in the dictionary. For all Rudolf knows, cilantro and
coriander could be two distinct herbs which smell and taste almost identically but at least one has
different properties which cannot be discovered without the correct tools. For example, one of
the two could cause allergic reactions in some that the other doesn’t cause or the flavor of one of
them may disperse throughout the food when cooked while the other holds the flavor regardless
of how it is cooked. Though, it is clear in the next paragraph that Falvey and Owens
acknowledge that there are introspectible clues available that Rudolf could have tried to discover
to help him compare the two. This is because they use the next thought experiment to show the
same result without the presence of introspectible clues.
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The other thought experiment that is meant to show that introspective knowledge of
comparative content is incompatible with externalism is a variation of the Twin Earth experiment
similar to Boghossian’s slow switching version of the experiment where our subject, Susan, is
shuttled back and forth between Earth and Twin Earth without her knowledge. Each time a
switch is made her concepts are replaced by the concepts of the social population on that planet
once she is there long enough. Susan believes that she has never left Earth and her concept of
‘water’ is the same as all other people on Earth, but unbeknownst to her at some points in her life
when she believed she expressed a thought about water it was actually about twater. If we were
to ask Susan while she is on Earth, and her Earth concepts have replaced her Twin Earth
concepts, when she says the sentence right now ‘water is a liquid’, is she expressing the same
thought as she did a year ago when she said the same exact sentence? Since Susan has never
been aware of the fact that she had been on any other planet than Earth she will answer yes.
However, if she was in fact on Twin Earth last year when she uttered the sentence she would be
wrong because her ‘water’ concept would have been different. Furthermore, the information that
would allow her to answer correctly is only available in the external environment through
empirical investigation. Therefore, Falvey and Owens conclude that if externalism is true then
(2) must be false.
Though, Falvey and Owens do not believe this presents a new problem for externalism
because they think that there is reason to believe that (2) would be false whether or not
externalism is true. The reason for this rests on yet another thought experiment. We are asked to
consider two sentences:
(i)

Nobody doubts that whoever believes that Mary is a physician believes that Mary
is a physician.
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(ii)

Nobody doubts that whoever believes that Mary is a physician believes that Mary
is a doctor.

We are then presented with philosophers Benson Mates and Alonzo Church who have differing
views of these two sentences. When Benson Mates utters both sentences he believes he is
expressing difference thoughts but when Alonzo Church utters both sentences he believes that he
is expressing the same thought. Each philosopher understands that each sentence expresses a
thought through the English language and they are both aware of the meanings of all the terms
involved within the English language. One of them must be wrong but according to Falvey and
Owens, the mistake made on either side is not likely to be a result of introspective failure.
(Falvey and Owens 113) The true message of this thought experiment revolves around our ability
to make a judgment about which philosopher is right in this disagreement. We are in the same
position as both Mates and Church in that we fully understand the content of both (i) and (ii) as
well as the meanings of all the terms involved in the English language. We believe that the terms
‘physician’ and ‘doctor’ are synonyms so both (i) and (ii) should express the same thing.
However, through introspection alone it is extremely unlikely that we can find enough evidence
to make any kind of judgment on the matter. Even if we believe that the thoughts expressed by
both (i) and (ii) have the same content, how do we know we are not mistaken in this belief if we
don’t do any empirical investigation into the practice of the English language and how it is
commonly used today by those who practice it? For all we know at some point in time since we
learned that ‘doctor’ and ‘physician’ are synonyms, someone could have developed an argument
as to why the terms shouldn’t be synonymous and successfully changed how they are defined in
the English language. “Even if one knows what one is thinking at a given time, and knows what
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one is thinking at a later time, it may be necessary to know something about one’s environment
in order to know whether these two thought contents are identical.” (Falvey and Owens 113)
While I agree with Falvey and Owens that due to all the previous thought experiments
introspective knowledge of comparative content does seem to be incompatible with externalism,
I find it hard to see how the last thought experiment is supposed to show how (2) is false
independent of externalism when externalism was clearly not taken out of the picture. The
problem was only generated by the idea that Mates and Church both believe that the thought
expressed by the sentences is the same thought expressed by the sentences in English. They
cannot both be right because the definition of a physician in English cannot both include and not
include doctors. This means the information which dictates who was wrong can only be found
through assessing the current state of the English language and how each term is defined within
it. Nowhere in this paper did I read that Falvey and Owens were restricting the social
environment from the kinds of external environment to which externalism applies and the
linguistic practices of those who speak a common language definitely falls under one’s social
environment. Furthermore, they state that, “while much of this information is logicophilosophical in character, it is not plausible that it can be acquired independently of a serious
empirical investigation into linguistic practice.” (Falvey and Owens 113)
So far the idea of empirical investigation has been the quintessential process which
describes the hold that externalism has on the concepts used in our mental states. The reason we
are not supposed to be able to have direct, authoritative knowledge of our own thoughts,
according to Incompatibilists, is because externalism entails that some aspects of our mental
states were determined by the environment and therefore only knowable after sufficient
empirical investigation. If, in this thought experiment, the relevant knowledge which would
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answer whether it was Mates or Church who was wrong can only be found through some
empirical investigation it is extremely implausible that externalism does not play any role in the
experiment. Yes this is a different perspective on externalism than we have commonly been
looking at because it is not the physical environment determining the content of the thoughts
expressed by the sentences in English but rather the collaboration of humans over many years.
However, the external environment for any individual also includes the other living beings in
their environment because to that individual the only difference between the living beings and
inanimate objects in the environment is that the living beings have a conscious mind directing
their behavior. Therefore, the only difference between the social environment and the rest of the
external environment is the fact that the social environment is molded by conscious minds. Just
as natural kind objects in the environment determine the content of their respective natural kind
concepts, whatever the content is of a thought expressed by a sentence will have been determined
by how the terms involved have been commonly defined by those who speak the English
language. So I conclude that unless Falvey and Owens have a good argument for why
externalism does not apply to the social environment then this last thought experiment does not
prove that (2) is false independent of externalism.
The problem discussed in the last two paragraphs is significant because if I am correct, it
is possible that introspective knowledge of comparative content isn’t false independent of
externalism which turns the tables by pointing to externalism as the plausible location of the
problem instead. However, when it comes to the compatibility of externalism and privileged
access the entire discussion of introspective knowledge of comparative content is irrelevant
because if we can show the introspective knowledge of content is compatible with externalism
then the desired progress we wanted for compatibility theories is reached. Falvey and Owens
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consider two separate arguments for why introspective knowledge of content is compatible with
externalism. Unfortunately the first argument they use as a response to content-skeptics utilizes
their conclusion that we necessarily lack introspective knowledge of comparative content in their
reasoning so anyone who agrees with me that they did not actually prove this will find the
argument unsatisfactory. Lucky for us they also reject that first argument as being insufficient
since the manner in which the content-skeptic phrases the argument can make the lack of
introspective knowledge of comparative content irrelevant to the situation at hand. They then
follow up their rejection with a response that is undeniable when upholding their premises.
In order to begin their discussion on why externalism does not entail a rejection of
introspective knowledge of content, Falvey and Owens decide to start from scratch. Is
externalism incompatible with the idea that we can know our own mental states directly and
authoritatively when we are assuming that we lack the ability to compare the content of our
mental states through introspection? Given the existence of the issue at hand it would appear that
the answer to this question is yes. (Falvey and Owens 113) This answer is often due to the
reasoning of the conclusion of thought experiments similar to Putnam’s Twin Earth. Essentially,
they all boil down to the idea that if someone were to be said to have knowledge of the content of
one of their occurring mental states using a certain concept then they must be able to know that
the concept utilized is that particular concept rather than some similar alternative concept. Since
it is very simple to design thought experiments where the information needed to distinguish
between the potential concepts is necessarily unavailable, introspection alone cannot accomplish
this feat and therefore we do not have introspective knowledge of content which is both direct
and authoritative.
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The usual compatibilist response to this argument by those who have not yet read Paul
Boghossian is to present the Relevant Alternatives argument. Falvey and Owens present this
argument for two reasons: they are starting from scratch so it is useful for the reader to see the
path that the debate has taken over the years but more importantly a form of this argument
becomes a crucial point in their reasoning for why we can have introspective knowledge of
content with externalism. The Relevant Alternatives argument proceeds by claiming that even
though one must be able to rule out certain alternative hypotheses in order to have knowledge, it
is not the case that one must rule out every alternative hypothesis that is logically possible.
(Falvey and Owens 114) It is when the conditions that determine what counts as knowledge are
so strict that they require that everything logically possible must be accounted for that it is
possible for Socrates’ paradox, “The only thing I know is that I know nothing”, to actually carry
some real truth. For any given situation the set of logically possible alternative hypotheses is
virtually infinite because it is only limited by what the mind can imagine which doesn’t
necessarily contradict itself. This set includes alternative situations where the universe is
governed by different physical laws or even concepts of space and time that are different from
whatever the nature of space and time are in our actual universe. If the conditions for knowledge
really were as strict as this then the incompatibilist making the argument would be right that we
don’t have knowledge but their judgment could not constitute knowledge either since they also
cannot rule out every logically possible alternative. You may say that I don’t know that my
occurring thought is about water because I can’t rule out that it wasn’t about twater. However, if
we are considering all logically possible alternative hypotheses then you can’t rule out the
possibility that I do know it wasn’t about twater because perhaps I am an alien or some
superhuman with much more evolved mental capacities who has the equivalent of what people
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call 20/20 vision in regards to introspection and also have the ability to have introspective
knowledge of comparative content when no other human can. The simple fact is that when we do
not restrict the conditions for knowledge to only account for relevant alternatives everybody
loses because knowledge is virtually impossible for those whose mental capacities are limited by
the current stage in the evolution of the human mind.
Falvey and Owens make this point through first postulating a novel thought experiment
and comparing it to Twin Earth. Suppose we imagine a man name Tom who is driving through
rural country roads where there are many barns to be spotted along the way. Tom has great
eyesight, knows the correct use of the word ‘barn’, and the weather conditions are perfect for
making visual judgments. So when Tom sees a barn and judges it to be a barn one would be
hard-pressed to claim that Tom does not know that the object he is viewing is a barn. However,
what if we were to learn that the area Tom is driving through is full of structures which are not
barns but were made to look like barns and they fulfill their purpose extremely well? In this case
we would actually want to claim that Tom does not know the object he is looking at is a barn
because the possibility that it is a barn facsimile would undermine the knowledge. If Tom were
an expert in detecting barn facsimiles that would be another story but since Tom is an average
person and barn facsimiles are meant to trick the average person into thinking it is a barn it is
likely that Tom cannot rule out the alternative that it is a facsimile.
This thought experiment seems counterintuitive because their immediate goal is to show
that irrelevant alternatives should be disregarded instead of showing an instance where an
alternative that previously didn’t enter into our minds becomes relevant. The reason is that they
wanted to highlight the difference between what is and isn’t relevant. The idea of twater that
comes with Twin Earth has much less relevance as an alternative to water than the idea of barn
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facsimiles because the postulation of someone wanting to construct an object with the purpose of
tricking people into thinking it is something else is much easier to digest than the postulation of
an exact duplicate of Earth where the only difference is the chemical makeup of the liquid
labeled ‘water’. According to Falvey and Owens, we should require that Susan be able to
distinguish water from turpentine and gin but twater should not be necessary since in the actual
world it is nothing but fiction. (Falvey and Owens 115)
While the original Relevant Alternatives argument worked for awhile because it kept the
infinite realm of logical possibility out of the discussion, the flexibility in the design of thought
experiments brought the problem back with a vengeance. Since the creator of a thought
experiment specifics all the premises, assumptions, and conditions of the experiment it is not
very hard to design an experiment where certain logical possibilities can become relevant when
they previously were not. If we considered the version of Twin Earth developed by Paul
Boghossian where Susan is shuttled back and forth between planets without her knowledge then
twater does become relevant because by stipulation it is an actual liquid she encounters from
time to time instead of being just fiction. According to Falvey and Owens, Boghossian would
claim that Susan doesn’t know whether her thought is about water or twater once twater is made
into a relevant alternative. To illustrate they provide a quote of Boghossian that he makes when
he discusses a thought experiment similar to the switching version of Twin Earth above where
we are considering two possible realities that take place on Earth where the only difference is
how the condition arthritis is defined. He calls the concept with the incorrect definition
tharthritis. Boghossian states that,
“[the subject] has to be able to exclude the possibility that his thought involved the
concept arthritis rather than the concept tharthritis, before he can be said to know what
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his thought is. But this means that he had to reason his way to a conclusion about his
thought; and reason to it, moreover, from evidence about his external environment which,
by assumption, he does not possess. How, then, can he know his thought at all? – much
less know it directly?” (Falvey and Owens 115)
These conditions for knowledge are hard to overcome, especially in the face of any
logical possibility being relevant. Although as long as it can be stipulated in a thought
experiment in the correct way, Falvey and Owens are not very concerned because the nature of
second-order mental states provides a route of argument that helps sidestep the inclusion of
implausible alternatives which are only relevant through specific stipulations in a thought
experiment.
Falvey and Owens start by stating that, “q is a relevant alternative to p if q is
incompatible with p, and the possibility that q obtains is relevant in the context.” (Falvey and
Owens 116) According to them, while Boghossian doesn’t make this claim directly they believe
he is holding onto a Relevant Alternatives principle like the one that follows:
(RA) If (i) q is a relevant alternative to p, and
(ii)

S’s belief that p is based on evidence that is compatible with its being the case
that q, then
S does not know that p.

Falvey and Owens believe that this not only appears to be a good principle in which to base our
conditions for knowledge but it seems to be the principle we use on a day to day basis. However,
they believe that the motivation behind the principle requires a closer look. Revisiting the
thought experiment with Tom, Falvey and Owens think that it is not really the lack of evidence
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that the object in front of him is not a barn facsimile which causes us to think that Tom’s belief
that the object is a barn doesn’t constitute knowledge. Instead it is the idea that if Tom was in the
counterfactual situation where the object in front of him actually was a barn facsimile, Tom
would still believe it was a barn nonetheless. This leads them to the postulation of a different
Relevant Alternatives principle which they believe is more in line with our intuitions pertaining
to what relevant alternatives must be ruled out before we can have knowledge. It is as follows:
(RA*) If (i) q is a relevant alternative to p, and
(ii)

S’s justification for his belief that p is such that, if q were true, then S would still
believe that p, then
S does not know that p. (Falvey and Owens, 116)

Although they never state it explicitly, I believe one of the reasons Falvey and Owens think this
principle captures the intuitions behind the conditions for knowledge in these types of situations
is because it is impossible to tell whether S would have the same evidence when their belief is
correct as they would when their belief is not. S’s evidence for their belief may be compatible
with a relevant alternative but there is no way of knowing if the evidence would have been the
same if the alternative situation had obtained. Perhaps in the alternative situation, S would not
have had the belief they did in the actual situation because they wouldn’t have had the same
evidence to justify it so in turn the belief would not have been developed.
This brings us to Falvey and Owens’ next point. They claim that the nature of the
evidence used to justify beliefs will often be a reliable indicator of how prone their belief is to
error. When the evidence for a belief is perceptual it will follow that (ii) in (RA) entails (ii) in
(RA*). (Falvey and Owens 117) Tom’s belief that there is a barn in front of him rests solely on
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his visual perceptions of the object. Since his visual perceptions of the object would be the same
if instead it were a barn facsimile then the evidence would be the same across situations which
satisfies (ii) in both principles. Whenever evidence is perceptual, for it to be compatible with
another situation obtaining strictly means that in the alternate situation the perception will
provide evidence which offers the same degree of justification towards the same conclusion as in
the actual situation. Since one would expect at least small differences in the perceptual
experience of different objects even when one is crafted to be identical to the other, the same
exact perception is not necessary as long as it justifies the same conclusion to the same degree.
Though when we consider cases where the belief is not about our perceptions but rather
our own mental states, (ii) in (RA) does not entail (ii) in (RA*). Falvey and Owens think that this
conclusion can even be illustrated using the Twin Earth switching experiment. Nothing in
Susan’s evidence that her thought was about water can rule out the possibility that she was
instead on Twin Earth thinking about twater. According to Falvey and Owens, “such a situation
would be evidentially indistinguishable from her actual situation.” (Falvey and Owens 117)
However, that does not mean that if Susan were on Twin Earth with a thought about twater that
she would believe she was on Earth and her thought was about water. Falvey and Owens claim
that Susan would not have the latter belief because, according to externalism, the content of
second-order beliefs are determined by the environment the same way first-order beliefs are. Let
it be said that this goes for all second-order mental states in general; Falvey and Owens must
have just decided to use ‘belief’ because it is much easier to follow the discussion when you are
only mentioning a specific kind of mental state rather than all of them in general. When Susan is
on Twin Earth it is not possible for her to have a belief about water because she doesn’t have the
Earthian water concept when on Twin Earth. This argument depends greatly on their assumption
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that in thought experiments where we switch someone back and forth between different
environments, concepts that are supposed to correspond to another in the alternate environment
but have slight differences will replace each other once the person has remained in the
environment long enough. Surprisingly enough, this assumption is not very controversial among
philosophers in the field despite the plausible alternative that instead of replacing each other we
just acquire a new concept once we stay in the environment long enough which has the same
label as a concept we already possessed. We will return to this at the end of the chapter.
Falvey and Owens believe that this is enough to show that someone can hold externalism
to be true and endorse (RA*) without having to accept the argument that we do not have
introspective knowledge of content. As long as the environment determines the content of our
second-order mental states the same way it does our first-order states, it is not possible for the
content of my second-order state to include concepts that differ from the concepts in the first
order state. Furthermore, as long as the content of any second-order mental states is derived from
the content of the first-order mental state to which it pertains then it is not possible for the
second-order state to be wrong. Even when Susan is under the impression she is on Earth when
she is actually on Twin Earth, Susan would still be able to know the content of her thoughts
according to (RA*) since (ii) isn’t satisfied and thus neither water or twater are relevant
alternatives to each other because it is not possible for Susan to be in possession of both concepts
at the same time.
While we might hesitate to call this information knowledge since it is based on the
assumption that the water and twater concepts replace each other, it certainly would be justified
enough to be knowledge in terms of correctness. The content of the second-order state will be the
same content of the first-order state and, unless it is a case of self-deception, the second-order
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state will use the content to accurately describe the first-order state. Whether or not Susan is on
Earth or Twin Earth, her second-order belief ‘that she is thinking water is a liquid’ will take the
content of ‘water is a liquid’ from her first-order thought. Even though which planet she is on
will matter towards what the content of ‘water is a liquid’ actually is, her lack of knowledge
concerning which planet she is on does not make a difference to what the content of the secondorder belief will be. The content of the second-order belief will always be the content of the
corresponding first-order mental state and the content of the first-order state will always be
dictated by the concepts utilized in that state. While the set of available concepts and their
possible content is determined by the environment we inhabit, the accuracy of our second-order
mental states is left untouched because the only content that can be derived from the first-order
state is what is already in the state and nothing else.
Falvey and Owens believe that the fact that the content of second-order mental states is
determined by the environment provides an argument against those of Anthony Brueckner’s
content-skeptics. When I claim that I know some water is dripping from a faucet, the contentskeptic will respond by claiming that I believe water is dripping but I do not know water is
dripping because by closure principles knowing that would entail that I know I am not a brain in
a vat and essentially everything that would come as a result of the physical reality being real. The
closure principle being referred to is the principle that knowledge is closed under known
entailment which dictates that if an individual knows that[p and that p entails q], then they know
that q. (Falvey and Owens 119) The content-skeptic can proceed to claim that we don’t know the
contents of our thoughts for similar reasons. If I actually had knowledge that I am thinking water
is dripping then by closure I would also have knowledge that I am not thinking twater is
dripping. According to Brueckner, if I were on Twin Earth without knowing it then things would
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seem exactly as they do now on Earth so I can’t know that I am not thinking twater is dripping.
(Falvey and Owens 119)
This is where Falvey and Owens use their conclusion that we do not have introspective
knowledge of comparative content. Without such knowledge it is possible for someone to know
that they think water is dripping without in turn also knowing that they are not thinking that
twater is dripping. The reason is that in cases where we don’t have the relevant knowledge to
compare a water thought to a twater thought there is no way for us to have the knowledge that it
is a water thought which would result in the knowledge that it is not a twater thought. The
closure principle is not satisfied because we lack the knowledge that p entails q. (Falvey and
Owens 120) However, Falvey and Owens concede that if the content-skeptic were to phrase their
argument differently the closure principle would no longer makes a difference.
The skeptic could grant us the belief that we are thinking that water is dripping but then
ask us to imagine a possible world where our environment contained a liquid that resembled
water in every perceivable way except that it isn’t water. I assume that the environment doesn’t
also contain water because Falvey and Owens add that our thought in such a situation would not
be about water due to externalism. Since water and twater concepts are different which entails
that thoughts involving each are different then in order to know that a thought is a water thought
rather than a twater thought we must at least know that it is not a twater thought.(Falvey and
Owens 120) It would seem that with the inclusion of possible worlds the lack of introspective
knowledge of comparative content does not save the compatibilist because imagining a possible
world allows us to entertain the idea of a concept that isn’t in our actual environment. The
justification for this reasoning is based in the idea that I cannot know I am not a brain in a vat
because if I were a brain in a vat everything would “seem” exactly the same as it does right now.
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Specifically I would believe that I was not a brain in a vat when in such a situation I would be.
(Falvey and Owens 121)
There is a problem with skeptical arguments that take these routes. When it comes to
counter-factual situations about our perceptions or our qualitative mental states we can
confidently claim that we would have the same perceptions in the counter-factual situation that
we did in the actual one. However, when we are discussing the content of our mental states there
is no way to make a claim that the content of those states, our beliefs in this particular situation,
would be the same in the counter-factual situation as they are in the actual one. This is precisely
due to the fact that the content of our second-order mental states are determined by the
environment in the same way that our first-order mental states are. (Falvey and Owens 122) If
we are asked to imagine what the content of our beliefs would be in a situation where our
environment is different, the content of our beliefs would change along with the environment
since it is what determines the content of those beliefs. Even if qualitatively everything “seemed”
the same in the counterfactual situation there is no way you can maintain externalism and expect
the content of some mental states to be consistent while changing the environment. We know the
content of our second-order mental states because externalism guarantees that the content of our
first-order mental states could not be anything other than what it actually is and that content is
directly transferred to our second-order mental states. “Just as I cannot think that water is wet
unless my environment satisfies certain features, so I cannot think that I am thinking that water is
wet unless my environment satisfies the same features.” (Falvey and Owens 123)
While Falvey and Owens did not allow for us to have introspective knowledge of
comparative content for our mental states, they did provide an argument which allows for us to
have introspective knowledge of content while maintaining externalism at the same time. This is
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a tremendous tool for compatibilists to respond to content-skeptics but in the end all they really
did was sidestep the issue. Showing how the traditional skeptical arguments can’t actually get off
the ground does not truly answer the question of how you can know your water thought without
knowing that it isn’t a twater thought. Just because there is no way for certain mental states to
remain the same in a counterfactual situation as it is in an actual one does not change the fact that
to know that a given mental state has a certain identity you must know it does not have a certain
alternative identity. Essentially this all boils down to the issue of whether a pair of concepts with
the same label would replace each other when environments are changed or if the pair could
coexist regardless of the current environment that the individual is inhabiting. When the concepts
must replace each other then Falvey and Owens are correct that the traditional skeptical
argument can’t get off the ground but if the concepts could coexist then is it possible for the
content of mental states using one of those concepts to remain consistent with a relevant change
in the environment. Susan could have a thought about water on Twin Earth and vice versa.
Though, at the same time consistency in the mental state is not a guarantee in such a situation
because it could have been the environment that evoked the idea. In such a case the change in
environment in the counterfactual situation would change the content of the state. Either way it is
solely because of the assumption that the concepts must replace each other that their arguments
have any real traction. If it turns out that the concepts do replace each other than Falvey and
Owens have done a superb job for the progress of the compatibilist cause but until the alternate
option has been ruled out the fact that their response to content-skeptics only sidesteps the issue
cannot be ignored. Until Falvey and Owens can actually answer the question of how you can
know your thought has one identity without being able to know it does not have some alternative
identity, their compatibilist theory must be taken with a grain of salt. To borrow a moral from the
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authors themselves, any philosophy of mind that cannot account for this must be mistaken, or at
least has a lot of holes in it.
In his book The World Without, The Mind Within, Andre Gallois also presents a solution
for Boghossian’s argument which is similar to Falvey and Owens solution of distinguishing
between introspective knowledge of content and introspective knowledge of comparative
content. Boghossian believes that he has established two claims:
(a) An individual in the switching situation does not know which of these beliefs she has:
the water belief or the twater belief.
(b) An Individual in the switching situation does not know that she believes water is
tasteless. (Gallois 179)
Boghossian spends the majority of his paper justifying (a) and then argues that (b) follows
directly from (a). While Gallois does not make any claim as to whether Boghossian actually
established (a), he does wish to refute the idea that (b) necessarily follows from (a).
Let’s grant Boghossian the claim that it does not seem plausible to think that an
individual in the switching situation would know whether their thought was about water or
twater. Gallois does not contend with the notion that someone in the switching situation can only
know that they believe water is tasteless if they know which belief is expressed when they use
the proposition ‘Water is tasteless’. However, he argues that even when we grant Boghossian
those claims it does not have to follow that (b) is true. To justify this claim Gallois presents a
simple thought experiment where we are asked to imagine that we are looking at a table. We are
then asked if we know which object is in front of us. According to Gallois, this question is
unanswerable unless the relevant contrast is specified. (Gallois 181) By relevant contrast he
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means which set of objects to which we are supposed to be comparing the object in front of us.
For instance, I know that the object in front of me is a table rather than a chair but I may not
know that the object is a table from this room rather than a table from the other room. When we
use the idea of relevant contrast in the switching situation, the individual may not know that their
belief ‘Water is tasteless’ is a water belief rather than a twater belief but they do know that their
belief expresses the idea that water is tasteless rather than expressing the idea that grass is purple.
(Gallois 181)
Gallois believes that the second of these contrasts is what is relevant when it
comes to having knowledge of the content of our thoughts. The reason for his belief is that it is
obvious that someone in the switching situation who does not know whether they are having the
thought that water is tasteless as opposed to the thought that grass is purple cannot be said to
know the content of their thought. However, what is not as obvious is the idea that someone
having the belief that ‘Water is tasteless’, but doesn’t know whether it is about water or twater,
does not know that they believe water is tasteless. Since upon the occurrence of our thought
‘water is tasteless’ we seem to be able know that it is that thought opposed to the thought ‘grass
is purple’ then we appear to be able know the content of our thoughts. Our lack of the ability to
know that we are not in a Twin Earth switching situation may not allow us to know whether our
thought uses a water concept instead of a twater concept but this should not take away from the
fact that there are a innumerable amount of concepts that we do know are not present in the
thought.
We will look at a different argument of Gallois’s which pertains to McKinsey’s argument
in Chapter VIII. The reason his argument against Boghossian is included in this chapter is
because it is very similar to Falvey and Owens’s argument so the best way to notice the slight
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differences is to put them next to each other. Both arguments draw on the idea that just because
we cannot know that our thought uses a given concept rather than some relevant alternative
concept it doesn’t mean that we cannot know the content of the thought. Falvey and Owens
argued that we cannot have a priori knowledge that our thought uses a particular concept rather
than some other concept but we can have a priori knowledge of the content of our thought.
Gallois, on the other hand, argues that we can have a priori knowledge that our thought uses a
particular concept rather than the set of irrelevant alternative concepts. While the only difference
seems to be that Gallois allows for some introspective knowledge of comparative content where
Falvey and Owens do not allow for any, the implications of this small difference are much
bigger.
Gallois’s argument is prone to some objections that Falvey and Owens’ argument is not
because it must account for how we can differentiate between concepts that are not relevant
alternatives to each other but we cannot differentiate between concepts that are relevant
alternatives to each other. The only instances where I can imagine that such a claim would make
sense are those where the information that distinguishes a given concept from a relevant
alternative is restricted from the individual in question. The Twin Earth thought experiment is
one such instance. Actual examples of this occurring are very rare if there even have been any.
Such an example would consist of two distinct objects or events where all observable properties
are the same and what differentiates them is information that is either completely inaccessible or
only inaccessible at a particular time period where we lack the technological or biological ability
to make the necessary observation. Since most substances have properties that we have been able
to observe throughout our history then it is hard to imagine such cases. However, one could
imagine that prior to developments in metalworking many people could not observe differences
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between some types of metals. In such a case a person may not be able to differentiate a thought
about aluminum from a thought about nickel because at that point in time they are relevant
alternatives to each other but the person may still be able to differentiate their thought about
aluminum from a thought about oxygen.
In contrast, Gallois’s argument does a better job at addressing how it is possible for us to
have a priori knowledge of the content of our thoughts since we can at least partially know the
identity of our concepts used in our thoughts. In Falvey and Owens’ argument we could not
know that our thought ‘water is wet’ is not the thought ‘grass is purple’ which seems rather
ridiculous. In reality when we have the thought ‘water is wet’ we may not be able to completely
rule out that we are not in a Twin Earth switching situation so we cannot know that the thought is
not actually about twater but we do seem to be able to know that the content of the thought is
completely different from the content of the thought ‘grass is purple’.
Gallois’s argument also does not require that a water and twater concept must replace
each other in the Twin Earth switching situation because in Gallois’s argument our ability to
know the content of our thoughts does not revolve around the idea that the content of our
thoughts would change with the appropriate change in our environment. It is consistent with
Gallois’s argument that we could have both a water and a twater concept at the same time no
matter which environment we are currently inhabiting. Furthermore, there is reason to believe
that the concepts should not replace each other. Let’s imagine a development on the Twin Earth
switching scenario where on both Earth and Twin Earth humans have developed the ability to
determine the chemical makeup of the substances they both refer to as ‘water’. Now when Susan
is transported back and forth between both worlds she learns that each water substance has a
different chemical makeup. In such a case it seems unlikely that Susan would lose her water
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concept on Twin Earth due to it being replaced by a twater concept. What seems more likely
would be that Susan would keep both concepts when she learns that they are actually distinct
substances. Wooly Mammoths no longer exist in our environment and yet we still have a concept
that refers to them. So why would both concepts replace each other when Susan is unaware of
each substance’s chemical makeup? Prior to this development it seemed like externalism
determined that both concepts replace each other in different environments since Susan uses the
same label for both and in a twater environment her ability to have a thought using a concept
with the label ‘water’ has a necessary relation to the twater that exists in her environment. After
this development it appears like Susan’s own mind is what determines her concepts are sorted
and labeled since the only change in her environment that caused the distinction between her
water and twater concepts had nothing to do with the referents of the concepts but instead with
our observational abilities. A change in our observational abilities is not enough to go from it
being necessarily the case that two concepts replace each other to their potential coexistence.
Rather it is more likely that both water and twater were the referents of Susan’s water concept
and once the discovery of their difference was made the one concept was split into two.
The fact that Gallois’s argument against Boghossian is consistent with the coexistence of
water and twater concepts no matter which environment an individual currently inhabits makes
the argument much more resilient than the argument of Falvey and Owens. However, we will see
in Chapter VIII that this argument of Gallois’s is part of an overall theory about the compatibility
of content externalism and privileged access which has flaws despite its strength against
objections. The main flaw being that in the theories claims that we cannot know the epistemic
status of our concepts as a natural kind or a descriptivist concept it diminishes parts of privileged
access which cannot be diminished without changing the principle altogether. If we recall from
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the first chapter, true compatibilist solutions must keep both content externalism and privileged
access consistent with the intuitions that led to their development in the first place.

83

Chapter VII
In her paper “Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access
is Not the Issue”, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio attempts to use the Incompatibilist’s own argument
against them by showing that the assumptions that must be made in order to validate such
arguments entail that the premise which corresponds to the principle of Privileged Access plays
an unnecessary role in the argument itself. If she is correct then the ‘Incompatibilist’ argument is
no longer an incompatibility argument but instead just an argument against content externalism.
She divides her paper into three sections: in the first she provides and explains all the necessary
factors of her argument. In the second section she shows how the current Incompatibilist
arguments require assumptions that back their advocates into dangerous corners where the only
ways out are to appeal to controversial claims. In the third section, Aarnio explains how these
controversial claims take the Incompatibilists down paths that lead to consequences that change
the classification of their position altogether. In this chapter I will provide an overview of her
central argument while explaining the necessary factors of her argument. Afterwards we can see
how the argument actually plays out and decide how well it actually fulfills the purpose for
which it was designed.
Aarnio’s central argument is somewhat simple but she makes very swift moves around
complicated issues while elaborating on it. Therefore, to make everything easier to follow I will
provide an overview of her central argument before diving into how the argument plays out.
Aarnio starts her first section by explaining Michael McKinsey’s argument from his paper that
we discussed in the second chapter. To reiterate, McKinsey argues that content externalism is
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incompatible with privileged access due to the absurd conclusion present in the following
argument:

(1) Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that p.
(2) The proposition that Suzy thinking that p logically implies the proposition
that E.
Therefore,
(3) Suzy can know a priori that E.
The use of logical implication in (2) is a controversial issue that McKinsey believes he
successfully argued for its truth by showing that metaphysical entailment leads to a conception of
wide states that Burge, being one of the developers of the terms wide and narrow mental states,
would not agree with. Aarnio also states that sometimes the argument above is put into terms
where externalism does not have to be a logical truth but must still be knowable a priori. The
only difference between the two arguments lies in premise (2) which is instead substituted with
the following premise:
(2*) Suzy can know a priori that if she is thinking that p, then E.
The key difference between the two versions of the argument is that when the second premise is
(2*) the argument involves material implication instead of logical implication. (Aarnio, 436)
Aarnio refers to both versions of this argument as ‘McKinsey-style Incompatibilist arguments’
since they take the form of the arguments McKinsey used in his papers.
Before moving to Aarnio’s central argument it is important to discuss an aspect of her
argument that is necessary but the reason for its necessity is not easy to see until the conclusion
of her argument. This aspect is that she will be using demonstratives within the propositions
which require a referent mostly because demonstratives are the least controversial of terms to
which content externalism is supposed to apply. As Aarnio states herself, “I take there to be very
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strong support for the claim that demonstratives function as singular terms (not quantifiers) that
rigidly designate an object with respect to all possible worlds, and that if a non-referring
demonstrative term occurs in a sentence, then that sentence fails to express a proposition.”
(Aarnio 435) Essentially, demonstratives are the type of terms that it seems extremely
implausible for them to be used without there being an object they refer to and thus unable to
escape the grasp of content externalism. The only difference this means for us right now is that
the above arguments will now take the following form:
(THAT1) Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that that [Fred] is
poisonous.
(THAT2) The proposition that Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous
logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists.
Therefore,
(THAT3) Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists.
In turn, the alternate version of the argument involves substituting the following premise for
(THAT2):
(THAT2*) If Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous then that [Fred] exists.
(Aarnio, 435-6)

Aarnio’s central argument is that premise (THAT1) in both versions of the argument is
unnecessary because the argument being setup as it is in both versions requires two assumptions
for its validity. These assumptions are the validity of some closure principles and a priori
knowledge of certain externalist theses. There are five closely related closure principles which
play distinct roles that she utilizes throughout the paper. Although, two of them are key
principles because not only does the validity of McKinsey-style arguments depend on the
validity of those two principles but they also blaze the trail that leads to the necessity of the
second assumption. These two key principles are as follows:
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Closure under a priori knowable logical implication (CAKL)
Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori
that p and x can know a priori that the proposition that p logically implies the proposition
that q, then x can know a priori that q.
Closure under a priori knowable implication (CAK)
Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori
that p and if x can know a priori that if p then q, then x can know a priori that q.

The closure principle (CAKL) is necessary for the validity of the McKinsey-style argument
using premise (THAT2) because without the principle there is no reason to think that Suzy could
know the consequent of the logical implication a priori, that that [Fred] exists, just because she
knows the antecedent a priori, that Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous. The validity of
the argument depends on a principle which dictates that a priori knowledge of the antecedent of a
logical implication leads to the possibility of a priori knowledge of its consequent. For the same
reason, (CAK), or a principle which performs the same role as the one above but with material
implication instead of logical implication, is necessary for the validity of a McKinsey-style
argument using premise (THAT2*).
However, in both situations above there is also the problem that it seems like both
(THAT2) and (THAT2*) must be knowable a priori for the arguments to be valid as well. Even
with the closure principles it seems wrong to think that Suzy could know that that [Fred] exists a
priori without her knowing a priori that her thought logically or materially implies it. The key
here is that both principles involve the knowability of the existence of that [Fred] rather than
claiming that the existence of that [Fred} will be known as long as the conditions are fulfilled.
The proposition that that [Fred] exists is knowable a priori as long as Suzy’s thought in (THAT1)
is known a priori and the closure principle is valid but the existence of that [Fred] can’t be
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actually known a priori until the logical implication and the closure principle are both known a
priori.
Now even though it seems like certain externalist theses must be knowable a priori in
order for the McKinsey-style arguments to be valid, this isn’t necessarily the case. This is the
subject of her second section and it is rather significant because in her third section Aarnio
provides good reasons for why Incompatibilists should not want to make such an assumption.
Aarnio claims that there are two possible routes that the Incompatibilist can take to avoid this.
Either they can argue that (THAT2) does not actually have to be knowable a priori or it is
knowable a priori but that knowability is conditional on the privileged access premise. (Aarnio
437)
Aarnio argues that both routes rely on two other closure principles for their validity
whose descriptions I will wait on providing till the elaboration of her argument for clarity’s sake.
Aarnio claims that any justification for those principles also justifies a ‘weaker’ principle which
essentially states that logical implications are essentially logical truths which have the property
of being logically implied by any proposition. (Aarnio 439) This would entail that as long as
Suzy can know any proposition a priori, which Aarnio regards as a very plausible assumption,
Suzy can also know any logical truth a priori as well. Aarnio then makes a crucial move by
stating that as long as Suzy can know one proposition a priori she is then in a position to know
(THAT2) a priori since it just describes a logical truth which is logically implied by the
proposition. Furthermore, the logical implication in (THAT2) simply states that if Suzy is
thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous then that [Fred] exists which is precisely the same
conditional expressed by (THAT2*). So by trying to avoid making the unconditional
assumptions of certain externalist theses, the Incompatibilist was led back to a point where it was
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shown that they must at least grant Suzy the capability of knowing an externalist thesis like
(THAT2) and (THAT2*) a priori.
At first this does not seem like a big problem, but Aarnio points out in her third section
that any justification for a priori knowledge of (THAT2) and (THAT2*) also supports a priori
knowledge of two propositions which she labels as (*) and (**) which will be described later.
However, as Aarnio argues, when you combine (THAT2) and (*) with (CAKL) or (THAT2*)
and (**) with (CAK) we are able to get to the conclusion (THAT3) without the use of the
privileged access premise (THAT1).
Now that her central argument is on the table it should be easy to follow how the
argument actually plays out in her description. While Aarnio does admit that there are arguments
against closure principles which could be a big weak point in her argument, she claims that she
only makes use of the principles that an Incompatibilist must appeal for their arguments to be
valid so if there were a significant problem with one or all of the principles the Incompatibilist’s
argument would end up being invalid as well. So any instance of closure principles in this paper
should only be questioned in considering their necessity to the Incompatibilist argument and not
when it pertains to its independent validity.
In the second section, Aarnio states that there are two routes available to the
Incompatibilist to avoid making the devastating assumptions. The first does not assume a priori
knowledge of (THAT2) or other externalist theses that perform the same function while the
second does assume such knowledge but makes it conditional on the privileged access premise.
(Aarnio, 437) According to Aarnio, both routes each involve one of the following two closure
principles:
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Closure of a priority under logical implication (CA)
Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori
that p, and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know
a priori that q.
Partial closure under logical implication (PLC)
Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori
that p, and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know
a priori that if p then q.

The first route employs (CA) while the second utilizes (PLC) as well as (CAK). (Aarnio, 438) In
order to show that neither route works out the way the Incompatibilist had hoped, Aarnio shows
how an absurd conclusion can be generated using the second route and then explains that the
same conclusion can be derived even more directly with the first route.
According to Aarnio, applying (PLC) to (THAT1)-(THAT3) makes the possibility of a
priori knowledge of (THAT2*) conditional on the privileged access premise being true. If we
take (THAT1) to be p then as long as (THAT1) logically implies (THAT2*) then by (PLC) Suzy
can know (THAT2*) a priori. Then through (CAK) and a priori knowledge of (THAT2*) we can
derive (THAT3). However, Aarnio wants to argue that the motivations for (PLC) also seem to be
the same motivations for a different principle which allows us to get a priori knowledge of
(THAT2*) without the necessity of a priori knowledge of (THAT1) as long as Suzy is granted
the possibility of a priori knowledge of at least one proposition which does not pertain to her
mental states. This last requirement is necessary for proving that the a priori knowledge of
(THAT2*) is not conditional on the privileged access premise. She never labels the principle she
refers to but we will label it (PLC*) and it can be described as follows:
(PLC*) For any propositions that p and that q, if the proposition that p logically implies
the proposition that q, then a subject can know a priori that if p then q. (Aarnio 438)
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It is easy to see that this principle shares the same amount of justification as (PLC) since all that
is taken out is x being the subject and the proposition that x can know that p a priori. A subject’s
ability to know a priori ‘that p logically implies that q’ is not diminished by the omission of the a
priori knowledge of ‘that p’ because a priori knowledge of the proposition ‘that p’ does not entail
a priori knowledge of everything the proposition logically implies. Essentially all (PLC*) states
is that all cases of logical implication have the possibility of being known a priori which is also
implied by (PLC). All this revision does is clarify that the a priori knowledge of the proposition
‘that p’ is not what allows for the possibility of a priori knowledge of what the proposition
logically implies. Instead it highlights that simply being a logical implication is what allows for
the possibility of a priori knowledge of the proposition ‘that p logically implies that q’.
Aarnio is now able to show how this second route fails to accomplish what the
Incompatibilist had hoped it would. The inclusion of (PLC*) is meant to show that the nature of
logical implication is that of a logical truth. The current prevailing doctrine concerning logical
truths has it that a logical truth is logically implied by any true proposition. (Aarnio 439) So if
we allow Suzy a priori knowledge of at least one proposition such as 2+2=4, which we will label
r, and we state that the proposition that s logically implies the proposition that u, then it must be
the case that the proposition that r logically implies that (if s then u). (Aarnio 439) Since we
assumed that Suzy can know r a priori, by (PLC) Suzy can know a priori that if r then (if s then
u). Due to this case in particular Aarnio believes that (PLC) validates the following principle:
Necessarily, for any subject x and any propositions that s and that u, if there is any
proposition r such that x can know a priori that r, and if the proposition that s logically
implies the proposition that u, then x can know a priori that if r then (if s then u).
This principle combined with (CAK) gives validation to the following argument:
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Suzy can know a priori that r.
Suzy can know a priori that if r then (if s then u).
Therefore,
Suzy can know a priori if s then u. (Aarnio 439)
When we substitute ‘r’ with ‘2+2=4’, ‘s’ with ‘Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous’,
and ‘u’ with ‘that [Fred] exists’ then we get the conclusion ‘Suzy can know a priori that if Suzy
is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous, then that [Fred] exists’ which is essentially (THAT2*).
(Aarnio 440) Aarnio asserts that the same conclusion can be derived even easier in the first route
when using (CA). While she never actually elaborates on how the first route arrives at the same
conclusion as the second, the most obvious reason for why the first arrives at the conclusion
more directly is because the proposition that can be known a priori is the same as the antecedent
proposition in the logical implication. The benefit of this is that the a priori knowledge of that p
alone provides us with the proposition that is enough to logically imply the logical truth of if that
p then that q which then gives us a priori knowledge of that q since we have the antecedent of
both conditionals.
Aarnio sums up the second section through showing that the Incompatibilist fell back on
(PLC) to avoid the unconditional assumption of a priori knowledge of (THAT2) or (THAT2*) by
making such assumed knowledge conditional on the privileged access premise. However, the
conjunction of (PLC), (CAK), an externalist thesis similar to (THAT2), and the assumption that
any subject in a McKinsey-style Incompatibilist argument can have a priori knowledge of at least
one proposition not pertaining to their mental states results in the fact that the subject in question
can have a priori knowledge of an externalist thesis similar to (THAT2*). (Aarnio 440)
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Aarnio’s third section is where she aims to prove that the possibility of a priori
knowledge of an externalist thesis similar to (THAT2*) can result in a priori knowledge that
[Fred] exists. This not only presents a problem for those who want to advocate that externalist
theses like (THAT2*) can be known a priori because Aarnio argues that such a priori knowledge
allows us to arrive at a priori knowledge that [Fred] exists independent of the privileged access
premise. This is where Aarnio’s use of demonstratives presents a crucial move in her argument.
The support for externalist theses like (THAT2) and (THAT2*) comes from the objectdependence of their content. (Aarnio 441) Any instance of any person thinking such content is a
case where the demonstrative that involved in the content must have an object which it refers to.
While both theses differ in how strong the entailment is between an instance of thinking a
thought about such externalist theses and the existence of the object it refers to, it is still the case
that both theses do have externalist entailments. (Aarnio 441) Therefore, Aarnio argues, the
following propositions are supported by the same things supporting (THAT2) and (THAT2*)
respectively:
(*)

(THAT2) logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists.

(**)

If (THAT2*), then that [Fred] exists.

According to Aarnio, the problem for Incompatibilists is that there is no possible way to
explain how we could allow someone a priori knowledge of (THAT2) or (THAT2*) but restrict
them from a priori knowledge of (*) or (**). (Aarnio 441) She claims that any a priori
knowledge of (THAT2) or (THAT2*) would have to be, “based on being able to recognize, a
priori, that the proposition that that [Fred] is poisonous is object-dependent – whether this would
involve recognizing that it is a Russelian proposition with Fred as a constituent, that it has an
object-dependent sense with thatFRED as a constituent, or something else.” (Aarnio 441)
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Although, the simple ability to know a priori that a proposition is object-dependent also brings
with it the ability to know a priori that any distinct proposition which contains the former
proposition will also be object-dependent. Since (THAT2) and (THAT2*) are propositions that
contain an object-dependent proposition within them, if we grant that Suzy can know (THAT2)
and (*) a priori then the following argument is valid through the application of (CAKL):
Suzy can know (THAT2) a priori.
Suzy can know a priori that (THAT2) logically implies the proposition that that [Fred]
exists.
Therefore,
Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists.
In turn, if we grant Suzy a priori knowledge of (THAT2*) and (**) then the following argument
is valid through an application of (CAK):
Suzy can know (THAT2*) a priori.
Suzy can know a priori that if (THAT2*), then that [Fred] exists.
Therefore,
Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists.
Aarnio concludes that any rationale which allows Suzy a priori knowledge of (THAT2) or
(THAT2*) also allows her knowledge of (*) or (**) which then allows Suzy to arrive at the same
absurd conclusion of the McKinsey-style Incompatibilist arguments without the involvement of
the privileged access premise. Though, she leaves it an open possibility that it may very well
come to be that the absurd conclusion of the McKinsey argument is only generated when
assuming both content externalism and privileged access even if the Incompatibilists were not
justified in their use of McKinsey-style Incompatibilist arguments so far. Aarnio’s argument is
not infallible so it is only right that she admit to the possibility of error but as she herself states,
“this places the ball squarely within the court of the Incompatibilist.” (Aarnio 442)
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In her conclusion, Aarnio makes it very easy for the reader to extract the moral of her
paper. Apart from potential controversy surrounding the use of closure principles her argument
leaves open four options. Either we reject externalism, deny that externalist theses like (THAT2)
or (THAT2*) can be known a priori, argue that such a priori knowledge is conditional on the
privileged access premise, or accept the fact that we can have some a priori knowledge of the
external world. (Aarnio 443) Aarnio herself thinks that the fourth option is the way to go but
such a controversial claim should be left for another paper so that the arguments are not tarnished
by its radical nature.
Unless one were to be persuaded that her use of closure principles or claim of the hold
that content externalism has on demonstratives should be rejected, Aarnio’s argument appears
airtight. There is, however, a consequence of her argument that is easy to overlook which calls
the classification of her argument as one of compatibility into question. This is because a new
incompatibility argument can be extracted from her own argument which deals with a conflict
between the possibility of a priori knowledge of externalism and the nature of demonstratives. If
one were capable of having a priori knowledge of content externalism and the nature of
demonstratives it would be possible for someone to have a thought using a demonstrative and
immediately know a priori that the referent of the demonstrative exists. As Aarnio states in the
beginning of her paper, any instance of a demonstrative is one where it acts as a rigid designator
and any case of a sentence where the demonstrative in it does not have a referent is one where
the sentence fails to express a proposition. In such a case, a sentence or thought that fails to
express a proposition will not have any content and thus doesn’t apply to content externalism so
a priori knowledge of content externalism does not apply. However, in cases where there is
content and content externalism does apply, a priori knowledge of content externalism and the
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nature of demonstratives does leave open the possibility of a priori knowledge of contingent facts
about our environment. This possibility alone presents an apparent incompatibility.
One way around this rejection is to adopt the common method used when the topic is
natural kinds and claim that we are not able to know a priori if the demonstrative used in our
thought refers to anything existing in the environment or not. While this is a good solution it
overlooks the fact that taking this route severs the necessary tie between content externalism and
demonstratives which is one of the least controversial of the few remaining types of terms to
which content externalism is supposed to apply. While it remains true that referring
demonstratives are still inescapably tied to content externalism, the possibility of non-referring
demonstratives would create enough doubt that would prevent us from being able to know
whether a particular instance of a demonstrative is referring or not. This is not a problem for the
conclusion of Aarnio’s argument because it allows for the compatibility of privileged access and
content externalism since the absurd conclusions of McKinsey-style instance arguments can
never be actualized without knowing whether the demonstratives used in them refer or not.
On the other hand, without the knowledge of whether a given demonstrative refers or not
Aarnio cannot make her central argument altogether. It was the fact that we could know a priori
that content externalism applies to a given demonstrative that allowed Aarnio to create the
incompatibility independent of privileged access. Without this part of her argument she did not
create a reason for why the incompatibilist would not want to make the assumptions described in
the second sections because the assumptions no longer lead to an incompatibility independent of
privileged access. So without the ability to know a priori whether a given demonstrative refers or
not, the most Aarnio’s argument can do is back an incompatibilist into a corner and force them to
make some controversial assumptions. The problem is that those assumptions do not have
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implications that overthrow the whole incompatibility argument anymore and the incompatibilist
can just sit back in the corner they were backed into until Aarnio makes the next move. The ball
is not squarely in the incompatibilist’s corner anymore.
Even though Aarnio’s theory has some serious implications, it should not be seen as a
completely useless endeavor. Her method of trying to create incompatibility without privileged
access was an original idea that had not been tried up until this point. In the end it may not have
gotten the job done but it does not suffer from any fate different than any of the other
compatibilist arguments which had been advances prior to her argument. The only theory which
will not fail will be the one which solves the problem altogether such a solution is not likely to
be found without the stepping stones like Aarnio’s argument being put in place first.
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Chapter VIII
Like Aarnio, Andre Gallois also presents an objection targeted at Michael McKinsey’s
Incompatibilist argument. Although, unlike Aarnio who phrases the McKinsey argument in
terms of the Twin Earth thought experiment, Gallois puts it in terms of modality. While there are
many more premises in the modal form of the argument, there are not as many assumptions left
unstated like there are in the version presented by Aarnio. The modal form of the McKinsey
argument is as follows:
(1) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that x thinks that x lives in a watery world)
(2) ETC
(3) ETC ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that ETC)
(4) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that ETC)
(5) ETC □ (x) (x thinks x lives in a watery world  x lives in a watery world)
(6) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that (5))
(7) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that □ (y) (y thinks that y lives in a watery world  y lives
in a watery world))
(8) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that x lives in a watery world)

Gallois labels this as the McKinsey* argument because it is different from the argument
McKinsey developed in that it does not make any assumption as to whether ETC involves
conceptual implication or metaphysical entailment. (Gallois 158-159) If it wasn’t clear already,
ETC is an acronym which represents the theory of content externalism. Since the McKinsey*
argument does not make any controversial assumption on that topic it is more resilient to
objections. The proposition (8) is equivalent to the negation of the third proposition of
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McKinsey’s triad which is in agreement with the conclusion commonly seen as absurd. Premise
(2) is just the assumption that content externalism is true which is required for this to be an
argument about the compatibility of content externalism with privileged access. Premise (5)
simply describes the hold that content externalism has over our concepts which were obtained
from our external environment. While there is much controversy surrounding the topic of which
concepts are and are not affected by content externalism, the one fact that is not up for debate is
that if a concept were acquired from interacting with a certain object in the external environment
then the individual who possesses the concept must live in an environment containing at least
one object to which that concept refers. However, it is one thing to assume ETC is true but it is a
completely different thing to assume that it is knowable a priori which is what premise (3) claims
possible. Many would argue that because ETC is a necessary truth it should be possible to come
to know it a priori. Others like Saul Kripke would object to this argument by claiming that some
necessary truths aren’t knowable a priori. While it may be necessarily true that an individual with
a concept obtained from an object in the environment must live in an environment containing
that object, it is not necessarily the case that someone could come to know this truth completely
independent of experience. Whether or not this is possible is a significant matter because if it
turns out that (3) is false then (6) must also be false which would cause the whole argument to
collaspe.
One last thing must be assumed to validate the McKinsey* argument. In tune with
Aarnio, Gallois claims that a closure principle is required for this validation. This principle is the
proposition that follows:
(9) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that (p & pq))  ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that q)
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Gallois acknowledges that closure principles are controversial within this topic but he believes
that the principle which is objected to most often makes much stronger claims than (9). The
principle he is speaking of claims that if someone knows p and knows that p implies q then they
also know q. (9) simply claims that if someone could know a priori that p as well as the fact that
p implies q then they could know a priori that q. (Gallois 160) (9) makes no claim as to whether
someone could come to know that q a priori in the actual world or even in possible worlds. It just
states the conditions under which a priori knowledge of q is possible, not for the actualization of
such knowledge. However, it is easy to see how such a closure principle is necessary for the
validation of the McKinsey argument. Without the principle we would not be able to get (4) from
(2) and (3), (7) from combining (4) and (6), or most importantly (8) by combining (1) and (7).
Gallois states that (3) and (6) along with (5) are the premises in the McKinsey argument
that are the most vulnerable to objection. (Gallois 186) Even though I characterized (5) as
expressing a claim of content externalism which is not up for debate, Gallois’s reason for
believing it is vulnerable has to do with a lack of elaboration about what kind of ‘water’ concept
is involved. While (5) may express a necessary truth for natural kind concepts, when it comes to
descriptivist concepts (5) is completely wrong. Gallois’s thesis is that even if we grant the
Incompatibilist (3) and (6), our inability to know a priori whether the concept used in our thought
is a natural kind or descriptivist concept leads to necessary revisions in many of the premises.
After a couple revisions, the new version of (8) will no longer be an absurd result.
Gallois starts off by considering a point made by Anthony Brueckner in his direct
response to McKinsey’s original argument. We cannot blindly accept (5) because it is possible to
imagine a scenario where someone can have a thought about a natural kind which does not exist
in the individual’s environment if they had gone through sufficient theorizing about the
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properties of that natural kind if it had existed. (Gallois 183-184) For instance, it is possible to
imagine someone skilled in atomic chemistry that lives in a world with both oxygen and
hydrogen atoms but both atoms have never actually combined. In this world, this person could
potentially theorize about the substance that would result from combining two hydrogen atoms
with one oxygen atom. This possible situation leads to (5) being changed to:
(5’)

ETC □ (x) (x thinks x lives in a watery world  (no one has theorized about
water  x lives in a watery world))

This revision also changes (7) to include that no one has theorized about water in the conditional
but more notably it changes (8) to:
(8’)

◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that (no one has theorized about water  x lives in a
watery world))

While (8’) is not as counterintuitive as (8), Gallois states that it is counterintuitive enough to be
rejected and thus requires that we reject one of the premises that led to its derivation because
without such a rejection we would be forced to give up either content externalism or privileged
access.
Naturally Gallois decides to reject the weakest of the premises which would be (6’)
because the addition of the theorizing condition causes (6’) to have a weaker claim than (6).
Gallois uses a thought experiment involving phlogiston as justification for this rejection. The
concept of phlogiston seems to function in a similar way as the natural kind concept of water by
picking out a specific substance, except that the substance that the concept of phlogiston refers to
does not actually exist. However, if it turned out that we were wrong about oxidation and the
substance phlogiston actually existed then it would follow that phlogiston is a natural kind and
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any concept derived from interacting with it would be a natural kind concept. Therefore, Gallois
claims that in this case ETC implies the following:
(10) (x) (x thinks that phlogiston was believed in by eighteenth-century chemists 
(no one has theorized about phlogiston  phlogiston exists)).
The argument, albeit a bad one as Gallois points out, is that if we grant an individual a priori
knowledge that they are having a thought about phlogiston and also assume that ETC is true then
we could know a priori that if no one has theorized about phlogiston then phlogiston exists.
Disregarding the fact that there are three big ‘ifs’ that must be satisfied prior to reaching a
priori knowledge that phlogiston exists, it is a bad argument because it is easy to imagine a
counterfactual situation where someone has a thought about phlogiston and the eighteenth
century chemists never theorized about it but yet it still doesn’t exist. Chances are that the first
chemist who theorized about phlogiston had some thought involving the substance before he
actually began theorizing about it. While the concept of the substance used in that thought would
have been a very underdeveloped concept, it nonetheless was present in the thought and
attempted to refer to a natural substance that the chemist believed to exist. According to Gallois,
this argument goes awry in the assumption that ETC implies (10) at all times. He claims that
ETC would only imply (10) if the concept of phlogiston used in the thought were a natural kind
concept. Whether this claim is accurate is something that will be examined shortly, but for the
time being Gallois asks us to assume that ETC does in fact imply (10) when phlogiston refers to
a natural kind. (Gallois 185-186)
Here is where Gallois presents what he labels the Semantic Variation thesis. When a
thought involves a concept, this concept will function differently within the thought depending
on whether the concept refers to a natural kind, does not refer to anything, or refers to anything
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that is not a natural kind. If the concept refers to a natural kind then it will perform as a rigid
designator where only things that are a member of that natural kind can be the referents of that
concept. In turn, if the concept does not refer to any existing things then it is a descriptivist
concept which performs as a non-rigid designator and anything which meets the description set
for it will be a referent of the concept. For phlogiston, this description would be ‘the stuff
thought by some eighteenth-century chemists to have negative weight’. (Gallois 186)
Gallois now evokes the question concerning whether ETC implies (10) at any time and if
so under which conditions does ETC imply (10)? According to (10), the occurrence of a thought
in someone that phlogiston was believed in by eighteenth-century chemists entails that, if no one
has theorized about phlogiston, phlogiston exists. Gallois labels this sentence which expresses
the proposition in (10) as S. Now Gallois also takes the two different propositions expressed by S
when phlogiston acts as a natural kind or a descriptivist concept and labeled them as P1 and P2
respectively. According to Gallois, the only way that an individual could be capable of
answering the question of whether ETC implies (10) is if we know whether S expresses P1 or P2.
Since it was already assumed for the time being that ETC implies (10) when S expressed P1,
Gallois examines what (10) would look like when S expresses P2.
(10*) (x) (x thinks that phlogiston was believed in by eighteenth-century chemists 
(no one has theorized about the stuff thought by eighteenth-century chemists to
have negative weight  the stuff thought by eighteenth-century chemists to have
negative weight exists)).

Gallois claims that (10*) clearly does not follow from ETC. When phlogiston acts as a non-rigid
designator then anything which meets the description would be a referent of the term. One
possible objection to this claim that (10*) does not follow from ETC is that phlogiston had been
theorized about by eighteenth century scientists which is why (10*) does not necessitate its
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existence. However, the reason this objection does not present a problem is because we can
imagine a counterfactual situation where phlogiston had not been theorized about by eighteenth
century scientists. In such a case, the subject’s thought about phlogiston as a descriptivist
concept would, by (10*), necessitate that a referent of phlogiston exists since it had not been
theorized about in the past despite the fact that the concept was not obtained from any referent.
Clearly this consequence is absurd because if it were impossible for a subject to have a thought
about a descriptivist concept that had not been previously theorized about then it would be
impossible for there to be any descriptivist concepts at all. Surely theorizers must be able have
thoughts about the concepts they are currently theorizing prior to the completion of their
theorization. Therefore, Gallois concludes that ETC does not imply (10) when phlogiston is a
descriptivist concept.
Due to this thought experiment Gallois believes the following claim should be
supplemented into the Semantic Variation thesis. “Since the semantic function of ‘phlogiston’
depends, in part, on the existence of phlogiston as a natural kind, determining the semantic
function of ‘phlogiston’ requires empirical investigation. However, one needs to determine the
semantic function of ‘phlogiston’ in order to tell whether (10) is identical with something
implied by ETC. Hence, no one can know a priori that ETC implies (10). Even if ETC can be
known a priori, there is no reason to think that (10) can.” (Gallois 187) Essentially what this all
boils down to is that even if we assume a priori knowledge of ETC and of a thought involving a
certain concept, we are still not capable of obtaining a priori knowledge that what the concept
refers to actually exists in the external environment without a priori knowledge of whether the
concept involved is a natural kind concept or not. Since knowledge of whether it is a natural kind
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concept or not is only obtainable through empirical investigation, it is impossible for anyone to
know a priori that the referent of a concept used in their thought actually exists.
According to Gallois, (5’) is only necessarily true when ‘water’ refers to a natural kind.
When ‘water’ performs as a non-rigid designator it is up in the air whether the conditions for (5’)
being true are satisfied. Due to this fact it is no longer the case that (5’) can enjoy the privileged
status of being a priori knowable simply by being a necessary truth. The argument in the last
paragraph proved that whether or not a concept refers to a natural kind is not knowledge that can
be acquired a priori and since this a priori knowledge is necessary for a priori knowledge of the
truth of (5’), (6’) is necessarily false.
Gallois considers an objection to his semantic variation thesis. Even though we cannot
come to know (6’) a priori because we cannot know a priori whether the concept used in our
occurring thought refers to a natural kind or not, the problem at hand is to try and find a way to
describe how we can have a priori knowledge of our occurring thoughts in the first place. Before
we can ask the question of how we can have a priori knowledge of the status of a given concept
used in a thought we need to first ask if we can to any extent have a priori knowledge of the
content of the occurring thought. If we can’t have a priori knowledge of any part of the content
of the thought then we couldn’t have a concept before us whose status as a natural kind or a
descriptivist can be questioned.
In response to this objection, Gallois asks us to recall his argument against Boghossian.
Even though someone may not be able to know their thought is about water rather than twater,
they may still be able to know a priori their thought that water is wet because they can contrast
this occurring thought against the potential, relevant alternatives that they do know they are not
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entertaining at the moment. Similarly with the semantic variation thesis, when it comes to
thoughts about water there will be a pair of propositions that could be expressed by those
thoughts that an individual may not be able to distinguish between a priori. However, Gallois
argues that this does not mean that no one can know a priori the content of their water thought.
For that to be true, the proposition that would be expressed by the thought ‘Water is wet’ if water
didn’t exist would have to be included in the set of relevant alternatives for the proposition that
water is wet. (Gallois 188) Gallois never clearly states how this overcomes the objection but I
think what he is getting at is that the proposition expressed by ‘Water is wet’ if water didn’t exist
would be a proposition utilizing a descriptivist concept and such a proposition could not belong
to the set of relevant alternatives for propositions utilizing a natural kind concept. Water
concepts that are non-rigid designators are not relevant alternatives to ones that are rigid
designators because they could never be interchangeable regardless of whether the world is one
where water exists or doesn’t exist. What I mean by interchangeable is that a proposition that
expresses ‘Water is wet’ when utilizing a descriptivist concept will never express the same thing
as a proposition that expresses ‘Water is wet’ utilizing a natural kind concept. While there are
many different things that can be expressed by both propositions, the only difference necessary
to justify this claim is that one implicitly expresses that water exists and the other doesn’t.
Gallois evokes another thought experiment to show that it is unnecessary to prove that the
pair of propositions discussed above do not belong to the same set of relevant alternatives in
order to show that (6’) is false. First, Gallois starts by claiming that even if the semantic variation
thesis were false there is no reason to believe (6’) is true. We are asked to imagine a world like
ours where Albertine’s concept of water is acquired from either direct or indirect contact with the
substance. We must then ask the question of whether Albertine could have thoughts about water
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if water did not exist and we are drawn back to the usual response that she could not unless she
has theorized about water sufficiently. This leads to the postulation of (12):
(12) If Albertine has acquired the concept of water from interacting with water the then
following conditional is necessarily true. If Albertine thinks she lives in a watery world,
and no one has theorized about water, Albertine lives in a watery world.

Galloiss argues that (12) has it that if Albertine has acquiring the concept of water from
interacting with water then there is no way she could have water thoughts without living in a
world with either water or water theorizers. However, (12) does not entail that there is no way
Albertine can ever have thoughts about water unless she lives in a world without water or water
theorizers. (Gallois 188)
To illustrate this point Gallois presents two different situations and in both it is open for
questions in Albertine’s eyes whether water exists or does not in her world. In the first situation
Albertine sees an actual body of water and decides to use the term ‘water’ as a synonym for a
non-rigid designator describing an odorless, colorless, tasteless liquid despite the fact that water
exists and is a natural kind. If she asks herself whether she could entertain a thought about this
concept of water in a world where water didn’t exist and in this situation the answer would be
yes because she could have had a thought about an odorless, colorless, tasteless liquid in a world
without water. In this situation (12) would be false because the antecedent was satisfied but not
the consequent.
In the second situation, Albertine acquires her concept of water in a way that ensures (12)
is true. Since this could have been by either interacting with water or inhabiting a world with
water theorizers, she is still constrained to asking herself the question of whether water exists or
not in her world. Albertine then asks herself, if she had acquired the concept from interacting
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with water could she have entertained thoughts about water in a waterless world? Here the
answer would be no because we are assuming (12) is true and since we are assuming the
antecedent would be satisfied from the direct interaction with water then water exists. However,
if Albertine proceeds to asks herself in this situation whether she could have thoughts about
water if it in fact did not exist then Albertine can in fact answer yes because the antecedent of the
condition in (12) is false so her potential thoughts are not constrained by it.
Gallois claims that he has argued that the usual thought experiments which have been
used to justify ETC do not support anything stronger than (12). (Gallois 189-190) What can be
derived from those thought experiments is, “Someone who has acquired a natural kind concept C
from interacting with a natural kind K could not have had C unless that natural kind exists.”
(Gallois 190) Although, even if we agree with this claim we are not forced to conclude that no
one could have C unless K exists. It is only when C was acquired from interacting with K that it
is impossible to have C without K existing. If C was acquired in some other way then it is
consistent with (12) and therefore ETC that we can have C without K necessarily existing.
Given this conclusion, we are forced to revise (5’) and replace it with:
(5*) ETC □ (x) (x has acquired the concept of water from interacting with water) 
□ (x thinks x lives in a watery world  (no one has theorized about water  x lives in a
watery world))).

Which then leads to (6’) and (7’) being revised and replaced with:
(6*) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that (5*)).
(7*) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that (y) (y has acquired the concept of water from
interacting with water  (y thinks y lives in a watery world  (no one has theorized
about water  y lives in a watery world)))).
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Gallois claims that we would be very wrong to deduce (8’) from (1) and (7*) and the most that
can be deduced from (1) and (7*) is this:
(8*) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that (x has acquired the concept of water from interacting
with water  (no one has theorized about water  x lives in a watery world))).

Gallois argues that (8*) is a harmless conclusion that is far from being absurd. The McKinsey*
argument no longer presents an incompatibility between ETC and privileged access because
many people would agree that we can know a priori that if we acquired our concept of water
from interacting with water, and no one has theorized about water, then water exists.
In response to Gallois’s overall argument, he does not leave open much room for
objection. Apart from rejecting the use of a closure principle, the only other vulnerable aspect of
his argument is the claim that we are able to know a proposition expressed by our thought a
priori even if we are not able to contrast this proposition from at least one particular possible
alternative proposition that could have been expressed by the thought. While it makes rational
sense that we should be able to contrast a ‘water’ thought from a ‘grass’ thought even if we are
not able to contrast a ‘water’ thought from a ‘twater’ thought, one could easily argue that in order
to claim that a thought is known to be a ‘water’ thought one must be able to distinguish from all
relevant alternatives and not just all but one. Postulation of such an argument would not
completely defeat Gallois’s compatibility argument because Gallois can always fall back on
Falvey and Owens’ argument that we can have introspective knowledge of content even without
introspective knowledge of comparative content. The only part of Gallois’s argument that would
be lost by having to resort to Falvey and Owens’ argument is that we could no longer claim that
we can know a priori that our thought is a ‘water’ thought as opposed to a ‘grass’ thought. The
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reason this would be lost is because Falvey and Owens claim that we are restricted from all
introspective knowledge of comparative content where Gallois only claims that we are restricted
from comparative content for corresponding concepts developed in unique scenarios like the
Twin Earth switching situation. While losing this part of the argument would not be the end of
the world for compatibilism, it does run counter to our intuitions of the types of things in our
minds that we are supposed to have privileged access to.
Putting aside this potential vulnerability, there is one aspect of Gallois’s theory which is
extremely significant for the compatibilist cause. This aspect is the idea that we are not capable
of knowing a priori whether the concept used in our thoughts is a natural kind or a descriptivist
concept. While this is a very simple notion, it almost entirely explains why the absurd conclusion
of McKinsey-style arguments can be generated in the first place. Surely it would be possible for
someone to reach a priori knowledge that some particular object exists in the external
environment when the person is armed with a priori knowledge of content externalism, the
content of their thought, and that a concept within that content is a natural kind concept.
However, by taking out a priori knowledge of the latter the possibility of a priori knowledge of
the existence of some object is erased. As long as it is the case that content externalism does not
necessarily apply to descriptivist concepts then we could never reach a priori knowledge that the
referent of a descriptivist concept exists precisely because we can’t be sure that the concept even
has a referent without empirical investigation. This aspect of Gallois’s argument allows us to
have a priori knowledge of all of the content of our thoughts except for the status of the concepts
involved as natural kind or descriptivist while maintaining content externalism.
It would appear that this alone could solve the entire compatibility debate but something
is still missing. Despite the rationality in the idea of not being able to know a priori whether a
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concept is a natural kind or descriptivist concept, we often do know that the concepts used in our
thoughts do have referents because at some time prior to the thought we have interacted with the
objects that helped shaped our concepts. A compatibilist would usually respond to this claim by
postulating that this knowledge is a posteriori because it was obtained through empirical
investigation but the fact of the matter is that upon instantiation of a thought we have this
knowledge without performing any empirical investigation after the thought’s instantiation. This
would be another potentially absurd conclusion for incompatibilists to latch onto unless there
were a way to describe the situation so that a posteriori knowledge can be part of knowledge
obtained a priori in such a manner that it could not be considered absurd. Such a description is
available and will be brought to light towards the end of Sarah Sawyer’s chapter. Even though
she only briefly mentions the issue of natural kind and descriptivist concepts, I believe she
should have spent more time with it because further elaboration on its affect within her theory
would make her theory stronger against objections than it originally appeared to be.
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Chapter IX
Sarah Sawyer starts off her paper by explaining that her motivation for writing it stems
from a sudden realization that her theory invites a consequence that could potentially be used to
refute her theory altogether. Although, instead of taking the usual route of amending the theory
so that the consequence can be avoided, she believes the best path to take is to embrace the
consequence. While it may not sound like an intelligent decision to embrace something
considered absurd by many respected philosophers, she believes that further clarification
pertaining to how this consequence is usually reached and to the descriptions of the processes
involved will free this consequence from the label of absurdness.
This particular problem originates with the question of, “how can semantic externalism
account for privileged access to the content of one’s thoughts?” (Sawyer 523) According to
Sawyer, this question presents us with two problems where the second is a result of a solution to
the first. The first problem starts with the fact that due to semantic externalism the set of possible
and actual thoughts that a person may have is determined by the relations that the person stands
in to their environment. The relations that the person stands in with either their environment or
other people in their environment with whom they communicate are what allow or restrict the
thoughts they potentially can and cannot entertain. “Given that a subject is unable to distinguish
the specific environmental features upon which her thoughts essentially depend from other
possible features upon which her counterfactual thoughts might have depended, how can a
subject generally know what she thinks?” (Sawyer 523) Such knowledge would require
empirical information about the relations they stand in with their own environment and the
necessity of such knowledge seems to refute the principle of privileged access. It also denies the
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first-person authority aspect of privileged access because it is possible that some other person
could be in as good of a position as we are to know the content of our own thoughts.
According to Sawyer, a sufficient solution to this problem has already been discovered.
The idea of second-order states discussed by Burge, among others, and attributed to Davidson
holds the key to solving this problem. The same factors which determine the content of our firstorder thoughts are also what determine the content of our second-order thoughts. She points out
in a footnote that most philosophers who adopt this stance usually subscribe to some kind of
‘containment principle’ where the content of the first-order thought is embedded in the secondorder belief but Sawyer herself does not want to be committed to any such principle; she just
claims that the content between levels of thought will co-vary alongside one another. Since the
same set of concepts are available to all our levels of thought there is no reason the content of a
second-order belief cannot have the same content as the first-order thoughts. (Sawyer 524)
Although Sawyer never explains further, I assume that the reason she believes this solution
overcomes the problem is because these second-order thoughts are reflexive and even though we
cannot have privileged access to the content of our first-order thoughts we can access the content
of the second-order thoughts. Usually this is due to the fact that the second-order thoughts will
be self-verifying since their content is drawn from the first-order thought and can be known a
priori because they are necessarily true due to the fact that you cannot have the second-order
thought unless the first-order thought occurred.
Sawyer argues that the second problem arises from the alleged absurdity of the
conclusion in the previous argument and is directed to the semantic externalist. Instead of the
burden being placed on privileged access to prove its truth in light of semantic externalism,
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semantic externalism must now prove its truth in light of privileged access. The apparent
incompatibility has once again resurfaced with the following claim:
(EC) x could not have non-empirical knowledge of contingent facts about her
environment.

(EC) expresses a claim about a priori knowledge that is considered by many philosophers to be
necessarily true. Although he is a compatibilist, we saw in Chapter III that Anthony Brueckner
concedes prior to developing his own argument that in the original McKinsey Argument the
proposition that Oscar can know E a priori “embodies a claim about a priori knowledge which is
obviously false on anyone’s view.” (Brueckner 197) E represents some contingent fact of the
environment that Oscar’s ability to think his thought ‘Water is wet’ depends on due to semantic
externalism. Sawyer constructed (EC) so that its negation expresses the claim that Brueckner
conceded to be obviously false on anyone’s view. (Sawyer 524) By constructing (EC) to express
the negation of the claim that Brueckner states would be obviously false on anyone’s view,
Sawyer is trying to make us feel safe in making the assumption that Brueckner would also
concede that (EC) expresses a claim that would be necessarily true on anyone’s view including
compatibilists. That (EC) is necessarily true is the claim that Sawyer wishes to challenge.
The problem then is that through semantic externalism we can know the necessary
conditions that must be met to possess any particular concept and if we assume that we have
privileged access to the content of our thoughts as well as our concepts then we are able to infer
a priori knowledge of many things we should only be able to know empirically. Since this
knowledge was acquired through introspection and conceptual analysis alone, this argument
illustrates yet another way in which semantic externalism and privileged access are apparently
incompatible. Sawyer labels this the Argument from Privileged Access. (Sawyer 524)
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According to Sawyer, the main reason why the Argument from Privileged Access leads
to the alleged incompatibility is because it allows for the generation of ‘instance arguments’
which Sawyer labels as such because they allow someone to go from the instance of a thought to
contingent facts about the world. (Sawyer 524-525) Instance arguments usually take the
following form:
(1) I am thinking a water-thought
(2) If I am thinking a water-thought, then I’m in a water-world
(3) Therefore, I am in a water-world
It is crucial to notice that for Sawyer, as many philosophers would agree, that for a subject to be
in a water-world is not necessarily for them to be in a world containing water as a natural kind.
The subject may be in a water-world which does not contain any water as a natural kind as long
as the subject is part of a community which has the concept of water. Sawyer alongside Andre
Gallois also points out that knowledge of the status of a concept, as a natural kind or descriptivist
concept, is not required for knowledge of the possession of a concept. However, this fact is not
as significant for Sawyer’s argument as it was for Gallois’s argument.
Through introspection we arrive at premise (1) and by conceptual analysis we get
premise (2). Premise (3) follows directly from (1) and (2) so it seems that we can have nonempirical knowledge that we live in a water-world but if this were possible then (EC) would be
false. Since many consider the negation of (EC) to be absurd then it appears that we have arrived
at a crossroads. Either we abandon semantic externalism or privileged access. Sawyer, on the
other hand, takes a route that most philosophers never even considered and instead of going left
or right she decides to turn around and go down the path we came from. She decides to challenge
the absurdness of (EC).
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Responses to the Argument from Privileged Access will fit into one of two categories.
Those who are advocates of semantic internalism will respond by claiming that the argument is
watertight and thus provides a reductio of semantic externalism. Others who do not want to give
up semantic externalism will respond with arguments that attempt to find a flaw in the Argument
from Privileged Access so that the conjunction of (1) and (2) does not necessarily entail (3). The
former are considered Incompatibilists and the latter are considered Compatibilists. (Sawyer 525)
Sawyer’s theory is rather unique in that she agrees with incompatibilists that the Argument from
Privileged Access does lead to the possible derivation of empirical knowledge from introspection
and conceptual analysis alone but her theory claims that such a derivation does not make
semantic externalism and privileged access inherently incompatible. Due to this uniqueness
Sawyer believes that it is essential to discuss two traditional compatibilist responses to the
Argument from Privileged Access before she presents her own theory. In order to see why such
an extreme method of argument, i.e. embracing an absurd conclusion, must be used we should
learn why the more conventional tactics were destined to fail. However, first Sawyer’s theory
commits her to explain a crucial aspect of the principle of Privileged Access she is utilizing.
The idea of any sort of infallibility when it comes to self-knowledge has been a very
unpopular and controversial topic since the inherent problems in the Cartesian view of the mind
were pointed out. It would therefore seem like a risky move on Sawyer’s part to adopt any sort of
infallibility for the version of Privileged Access she wishes to use. However, she does in fact
adopt the idea that an individual has infallible access to their own concepts and presents an
argument for why this is the case which appears to be iron clad. First, we must look at the
process of an individual attributing a thought to a subject. The first condition that must be
satisfied before a correct attribution is possible is not the ability to make a correct inference from
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the subject’s actions but instead that the individual possesses the same concepts as the subject.
(Sawyer 526) In the Twin Earth scenario, neither twin could possibly attribute their respective
‘water’ thoughts to the other because they do not possess the same water concepts. The
attribution of a thought requires at the very least the ability to entertain the same thought
yourself. As philosophers, we are not restricted as such because it is assumed that we possess the
concepts discussed in our hypothetical thought experiments. Although, we are constrained to
having to be more careful in our attributions since a correct attribution on our part also depends
on our recognition of the environment our subject inhabits at the time of the attribution. The
subjects themselves are not similarly constrained because they, as well as everyone else who
inhabits the same environment, are “locked in” to the same way of thinking.
With all this on the table it’s time to think about how we attribute thoughts to ourselves.
The first condition here is already satisfied because there is no question that I possess the same
concepts as the person thinking the thought because I am the person thinking the thought.
Sawyer points out that this would explain the asymmetry in our ability to attribute a particular
thought to ourselves and our ability to do the same with others even when the same exact
behavioral evidence is available in both situations. However, Sawyer wants to go even further
and claim that when we ascribe a given thought to ourselves it is not the case that we can be
wrong in the ascription because the very act of ascribing the thought to ourselves involves
thinking the thought as well. Even if the thought we had been thinking which motivated us to
attribute some thought to ourselves in the first place were different than the thought we ended up
ascribing to ourselves, the ascription itself could not be wrong because we ended up thinking the
ascribed thought anyways. Sawyer’s notion of ‘thinks’ is such that whenever the proposition ‘S
*’s that p’ is satisfied where ‘*’ is some form of propositional attitude, this satisfaction
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necessarily entails that ‘S thinks that p’. “The question whether or not you are entertaining a
given thought is a mistaken question. The very formulation of such a question determines that
the answer must be affirmative. Thoughts about the possession of a concept are self-verifying.”
(Sawyer 527) This leads Sawyer to the postulation of (PA) which she describes as the principle
of privileged access with respect to concepts.
(PA) For all x, if x thinks she thinks that p, where concept F is an essential component of
the thought that p, x has the concept F.

Sawyer claims that under (PA) it would be impossible for even Davidson’s swampman to be
mistaken in thinking that he possessed some concept because he could not think a thought using
a concept he did not possess.
Sawyer acknowledges that her account of privileged access is far from being complete
but (PA) still serves the purposes it was intended for. The first purpose is that she claims that
regardless of whatever potential problems privileged access and semantic externalism have on
their own, the addition of semantic externalism to (PA) would not entail any additional
problems. Sawyer never elaborates as to why this is the case but it would seem that what she has
in mind is that semantic externalism provides us with knowledge of the necessary conditions for
possessing a given concept and (PA) provides us with knowledge of the necessary conditions for
thinking that we have a given thought. The simple, straightforward combination of knowledge of
the necessary conditions for those two things is not enough to generate any new problems and
therefore not inherently incompatible. The second purpose fulfilled by (PA) is that it is sufficient
to generate instance arguments and thus susceptible to the Argument of Privileged Access
without the necessity of complete knowledge of the current, conscious psychological state we are
in. Sawyer states in a footnote that this means that instance arguments and the Argument from
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Privileged Access are not weakened in cases where a mental state of jealousy is mistaken for
hatred. (Sawyer 527)
Now that we have (PA) on the table it is time to look at the two traditional compatibilist
responses that Sawyer wants to reject. The first response is to deny that we have knowledge of
our concepts. It is tough to say how one could make this claim and remain a compatibilist
because I cannot imagine how an argument would go that we have a priori knowledge of the
content of our thoughts but we do not have knowledge of the concepts which are part of that
content. We are assuming that full knowledge of the content of the thought is not required for us
to know the thought in general but it is hard to see how any sense can be made of the content of
the thought minus the content provided by the concepts and therefore how any knowledge can
result from it. So the only way to make any sense of the claim is to adopt the view of
Wittgenstein and argue that it doesn’t make any sense to say that a proposition is known if it is
guaranteed to be true. (Sawyer 527-528) On my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s view, when
something is necessarily true is it not that we come to learn it as we do contingent facts but rather
we become aware of it as a necessary truth. I can’t think of any other way to describe it because
surely Wittgenstein isn’t suggesting that our minds have an inherent restriction for processing
information about necessary truths. Though I can see how we wouldn’t want to call it knowledge
because knowledge is learned and in order for something to be learned there must be a possibility
of error; there must be the possibility that the fact I learn could have been different but I went
through a process of ruling out those other potential alternatives. For necessary truths like
1+1=2, we do not learn it but are instead made aware of its existence as a necessary truth. Since
there is no possibility of thinking that we have a thought using concept F, when F is a concept we
do not have, then our ‘knowledge’ that we have concept F cannot be considered knowledge. This

119
would solve the problem because we could never have knowledge of (3) let alone a priori
knowledge of it.
The other response pertains to Nozick’s conditional theory of knowledge and more
specifically about its consequence that knowledge is not closed under known entailment. A
common example is the following:
(1’) I am working at my desk
(2’) If I am working at my desk then I am not a brain-in-a-vat
(3’) Therefore, I am not a brain-in-a-vat

It would appear that there is no way that we could know (1’) and (2’) without that yielding
knowledge of (3’) but when the idea of possible worlds is introduced nothing is certain. Nozick’s
conditional theory of knowledge allows for the possibility that (1’) and (2’) could be known
without entailing that (3’) can be known because it is possible that each proposition could be
assessed by different sets of possible worlds. (Sawyer 528) In Nozick’s conditional theory a
subject, S, can be said to know a proposition, P, if and only if 4 conditions are met: P is true, S
believes that P, if P were false then S would not believe that P, and if P were true then S would
believe that P. The only instances where S could know (1) and (2) without that resulting in
knowledge of (3) are when the last two conditions are assessed for (1) and (2) on one possible
world while those conditions are assessed for (3) on some separate possible world.
Sawyer wants to maintain that we shouldn’t take this argument as a reason to think that
knowledge isn’t closed under known entailment. Just because we could assess the premises and
conclusion relative to different sets of possible worlds does not mean that we should assess them
in that manner. Moreover, we have more reasons to think that we should not assess them in that
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manner than we have for thinking that we should. There is a possible world where (3) does not
meet the 3rd condition because it is possible to imagine a world where S is a brain-in-a-vat but
does not believe they are a brain-in-a-vat. However, in that possible world S could not know (2)
either because in that world we could say with consistency that if S does not believe that they are
a brain-in-a-vat despite being a brain-in-a-vat then it is possible that S also believes that they are
working at their desk even though they are actually a brain-in-a-vat. This possibility alone
invalidates the conditional in (2). If every world where both (1) and (2) are known is one where
(3) is also known and every world where (3) is not known is one where either (1) or (2) is not
known then there seems to be very good reasons for believing that we should not assess
propositions which are paired together according to different sets of possible worlds.
The whole concept of possible worlds implies that each distinct possible world is
different from any other in some way. The truth of any proposition could be affected by even the
slightest change in circumstances so when we assess paired propositions we should not do so
according to different sets of possible worlds. Upon moving from one possible world to another a
proposition we previously considered to be true could become false. If two or more propositions
cannot all be true on the same possible world then there is no justified reason to believe that we
should hold them all to be true just because each one is true on distinct possible worlds. If we
were to allow for this line of reasoning then the propositions ‘I am currently in New York’ and ‘I
am currently in California’ could potentially both be considered true and, even worse, known.
Under Nozick’s conditional theory, the first proposition could be known because it meets the
conditions when assessed in our actual world while the second proposition could also be known
because it meets the conditions when assessed in some other possible world where I happen to be
on vacation this week. The possibility that I can know that I am currently in New York and that I
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am currently in California at the same time appears as absurd, if not more than, the conclusion of
the McKinsey argument that it is possible for us to have a priori knowledge of the external
environment. Considering that Sawyer is challenging the absurdity of the conclusion of the
McKinsey argument, we should not conclude that due to this apparent absurdity we should not
assess propositions according to different sets of possible worlds under Nozick’s conditional
theory. However, it is enough reason to claim that the closure principle which was under scrutiny
by this use of Nozick’s conditional theory should at least be safe for the purposes of her
argument.
While there are other problems with compatibilist responses like those that deny
knowledge of concepts or reject certain closure principles, the main factor that Sawyer wants to
point out for why these arguments are unsatisfactory is that claiming that the conclusion of an
instance argument is not known does not evade the Argument from Privileged Access. (Sawyer
528) The only people who were concerned about the Argument from Privileged Access but are
relieved by the claim that the conclusion of an instance argument is not known are
incompatibilists who do not want to sacrifice semantic externalism. This is because semantic
externalism was backed into a corner and Wittgenstein and Nozick’s responses gave it an out.
They would be happy to sacrifice privileged access instead of semantic externalism.
Compatibilists, on the other hand, would be far from relieved from Wittgenstein and Nozick’s
responses because it diminishes privileged access down to something a lot weaker than the
principle we usually allude to in this debate and whose development was motivated by our
intuitions about our access to our own minds. Furthermore, it would be extremely hard to
persuade someone that they cannot know the conclusion of a type of argument that they have
used many times before and has systemically allowed them to form true beliefs about their
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environment. Sawyer wants to go as far as to claim that we can know that this method provides
us with true beliefs. (Sawyer 528) If the Argument from Privileged Access depended on the
question of whether or not the conclusions of instance arguments could be known then it would
be pushed aside until that question is answered; but the real force of the argument is that in
actuality people have the ability to systematically use instance arguments to obtain true beliefs
about the environment and any theory which cannot account for how or why this method is
capable of systematically yielding true beliefs is going to be found lacking something if it is not
altogether wrong.
In the end, Sawyer’s response to objections against the Argument from Privileged Access
comes down to the fact that throughout human history we have used instance arguments to
systematically arrive at true beliefs. Systematic generation of truth would seem to be a strict
definition of what should be considered a reliable method and to date the best way to deem that
we have epistemic warrant for holding a belief is that we arrived at this belief through a reliable
method. (Sawyer 528) For this reason Sawyer believes that criticizing instance arguments is not
the correct way to argue for compatibilism. Instead, we should be criticizing what is deeming the
conclusion of instance arguments absurd in the first place. We should be questioning our belief
that (EC) expresses a claim that is necessarily true on anyone’s view.
Sawyer attempts to answer this question by doing three things. First she offers an
explanation for why it is that instance arguments can systematically yield truths about our
environment when used correctly. Next she identifies a causal feature that is usually not present
when we make what we consider to be invalid inferences from introspective knowledge to
empirical knowledge. It is the lack of this causal feature that elicits our doubts in the
acceptability of instance arguments. Sawyer aims to show that instance arguments aren’t
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inherently unacceptable because when this causal feature is present it justifies the inference from
introspective to empirical knowledge. Once this has been proven the last factor of Sawyer’s
argument is that it is semantic externalism which necessitates that this causal feature will always
be present in instance arguments. As long as this feature is present in the instance arguments the
inference from introspective to empirical knowledge will be acceptable. (Sawyer 529)
Sawyer explains the reliability of instance arguments through comparing conceptacquisition to photography. Photography is a process through which we take in information
about the current state of the external environment by imprinting light reflections on paper so
that we can use the information about that given state of the environment at some later time.
Although the result of this process is simple, the process itself is rather complicated. Similarly,
concept-acquisition is a process of storing information about the current state of the external
environment upon its acquisition precisely because for any given concept there is ‘one of a
unique set of possible causal processes’ necessary for its acquisition. (Sawyer 529) According to
Sawyer, the Argument from Privileged Access relies on the similarities between photography
and concept acquisition. She refers to concepts as resembling ‘mental photographs’ which can be
used in our thought and communication at a later time and give us the ability to use them as
evidence to determine the existence of some past state of the environment. (Sawyer 529)
The explanation of the reliability of instance arguments comes out when we show where
the analogy between photography and concept-acquisition breaks down. Sawyer admits while it
may not currently be physically possible, it is at least logically possible that someone could
produce a fake photograph which depicts some information about a past state of the environment
which did not occur. The reason this is important is because she argues that a similar situation
with concept-acquisition could never happen because semantic externalism ensures that there is
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no way that a particular concept could be acquired through a process that is not part of the unique
set of possible causal processes necessary for its acquisition. Fake photographs are possible
because someone could potentially create the exact right amount and kinds of light in just the
right places but due to semantic externalism there is no way to get a given concept without the
exact right conditions necessary to acquire it. Therefore, Sawyer illustrates that semantic
externalism necessitates a causal feature of instance arguments which is that, “causal contact
(either to a natural kind or to a linguistic community) is a necessary condition for the acquisition
of a concept,” and to make any claim that states otherwise is to deny semantic externalism which
is on par with accepting incompatibilism. (Sawyer 530) In order to prevent possible objections to
this claim, Sawyer considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken in our
thought’s that we have a given concept? She offers the contrapositive of (PA) to show why this
question would be mistaken:
(PA’) For all x, if x does not have the concept F, where concept F is an essential
component of the thought that p, x does not think that she thinks that p.

Before Sawyer moves on to why semantic externalism guarantees the presence of this
causal feature in instance arguments she believes that she must illustrate two disanalogies
between inferences from photographs and inferences from concepts. In photography, inferences
made from photographs will yield specific facts about the external environment but inferences
from concepts will yield general facts about the external environment. (Sawyer 530) Sawyer
believes this is one possible explanation for why it is possible to produce fake photographs but it
is not possible to acquire ‘fake concepts’. If some form of causal contact is necessary in order to
possess a certain concept there is no way to fake that causal contact but the correct amount and
kinds of light necessary to produce a given photograph can be faked. The second difference is
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simply that the main purpose of photographs is to store information about the past where the
main purpose of concepts is to be used in thought and communication. However, this is no
reason to think of concepts in a different manner since the reason we are able to use them for
such purposes is because they do store information about the external environment. (Sawyer 530)
Here is where Sawyer presents a crucial feature of her argument which has been working
beneath the surface until now. She has been describing instance arguments up to this point in the
way that causes most people to think that they are unacceptable in the first place. Usually we
take instance arguments as a way to go from introspective knowledge to empirical knowledge of
the current state of the environment. It could easily be argued that any empirical knowledge of
the current state of the environment is impossible regardless of resulting from introspective
knowledge. Even with empirical investigation, the second you gain empirical knowledge of what
was the current state of the environment that state becomes a past state of the environment.
Therefore, Sawyer makes the qualification that the true purpose of instance arguments is not to
give us knowledge of facts of one’s current external environment but instead to give us
knowledge of facts of the past states of our environment. (Sawyer 530) If we imagine Susan in a
Twin Earth switching scenario where her concepts are replaced once they spend a sufficient
amount of time in the different environment, it is possible for her to have thoughts about a water
concept, rather than a twater concept, in a twater environment as long as it is before her concepts
are replaced. If Susan were to use instance arguments to conclude that she was in an environment
containing water during this period of time then she would be wrong in her conclusion.
However, Susan could make a correct conclusion that in the recent past she inhabited an
environment containing water.
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Finally, we move on to Sawyer’s argument that semantic externalism guarantees that this
causal feature she described earlier is present in instance arguments. According to Sawyer,
individualism is the theory that claims that causal contact isn’t a necessity in order to acquire a
concept. Instead causal contact is only required for knowledge that our concept has some referent
in the external environment. Under individualism it is possible to imagine a person who could
make inferences from their concepts to facts about the external environment prior to any actual
experience of the environment. Essentially, individualism embodies the concern that most people
generally have with instance arguments; they present a possibility of someone having knowledge
of contingent facts about the environment, facts commonly construed as only being ascertainable
empirically, prior to any causal contact with the environment. Semantic externalism, on the other
hand, expresses claims which are the negation of the claim of individualism expressed above.
Knowledge of contingent facts prior to causal contact is impossible under semantic externalism
which means that the feature of instance arguments that elicits most people’s concerns cannot be
present in such arguments. Now this does not mean that any conclusions of instance arguments
are acceptable because we still cannot gain knowledge from them about the current state of the
environment. However, the fact that prior causal contact is necessary to possess a concept means
that our ability to think a thought using that concept allows us to gain knowledge of the past state
of our environment since in the past we must have had a certain kind of causal contact with that
past state of the environment.
“Semantic externalism is precisely the view that an individual cannot be regarded as
complete with the concepts of external contingents independently of any prior causal contact
with a specific given environment. The self can no longer be regarded as an entity completely
separate from her environment. As a result, the apparent clear divide between the mind and the
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world is eroded. The world we inhabit determines our mental capacities, our ability to think
certain thoughts.” (Sawyer 531-532) This essential tie between our mind and our environment
ensures that our concepts are proof in themselves that the necessary empirical conditions
required to acquire them were satisfied at some earlier point in time. Moreover, our privileged
access to these concepts ensures that we know this fact. The problem that most people held with
instance arguments were that they seemed to allow us to come to know contingent facts about the
environment without delving into experience at all but this line of thought is mistaken. We did
have to delve into experience to gain this knowledge; it is just that we didn’t have to go into
experience in between the occurrence of the thought and the acquisition of the knowledge. The
causal contact necessary for the acquisition of the concepts used in the thought occurred prior to
the instantiation of the thought. Without that prior causal contact we could not have had that
thought in the first place.
Sawyer concludes that through the conjunction of (PA) and semantic externalism we are
able to have direct knowledge of the concepts we possess as well as of the necessary conditions
for acquiring those concepts. She wants to illustrate that knowledge of the latter is only possible
under the assumption that semantic externalism can be known, but for the moment it is fine that
it is possible to be known. (Sawyer 532) Sawyer does not believe that her theory presents a
problem for epistemology or for the philosophy of mind because in no way does her theory claim
that we can come to know everything empirical a priori. We can only come to know empirical
things through introspection that have already been acquired empirically. (Sawyer 532) All
Sawyer’s theory states is that privileged access gives us infallible access to our concepts so if we
could know the necessary conditions for their acquisition then we could know that in a past state
of our environment those conditions were satisfied.
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Chapter X
This journey through the compatibility debate between Content Externalism and
Privileged Access has gone back and forth between those who think they have found a solution
and others who are convinced that there is no possible solution. Once Paul Boghossian arrived at
the scene all the potential solutions had to get much more intricate because we could no longer
obtain our self-knowledge through inference or introspection without completely refuting his
arguments which appear to be ironclad. Some people like Kevin Falvey, Joseph Owens, Andre
Gallois, and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio tried to side-step Boghossian’s arguments and in some ways
they could be said to have succeeded. Although even those who believe they succeeded do so
with a grain of salt because they know that our concepts of externalism and/or privileged access
were weakened in the process. It wasn’t until Sarah Sawyer decided to challenge the absurdness
of the possibility of a priori knowledge of the external world that a light could be seen at the end
of the tunnel. As with everything in philosophy, not everyone would be convinced that Sawyer
actually solved the problem. The purpose of this project was to go through the steps of the
compatibility debate to see why it is in the current position that it is in today. In this conclusion I
will argue that Sawyer’s solution is the best solution for compatibility put forth so far and I will
explain why it overcomes the McKinsey argument while meeting the restrictions of a priori selfknowledge set in place by Boghossian.
Sawyer’s theory is essentially that given semantic externalism in order to acquire a
concept there must have been prior causal contact with either a natural kind or a linguistic
community. So unless we are willing to give up semantic externalism, whenever we have an
ability to think a thought utilizing a particular concept we can know that at some point in time we
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had causal contact with either the natural kind that the concept refers to or a linguistic
community that already possesses the concept. The reason that this does not interfere with the
way in which we can know our own thoughts is because we cannot come to know contingent
facts about the current state of our external environment but instead only about past states of the
environment. While we did not acquire a priori knowledge of the concepts used in the thought
since it was through empirical investigation that we acquired them, we did access the content of
the thought completely outside of experience. Therefore any knowledge that results from our
access to that content was obtained outside of experience and thus a priori. This knowledge
would also be authoritative because no one else has access to these thoughts in or out of
experience so no one else could be in a better position to claim that we are mistaken. Authority
doesn’t mean infallibility so the possibility of error is still present but all that matters is that no
one is in a better position than we are to discover potential errors.
Some believe that knowledge of this kind may not be considered direct because going
from knowledge of individual concepts to how those concepts function together in a thought
require processes such as inference and observation. It is hard to object to this argument since
any mediating steps between a thoughts occurrence and the acquisition of knowledge could
easily be said to do away with any attribution of directness. However, there are a few things to
keep in mind; the first is that this problem began with a priori knowledge and it was later on that
some author started to discuss things like direct and authoritative knowledge. So the lack of this
knowledge being direct doesn’t clash with our intuitions about our privileged access to our
thoughts that started this debate in the first place. The second thing to keep in mind is that there
are a number of ways that we can describe how we go from the occurrence of a thought to the
acquisition of knowledge without using inference, observation, or any other mediating steps. One
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such possibility is that whatever was going on subconsciously or in the external world that
caused an occurrence of a thought could have prompted a gathering of relevant information from
our concepts to construct the thought. We simply accessed the information that our subconscious
mind already gathered and didn’t have to infer the content of the thought from the concepts
contained within it. Basically what I am arguing is that if one were to object to Sawyer’s
argument based on a lack of directness then we would have to consider it as a completely
separate issue first because there are a number of different possibilities to account for.
The last part of Sawyer’s argument is meant to show that as long as we hold onto
semantic externalism we can be sure that any instance arguments we use will have the causal
feature that makes them reliable. In doing so she also provides an argument for why we cannot
give up semantic externalism by showing that the only other option is internalism. To accept
internalism is to allow for the possibility of a priori knowledge of the external environment
because under internalism our concepts do not necessarily depend on relations to their referents
in the external environment. This is on par with accepting the possibility presented in the
conclusion of the McKinsey argument which most people consider absurd. As long as you
believe that we cannot have a priori knowledge of contingent facts of our external environment
regardless of whether they are facts about its past or current state, you cannot subscribe to
internalism. Assuming then that semantic externalism is adopted, our ability to think a thought
with a given concept means that prior causal contact must have occurred since we could not
possess the concept without it. However, a priori knowledge of contingent facts of past states of
the environment should not concern us. The features which categorize the knowledge as ‘a
priori’ do not imply that we acquired all the relevant information that led to the acquisition of the
knowledge outside of experience. Clearly to have knowledge of anything in the external
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environment one must experience the external environment through empirical investigation. The
a priori feature just refers to our access to the content of the thoughts using the knowledge
obtained in experience through empirical investigation. Furthermore, the a priori access is only
to the self-knowledge that we are thinking a thought with a given content that was acquired from
experience.
Now there are 2 reasons why Sawyer’s theory is so far the best solution presented to the
compatibility debate and therefore why I believe it solves the problem altogether. The first
reason is because it allows for consistency in McKinsey’s triad of propositions without changing
our notions of semantic externalism or privileged access while also addressing the conditions set
in place by Boghossian. If we recall, McKinsey’s triad is:
(5) Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet.
(6) The proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is wet necessarily depends upon E.
(7) The proposition E cannot be known a priori, but only by empirical investigation.
Under Sawyer’s theory, (1) is straightforward and E in (2) is simply the causal feature of
semantic externalism that prior causal contact is required for Oscar’s possession of his concept of
water. On the other hand, (3) is not as simple. If semantic externalism can be known a priori
then (3) is wrong because Oscar could then potentially know E a priori. If semantic externalism
cannot be known a priori then E also cannot be known a priori. However, as we saw in earlier
chapters some have argued that if semantic externalism cannot be known a priori then there is no
longer a problem. In such cases we lose the potential ability to use instance arguments to
generate knowledge of the external environment and the absurd conclusion which started all of
this no longer exists. So for the sake of argument we will assume that semantic externalism is
knowable a priori. Through a priori knowledge of his thought and semantic externalism, E would
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be that Oscar has had prior causal contact with water or a linguistic community with the concept
of water. The only possible instance where McKinsey could allow that E is knowable a priori is
where he includes descriptivist concepts but in such a case the problem dissipates because
Oscar’s thought no longer depends on E. Knowledge of his thought does not lead to an absurd
conclusion anymore but McKinsey would probably not consider it ‘knowledge’ anyways
because it does not pertain to anything that exists. If McKinsey is to maintain his position that
the triad is inconsistent then he only has one option which is to argue that E isn’t knowable a
priori and he claims that Oscar cannot know his thought a priori due to that fact.
Sawyer’s theory addresses this problem. The only possible reason McKinsey could have
for why semantic externalism is knowable a priori but E isn’t is because we cannot know a priori
whether our concept is a natural kind or descriptivist concept. For McKinsey, such knowledge
should only be obtainable through empirical investigation. He never discusses whether or not
semantic externalism is knowable a priori but since we are assuming it is in this hypothetical
situation then it seems like this is where McKinsey’s objection would most likely exist. Either
way it does not matter because Sawyer’s theory is not burdened by this interpretation of E.
In most cases McKinsey is right that we should not be able to know that water exists in
the external environment as a natural kind or as a concept in a linguistic community because of
the possibility of descriptivist concepts. Although in the case of Sawyer’s theory, we have
infallible access to our concepts and our memory is not restricted. We can remember if we
obtained our concept of water from interacting with the substance, learning of it from other
people who have the concept, or if we simply had a thought about a colorless, tasteless, and
odorless liquid and developed a concept to represent this hypothetical substance. So in this
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theory we can know the status of our concepts a priori since we do not need to do any empirical
investigation for the information.
In previous chapters when we discussed this problem we were restricting memory
because it seemed counterintuitive to the idea of a priori knowledge since knowledge of how we
acquired a concept was obtained through our experience of the external environment. Sawyer’s
theory has it that we have a priori access to the content of our concepts which we have
previously acquired and how we initially acquired a concept would definitely be the type of
information stored in it. The only catch here is that we can only have a priori knowledge of the
status of our concepts as they pertain to a past state of our environment. A scenario is consistent
with Sawyer’s theory where after our acquisition of a concept through causal contact with an
object in the external environment all of the objects that the concept refers to are wiped off the
face of the Earth. It is up for debate as to whether such concepts would become descriptivist
concepts or if they would still be natural kind concepts despite the lack of existing referents.
However, in such a case we clearly could not be said to have a priori knowledge of the current
state of our external environment. We should view our knowledge of the status of all of our
concepts in the same way because upon the occurrence of any given thought our knowledge of
the status of the concepts used within it is limited to our last interactions with the referents of
those concepts.
Overcoming McKinsey’s triad of propositions with Sawyer’s theory is a much more
difficult task than using it to explain away the absurdity in the conclusion of Aarnio’s argument
she extracted from McKinsey’s triad:
(1) Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that p.
(2) The proposition that Suzy thinking that p logically implies the proposition
that E.
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Therefore,
(3) Suzy can know a priori that E.
All one must do is let E represent the proposition that Suzy at some time prior to thinking that p
has had the prior causal contact required by semantic externalism to possess the concepts utilized
in that p. A priori knowledge of semantic externalism is enough to allow for that possibility even
without the infallible access to our concepts since we do not have to deal with any proposition
claiming that E isn’t knowable a priori. For the same reason overcoming the triad is also more
difficult than ridding the absurdity of the conclusion in Andre Gallois’s McKinsey* argument:
(1) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that x thinks that x lives in a watery world)
(2) ETC
(3) ETC ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that ETC)
(4) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that ETC)
(5) ETC □ (x) (x thinks x lives in a watery world  x lives in a watery world)
(6) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that (5))
(7) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that □ (y) (y thinks that y lives in a watery world  y lives
in a watery world))
(8) ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that x lives in a watery world)
ETC, as we recall from Chapter 7, refers to externalist theories of content (content
externalism). Gallois’s solution was that our lack of an ability to know a priori whether our
concepts are natural kind or descriptivist is enough for us not to be able to know a priori that we
live in a watery world. While this solves the problem we lose the ability to know that the a priori
knowledge we obtain from our own thoughts actually applies to anything in the external
environment prior to doing empirical investigation. It seems wrong to say that when Oscar has
the thought ‘water is wet’ he can’t know if there actually is any such thing that his water concept
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refers to in the world he inhabits until he encounters it again. I stress the word ‘again’ because
Oscar has obviously encountered water before in one way or another if he has the concept, is
able to use it in a thought, and knows it includes the property of wetness. On the other hand,
Sawyer’s theory just assumes Oscar has had interactions with water before since his possession
of the water concept requires it through semantic externalism. The absurdity of the conclusion in
the McKinsey* argument is removed through her theory by substituting the consequent of the
second conditional in (5), ‘x lives in a watery world’, with ‘x lived in a watery world at some
time prior to the occurrence of x’s thought that x lives in a watery world’. With this substitution
the conclusion (8) would become ◊ (∃x) (x knows a priori that x lived in a watery world at some
time prior to the occurrence of x’s thought that x lives in a watery world). Again there is no need
for infallible access to concepts because (6) essentially states that it’s possible for someone to
know a priori the equivalent of proposition E.
The real challenge for Sawyer’s theory does not lie in the different versions of the
problem presented by McKinsey. Boghossian was the one who brought the real challenge to
compatibilists. He believed that semantic externalism and privileged access had to be compatible
because he truly felt that we do have a special access to our mental states despite the hold that
semantic externalism has on them. Though he also believed that no argument could think of or
had read from others would actually solve the problem. The reason that no argument would
suffice was because in each argument the self-knowledge they entailed had at least one of three
features that a priori self-knowledge could not exhibit. In order to show that Sawyer’s theory has
the potential to be a true solution to the problem it must be tested against these three features to
see whether the self-knowledge it allows for exhibits any of them. According to Boghossian, a
priori self-knowledge cannot be acquired through inference or inner observation. In the same
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regard it also cannot be acquired from or based on nothing. As we have seen so far in Sawyer’s
theory, if the resulting a priori self-knowledge cannot be argued to be the result of inference or
inner observation then it almost certainly could be argued to be based on nothing. However, it is
the way in which Sawyer’s theory works that it disagrees with Boghossian’s whole argument for
why a priori self-knowledge cannot exhibit these features in the first place.
Boghossian’s main argument for why inference cannot be used to acquire self-knowledge
is because it will always result in an infinite regress in one way or another. When discussing
what justifies our a priori knowledge of an occurring mental state, the justification will have to
rest on another mental state since the a priori factor restricts us from using anything outside of
our mind. The mental state on which the justification rests will itself have to be justified by yet
another mental state and so on. A different kind of infinite regress ensues when we do not require
that our knowledge of every mental state involved must itself be justified in order to have
justified knowledge of an occurring mental state. Perhaps all that we need to have justified
knowledge of an occurring mental state is that this knowledge is justified by knowledge of
another mental state. The key here is that the knowledge of this latter mental state does not have
to be justified knowledge as long has the knowledge is sufficient to justify the knowledge of the
occurring mental state. This would appear to solve the problem but this is just an illusion because
the acquisition of the latter knowledge must have gone through the same process when it was an
occurring mental state. So in order to have knowledge of that state we must have knowledge of
yet another state. Instead of an infinite regress of justification we have an infinite regress of
knowledge of particular mental states that must be known before we can have justified
knowledge of an occurring mental state.
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In Sawyer’s theory she describes the process through which we obtain our selfknowledge of our thoughts. She claims that we obtain knowledge of our thoughts through
introspection and through conceptual analysis we obtain knowledge of the fact that semantic
externalism ensures that prior causal contact must have occurred for us to possess the concepts
used in the thought. If we make the jump to knowledge that our concepts must have referents in
the external environment then that knowledge was acquired through inference from the first two
bits of knowledge. The knowledge resulting from introspection is something that will be
discussed when we get to Boghossian’s second section. As for conceptual analysis, it should be
an unproblematic method of obtaining self-knowledge for Boghossian because if you can have a
priori knowledge of semantic externalism then its implications should also be knowable a priori.
On the other hand, the knowledge resulting from inference that we must have had prior causal
contact to possess the concepts in our thoughts does run into problems with Boghossian’s first
section.
At first glance, Sawyer’s theory could be in a bit of a problem because it involves selfknowledge resulting from an inference. The knowledge that we live in a world where referents
exist for the concepts we used in our thought is justified by combining the knowledge of our
occurring mental state with our knowledge of semantic externalism. An infinite regress appears
to unfold because the knowledge of our occurring mental state must be justified by our
knowledge of some prior mental state. Within Sawyer’s theory this latter mental state which does
the justifying would be the mental state that occurred when we had the necessary prior causal
contact with those referents of the concepts used in the occurring mental state. The knowledge of
the latter state would then be justified by knowing that in the past our knowledge of our mental
states has reliably allowed us to come to true judgments about the external world. However, in
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Sawyer’s theory this regress does not actually have to occur because the knowledge that we
possess a given concept is enough to justify the knowledge which results from the inference. Our
ability to think a thought using the concept ensures that we possess the concept and knowledge
of semantic externalism allows us to know that our possession of the concept guarantees that we
acquired it through the required kind of contact with its referents. While knowledge of other
mental states might help provide further justification, this additional justification is not
necessary. Sawyer’s claim that we have infallible access to our concepts is what ensures that we
do not have to worry about whether or not our concept is a natural kind or descriptivist concept.
As long as we can remember the manner in which we acquired the concept we can know whether
we obtained it through causal contact or if we hypothesized about it.
As long as the only inference used in this theory is the inference from knowledge of
externalism to knowledge that prior causal contact is necessary for the possession of a concept
then it does not clash with the direct feature of privileged access. Once this inference is made
then it becomes knowledge that we can use whenever we wish to. If we already have the
knowledge before the occurrence of a thought then we can simply know without the use of any
further inferences that our possession of the concepts used in the thought requires that we had
prior causal contact with certain objects in the external environment.
If someone were to object to this argument by claiming that more inferences must occur
in between the occurrence of a thought and obtaining a priori knowledge of its content then it
would present a problem for how the theory accounts for the directness feature. The first point to
be made is that the inference described above only pertains to how we acquire a priori
knowledge of the status of our concepts used in our thoughts. If an inference is necessary in
order to simply know the content of our thoughts then this would be a problem but there does not
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appear to be any such inferences made for the acquisition of that knowledge. Inferences would
be required to obtain both the a priori knowledge of the status of our concepts as well as the
conclusions of instance arguments but the simple observation that leads to the a priori knowledge
of the content of a thought does not use any inferences whatsoever. Any objection by this route
would need to show that inferences must have occurred in order to acquire the a priori
knowledge of the content of a thought but at this point in time I have neither seen nor could I
imagine any such arguments.
In Boghossian’s second section he argues that self-knowledge cannot be the result of
inner observation. According to Boghossian, the inspection of an object can at most provide us
with knowledge of its intrinsic properties. Things like extrinsic or relational properties can only
be discovered through empirical investigation. He maintains that in order to us to be able to say
we know an object we must be able to distinguish that object from other objects which could be
considered relevant alternatives. In the same regard, the introspection of our own thoughts can at
most provide us with knowledge of the intrinsic properties of our thought’s as well as the
concepts within them but the ability to distinguish those concepts from other concepts which
could be considered ‘counterfeits’ requires that we have knowledge of the thought’s and/or
concept’s extrinsic or relational properties. Therefore he concludes that introspection, or inner
observation, cannot be the process through which we acquire self-knowledge of our mental
states.
In Sawyer’s theory, the knowledge we obtain of our occurring mental states is acquired
through introspection. Boghossian would argue that we cannot distinguish this mental state from
other mental states which contain at least one different ‘counterfeit’ concept. However, Sawyer’s
notion that we have infallible access to our concepts does allow us a way around this problem.
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Since we can remember the event in our life when we acquired the concept used in the thought
we can know exactly what concept it is. Although it as not as easy to explain away the problem
presented in Boghossian’s Twin Earth thought experiment where the subject is transported back
and forth between Earth and Twin Earth without their knowledge. Here our subject knows that
they have had prior causal contact with the substance they call water but they are unaware of the
fact that they’ve actually come in to contact with two distinct substances called water. All of the
technology available to the subject is insufficient for discovering the difference between the
substances.
In this scenario our subject cannot distinguish whether their thought about water was
actually about water or ‘twater’. Sawyer does not address this thought experiment but I believe
that her theory can still account for it. The subject can know that they have had prior causal
contact since they know they possess the water concept but they just don’t know that they’ve
been in prior causal contact with two distinct substances. So instead of the subject possessing
two distinct concepts that they can’t differentiate from each other they actually just have two
distinct substances labeled under one concept since to the subject both substances have identical
properties. It makes no sense to claim that the subject’s unconscious mind can identify the
difference between the substances and classify them under two distinct water concepts when the
subject consciously has no ability to do so. The most likely situation is that both substances with
fall under the same concept until the subject is able to discover the difference between them and
once discovered they will create a new concept so the two substances can be properly classified.
So in this thought experiment, it is true that the subject cannot tell the difference between their
water and ‘twater’ thoughts. However, for Sawyer’s theory there aren’t actually going to be
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distinct water and ‘twater’ thoughts because both substances have identical properties to the
subject so they both fall under one water concept.
Essentially Sawyer’s theory would address Boghossian’s problem with inner observation
by claiming that if a subject observes a difference in properties between two substances then they
will be able to classify them under distinct concepts and they will be able to distinguish between
thoughts using both concepts. This is because the information that pertains to the differences
between them will be included in the concept and the subject has infallible access to this
information when their mental state using either concept occurs. However, if a subject is not able
to observe any difference between the properties of two distinct substances then they will
naturally classify them under the same concept. Properties are what we use to differentiate one
natural kind from another so if a subject observes exactly the same properties in two substances
they have no reason to think that the two substance do not fall into the same category.
One objection to this argument is that it doesn’t address Boghossian’s argument that
inner observation at most yields knowledge of intrinsic properties and it is instead the extrinsic
or relational properties that determine the content of a thought. This only matters when we were
assuming the only information available to our inner observation must be obtained outside of
experience. In Sawyer’s theory all of our interactions with a substance in experience are stored as
information in our concept of that substance and this information is available to us when we use
inner observation to acquire the knowledge of the content of our thoughts. While inner
observation alone isn’t enough to yield knowledge of extrinsic properties, when you combine it
with infallible access to the information stored in our concepts then it can actually allow for
knowledge of extrinsic properties. As long as there are methods to obtain knowledge of extrinsic
properties then we can use those methods in experience, store the information in the concepts,
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and retrieve the information when using inner observation on our thoughts. So in Sawyer’s
theory she actually agrees with Boghossian that observation alone can only yield knowledge of
the intrinsic properties but this misses the idea that empirical investigation can give us
knowledge of extrinsic properties which can be stored and retrieved later through inner
observation.
In Boghossian’s last section he argues that self-knowledge cannot be based on nothing; or
in other words it must be considered a cognitive achievement to be considered knowledge. The
main reason for the inclusion of this section is because Boghossian could not imagine what else
could justify self-knowledge other than inference or inner observation so the last option to
consider is self-knowledge based on nothing. In the previous paragraphs I argued that selfknowledge in Sawyer’s theory is a result from inference and inner observation but it does not
create the same problems that Boghossian thought they did. Since this self-knowledge is a result
from inference and inner observation it will necessarily be classified as a cognitive achievement.
In this section Boghossian argues that self-knowledge which doesn’t result from inference or
inner observation is still a cognitive achievement because it doesn’t exhibit three characteristics
that self-knowledge which is not a cognitive achievement would exhibit. As long as it is a
cognitive achievement it cannot be based on nothing but this does not present a problem for
Sawyer’s theory because having self-knowledge not be considered a cognitive achievement is
sort of a last resort for compatibilists. Most philosophers would not consider knowledge which is
based on nothing to be knowledge in the first place because it does not actually apply to
anything. So the fact that Sawyer’s theory does not address this section is actually a good thing
because it shows that the self-knowledge that it yields is considered a cognitive achievement and
is applicable.
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It is very well possible that sometime in the future there will be more incompatibilist
arguments developed that compatibilist theories must address before they can be truly considered
a potential solution. At that point in time Sawyer’s theory could be once again called into
question. However, at this point in time the McKinsey argument and Boghossian’s arguments are
the strongest incompatibilist arguments available and Sawyer’s theory is able to address them
both. So far it is the only theory which can account for the potential problems created from
combining content externalism and privileged access while also maintaining consistency with
our intuitions about both. It feels safe to say that until new incompatibilist arguments are
developed, Sawyer’s theory is the best fallback for compatibilists to justify how they can know
the content of their thoughts while living in this world ruled by externalism.
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